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Iowa Law Review 
VOLUME 58 JUNE 1973 NUMBER 5 
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE 
IOWA CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCESS 
Kermit L. Dunahoo* 
Trial judges must constantly make decisions with no fixed rules to 
guide them. This absence of structure is unavoidable-it would be a 
Herculean task, and a pyrrhic victory at best, to attempt to establish 
formal rules of procedure to cover every possible situation that can 
occur in the many stages of the criminal trial process. As one com-
mentator has observed: 
Situations inevitably arise wherein two possible lines of action offer them-
selves to the judge; decision is to be made between two principles of 
law; or some of the few conditions present themselves wherein there is 
no governing rule. Under such circumstances, since the court is bound 
to act. he must use his judgment as to what is best under the particular 
conditions for arriving at justice, and therein he exercises the power of 
decision termed "judicial discretion."l 
The purpose of this Article is to explore in depth what is meant by 
judicial discretion and to pinpoint some of its parameters. This is ex-
plored in a detailed analysis of how the concept of judicial discretion 
has been used, and sometimes abused, in the Iowa criminal trial pro-
cess. 
I. Tm: NATURE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
As suggested, the exercise of discretion by the trial court is an es-
sential foundation stone of the criminal trial process. Even though it 
is a crucial element of this process, it is clear that the power to act in 
a discretionary manner does not give the trial court the license to take 
*Assistant Attorney General, Area Prosecutor's Division, Iowa Department of 
Justice, Member, Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee, B.S., 1963, M.S. 
1968, Iowa State University; J.D. 1971, Drake University. Effective September, 
1973, Mr. Dunahoo will be an assistant professor of law at the college of William 
and Mary. 
Nothing herein is to be construed as an official opinion or expression of policy 
of the Attorney General of Iowa. 
1 R. BoWERs, Tm: JUDICIAL DISCRm'ION OF TRIAL CoURTS § 6, at 11-12 (1931). 
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arbitrary, off-handed actions in the name of orderly administration of 
justice. Rather, the power to exercise discretion 
must be utilized fairly and impartially, not arbitrarily, by application of 
relevant, legal and equitable principles to all !mown or readily available 
facts of a given issue or ·~ause to the end that justice may more nearly 
be effectuated.2 
Thus, judicial discretion can never mean "the arbitrary will of the 
judge •... It is a legal discretion, founded upon conditions which call 
for judicial action, as distinguished from mere individual or personal 
view or desire.''3 Accordingly, discretion "imports the exercise of 
judgment, wisdom, and skill, as contradistinguished from unthinking 
folly, heady violence, and rash injustice."4 
Once this discretion has been exercised, it is subject to appellate re-
view, but only to the limited extent of determining whether it has 
been abused. However, 1he decisions of the trial court are cloaked 
with "a strong presumption in [their] favor,''5 and "[u]ntil the con-
trary appears, the presumption is that the discretion of the district 
court was rightfully exercised."6 Indeed, 
[a]ll reasonable presumptions are in favor of regularity, and against error; . 
and if there is any reasonable hypothesis upon which the ruling can be 
upheld, it must be adopted.7 
Moreover, to overcome this presumption of regulatity requires an af-
firmative showing of abuse and the burden of so showing rests upon 
the party complaining. 8 • 
This burden is heavy, indeed, for it can only be sustained by show-
ing abuse and prejudice. In the words of a leading treatise on discre-
tion: 
to warrant an appellate court in setting aside a ruling of the trial court 
made in the exercise of a conceded discretion. . . . The action complained 
of must have been unreasonable in the light of attendant circumstances-
the discretion must have been exercised for reasons clearly untenable or 
to an extent clearly unreasonable [and] the action must have resulted 
prejudicially to the rights of the party complaining. Without a union of 
these conditions, the ruling will stand; and, they concurring, it is seldom 
that a reversal is refused.o 
2 State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2i 748, 751 (Iowa 1973). 
a Arthaud v. Griffin, 205 Iowa 141, 144, 217 N.W. 809, 811 (1928), citing In re 
Superintendent of Banks, 207 N.Y. 11, 100 N.E. 428 (1912); accord, State v. District 
Court, 213 Iowa 822, 830, 238 N.W. 290, 294 (1931). 
4 See generally Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. 179, 225, 154 A2d 57, 
82 (1959). 
6 Murray v. Buell, 74 Wis. U:, 18, 41 N.W. 1010, 1011 (1889). 
a R. BowERs, Tm: JUDICIAL DI3CRETION OF TnrAL CoURTS § 18, at 34 (1931) ; ac-
cord, State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 110 111 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1961). ''We pre-
sume the regularity of actions of officials or courts unless the contrary is made 
to appear." Id. 
7 Breed v. Ketchum, 51 Wis. 164, 169, 7 N.W. 550, 552-52 (1880). 
BR. BoWERs, Tm: JUDICIAL DIECRETION oF TRIAL CoURTS § 18, at 33 (1931). 
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The heavy burden borne by a party seeking review of the exercise 
of discretion is further weighted by the fact that appellate courts tend 
to apply the stringent "reasonable man" standard of review. Discre-
tion accordingly has been abused. 
only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial 
court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action 
taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused 
its discretion.:w 
This means that, in the absence of injustice, an appellate court will not 
substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Within this analyt-
ical framework, the following sections of the Article will examine the 
actual exercise of discretion in the criminal trial process, beginning 
with the pretrial stage, the first stage of the process in which the trial 
judge has an opportunity to exercise discretion in any substantial man-
ner. 
n. JunrciAL DIScRETioN m THE PRETRIAL PRocEss 
There are numerous situations which call for the exercise of judicial 
discretion prior to the actual commencement of trial. During the pre-
trial process the court may be called upon to rule on questions of such 
disparate nature as whether to appoint counsel for an allegedly indig-
ent defendant, whether to sever the trials of jointly indicted defend-
ants, or whether to accept or reject a proffered plea of guilty. In this 
section, we will discuss the most significant matters that may be raised 
by the parties or by the court on its own motion. Obviously, all of 
these questions will not arise in every trial, nor will they necessarily 
occur in the order in which they are discussed. 
A. Legal Assistance for Indigents 
One problem with which the trial court must be prepared to deal 
before trial is that of determining whether to appoint counsel for a 
defendant who claims to be unable to afford legal assistance. In making 
the determination of whether an individuai case is a proper one for the 
appointment of publicly paid counsel, the trial court must resolve 
three issues: (1) whether the specific crime charged is of the type 
requiring appointment of counsel; (2) whether an indigent defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appointive counsel; 
and (3) whether the defendant in fact qualifies as an indigent. 
The Iowa Code affords the right of appointive counsel to indigents 
charged with felonies11 or indictable misdemeanors.12 However, it is 
9 Id. § 13, at 25. 
1 0Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942). 
11 See IowA CoDE §§ 775.4-.5 (1973). 
12 See Wright v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Iowa 1970), interpreting Iowa 
CODE §§ 775.1, .2, .4, .8 (1973). 
1026 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
silent about simple misdemeanors, and, in Wright v. Denator the Iowa 
Supreme Court expressly refused to comment on whether indigents 
so charged are entitled to appointive counseJ.l~ 
In light of Argersinger v. Hamlin/5 however, it appears unlikely 
that the Iowa SupremE~ Court will extend the right to counsel to 
simple misdemeanor charges. fu Argersinger, the United States Su-
preme Court, rather than extending the sixth amendment right to 
counsel to all state offenses/6 held that a trial court's refusal to appoint 
counsel for an indigent defendant merely precludes subsequent sen-
tencing of that person to imprisonment. The Court said: 
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no per-
son may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trialP 
The Court continued: 
Under the rule we annotmce today, every judge will know when the trial 
of a misdemeanor start~; that no imprisonment may be imposed, even 
though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel 
He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and 
therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before 
the trial: starts.1s 
The import of Argersinger is that the trial court is not required to 
appoint counsel on simple misdemeanors, but the court's refusal to 
do so, albeit a refusal properly within its discretion, has the effect of 
sharply curtailing the court's normally broad sentencing discretion. 
In other words, even though practically all simple misdemeanors are 
punishable by either a :fine or imprisonment, a judge who chooses not 
to appoint counsel may only impose a fine i£ the defendant is subse-
quently convicted. 
If the crime charged re!quires the court to appoint counsel, or if the 
court so chooses, the cow:-t must determine whether the defendant has 
waived his right to counsel. Simple waiver, however, is not all that 
must be established, for it would appear to be an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to fail to appoint counsel even though the indigent 
13178 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 19'10). 
Hid. at 342. 
15 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
10 C/. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (sixth amendment 
right to counsel on felony charges extended to states). 
In [Gideon], the Court w1animously announced a clear and simple con-
stitutional rule: In the absence of waiver, a felony conviction is invalid 
if it was obtained in a court that denied the defendant the help of a 
lawyer. Loper v. Beto, 4:>5 U.S. 473, 481 (1972). 
17 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
1S[d. at 40. 
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defendant waived his right, if the record indicated that the defendant 
did not do so knowingly and intelligently.19 
Assuming that counsel is required and that there has been no know-
ing and intelligent waiver, it remains for the court to determine 
whether the defendant is indigent.20 However, except for the vague 
directive to appoint counsel for a defendant who "is unable to employ 
any,"21 the Code provides neither a specific definition of indigency nor 
general criteria for the trial court to consider in reaching its own 
determination. The supreme court has not set forth any definitive 
guidelines in this regard. Instead, it has confined its opinion to enum-
eration of some of the factors that should be considered in making the 
determination, as well as some that should not. 
Thus, in Bolds v. Bennett/2 for example, the supreme court listed 
some of the factors that a trial court can properly consider in making 
its determination of indigency. These include: 
(1) real or personal property owned; (2) employment benefits; (3) pen-
sions, annuities, social security and unemployment compensation; (4) in-
heritances; (5) number of dependants; (6) outstanding debts; (7) serious-
ness of the charge; and (8) any other valuable resources not previously 
mentioned.23 
On the other hand, the supreme court has ruled that the availability 
of the resources of the defendant's relatives is an improper consider-
ation,24 as is the fact that the defendant has posted bail.25 
Once counsel has been appointed for an indigent, a related matter 
must sometimes be considered. The Code provides that a court-
appointed attorney "shall be entitled to a reasonable compensation ... 
including such sum or sums as the court may determine are necessary 
for investigation in the interests of justice .•.• "26 The supreme court 
has interpreted this section as lodging 
19 For further discussion of the indigent defendant, see text accompanying notes 
718-19 infra. 
20 There is a legislative standard for determining eligibility of a defendant to 
make use of the public defender system: inability to employ private counsel 
"without prejudicing his financial ability to provide economic necessities for him-
self or his family." See IowA CoDE § 336A.4 (1973). 
Although this standard is mentioned in the Iowa Code only with respect 
to public defenders, one may reasonably argue that it was the intent of 
the legislature to have this standard applied in the case of appointed 
counsel as well. Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 IowA L. REv. 598, 681 (1972). 
21 IowA CoDE § 775.4 (1973). 
22159 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1968). 
23 Id. at 428. 
2~ State v. Wright, 111 Iowa 621, 624, 82 N.W. 1013, 1013-14 (1900). 
25 State v. Van Gorder, 192 Iowa 353, 354-55, 184 N.W. 638, 639 (1921). 
26 IowA CoDE § 775.5 (1973). A common sense interpretation of this statute 
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limited discretionary power in the trial court to disburse reasonable com-
pensation to an attorney defending an indigent for the purpose of con-
ducting an investigation in the interests of justice.27 
This discretion should be exercised in such a way that the court-
appointed attorney is not required to incur personal expenses "in 
preparing and conducting a meaningful and conscientious defense for 
the accused," while also protecting against frivolous, unwarranted 
claims "by restricting payment to those investigations which in the 
court's judgment are nec:essary in the interests of justice."28 
State v. Hancock29 is a case where the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in this regard. In this forgery case, the court denied the de-
f~ndant's application for public funds to obtain an independent anal-
ysis of her handwriting for comparison purposes, after the state had 
given notice that it intended to use expert witness testimony concern-
ing the defendant's handwriting exemplar.30 Reversing the subse-
quent conviction, the supreme court was 
convinced the refusal to provide funds for an independent analysis of 
defendant's handwriting was not in the best interests of Justice, particu-
larly in view of the fact the State had given notice it intended to call an 
expert .••. 31 
This seems to indicate that mutuality of opportunity for expert wit-
ness' services is a definite factor in deciding whether the defendant 
should be entitled to such funds. However, these public funds do not 
appear to be limited to services used in offsetting the state's theory of 
the case and instead might be available, as a matter of right under cer-
tain circumstances, to enable the defendant to effectively develop any 
affirmative defense. 32 This broader approach was given at least some 
impetus by the fact that, in Hancock, the court premised its decision 
upon "the interests of justice" rather than on mutuality per se, and 
the court stated: 
In denying her request the court effectively prevented defendant from 
would, of course, render these public services available also to an indigent de-
fendant who is permitted to proceed pro se. 
27 State v. Hancock, 164 N.ViT.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1969). 
28 I d. 
20 Id. 
30Jd. 
31 I d. at 333. 
3 2 For a listing of a number of cases in which various appellate courts have 
upheld, as a matter resting in the trial court's discretion, the appointment of 
investigators or experts to aid in the preparation of an indigent's defense not-
withstanding the absence of specific statutory authority see Anot., 34 AL.R. 3d 
1256, 1269-72 (1970). But see Hardt v. State, 490 P.2d 752, 756 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971) (trial court cannot appoint investigator and expert in the absence of 
specific legislative authority to do so). 
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even the possibility of obtaining evidence which may have been highly 
relevant and material to a meaningful defense.ss 
B. Pretrial Release 
Another problem which trial courts must face in nearly every case 
is that of initially determining whether to allow a particular defendant 
to be released prior to trial, and, i£ so, under what terms and condi-
tions. Bail is ordinarily set twice during the pretrial process, :P.rst at 
preliminary arraignment34 upon the informal charge and again at the 
arraignment35 after the defendant has been formally charged. Con-
siderable judicial discretion is involved in determining whether and in 
what amount a surety bond will be required or whether the defend-
ant will be released on his own recognizance or on unsecured bail, but 
the courts apparently have no discretion to refuse to set bail on bail-
able offenses.36 This is because both the Iowa constitution37 and the 
Iowa Code38 render all defendants "bailable," except when charged 
with certain crimes. It is arguable that all defendants are bailable, 
however, because the Iowa constitution affords a right to bail on all 
noncapital offenses and there no longer are any capital offenses in 
Iowa. Therefore, the statutory prohibition of bail in cases of first-de-
gree murder and kidnapping for ransom is arguably unconstitutional. 
Although the Iowa Supreme Court has never faced this question, the 
majority of other appellate courts that have rul~d under similar cir-
cumstances have held that bail is a matter of right on all charges.39 
33164 N.W.2d at 333, see also State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973). 
34!owA Code§ 761.5 (1973). 
ss Id. §§ 763 et seq. 
36 But see Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, --, 296 A.2d 829, 835 
(1972): 
We do not intend by this opinion that pretrial bail may not be denied 
regardless of the circumstances. As noted before, the right to release 
before trial is conditioned upon the accused giving adequate assurance 
he or she will appear for trial. If upon proof shown, the court reason-
ably concludes the accused will not appear for trial regardless of the 
character or the amount of the bail, then in such an instance bail may 
properly be denied, regardless of the nature of the charges. The burden 
of proof is upon the Commonwealth. This decision must be reached 
by the application of certain criteria, such as: (1) general reputation in 
the community; (2) past conduct while on bail; (3) ties to the community 
in the form of a job, family, or wealth . . . . However, the trial court 
must also consider that modern police methods, such as exchange of 
photographs and fingerprints, act as deterrent to flight. Id. 
37 IowA CoNST. art. 1, § 12. 
38 IowA CoDE § 763.1 (1973). 
39 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, --, 296 A.2d 829, 832 
(1972); State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 358-59, 294 A.2d 245, 249 (1972); Taglianetti 
v. Fontaine, 105 RJ. 596, 600, 253 A.2d 609, 611 (1969); State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 
429, 435, 92 N.W.2d 205, 209 (1958); In re Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 537-38, 188 P. 424, 
425 (1920); contra, People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
1030 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol 58 
In setting the terms of pretrial release of "bailable" defendants, the 
Code mandates either release on personal recognizance or upon unse-
cured appearance bond "unless the magistrate determines, in the exer-
cise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the 
appearance of the defendant as required."40 Once the magistrate has 
made such a determination, he "shall" then impose the least severe of 
the statutorily enumerated conditions of release "which will reason-
ably assure the appear~mce of the person for trial . . •. "41 
Because the decision to allow pretrial release demands first that the 
court determine whether to require the defendant to post a bond, and, 
if so that the court set the amount thereof, many appeals present as-
signments of error in the alternative, asserting that there was an abuse 
of discretion in not affording pretrial release merely on personal recog-
nizance or, alternatively, that the amount. of the cash or surety bail 
bond was set excessively high under the circumstances. The supreme 
court takes the position that " [ d] etermination of the conditions for 
the release of one charged with a public offense is directed to the 
magistrate's discretion," and accordingly "[i]f such order is supported 
by the record we must affirm."42 Because the sole statutory criterion 
in setting the specific terms of pretrial release is to impose the least 
severe condition which will "reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person for trial ... ,"43 the question of the defendant's credibility can 
be a crucial factor. Accordingly, noting that the statute clearly im-
plies that the district court has discretion in allowing release on per-
sonal recognizance, the supreme court has pointed out that at least the 
152, 171 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 899 n.45 (1972); People e:c Tel. Dunbar v. District 
Court, -- Colo. -, 502 P.2d 420, 421-22 (1972). 
~o IowA CODE § 763.17 (1) (1973). 
41ld. The conditions of release are: 
a. Place the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organi-
zation agreeing to supervise him; 
b. Place restrictions on the travel, association or place of abode of the 
defendant during the period of release; 
c. Require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount 
and the deposit with the clerk of the court in cash or other qualified 
security of a sum not to exceed ten percent of the amount of the bond, 
such deposit to be returned to the defendant upon the performance of 
the appearances as required in section 766.1; 
d. Require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient surety, or the 
deposit of cash in lieu thereof, provided that. except as provided in sec-
tion 763.2, bail initially given shall remain valid until final disposition 
of the offense. If the amount of bail is deemed insufficient by the court 
before whom the offense is pending, the court may order an increase 
thereof and the defend~t must provide the additional undertaking, writ-
ten or cash, to secure his release. 
e. Impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure 
appearances as required, including a condition requiring that the defen-
dant return to custody after specified hours. l<l. 
42 State v. Fenton, 170 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa 1S69). 
43 IOWA CODE § 763.17 (1) (1973). 
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trial court has "the benefit . • . of seeing and hearing this defendant 
which we do not have."« 
Considerable discretion is generally recognized in setting the amount 
of bail on a particular charge, especially when the defendant has a 
previous record or other charges pending against him. Typical of the 
supreme court's attitude is the case of State v. Mussman,45 where thQ 
court said: 
Admittedly the amount of the bail which was ordered is large, but in view 
of the defendant's past misconduct and the pendency of two rape charges 
against him now, we conclude the order appealed from is supported by 
the proceedings in the district court.4S 
Nevertheless, the supreme court has held that excessive bail cannot bQ 
used as a means of keeping a "dangerous" defendant incarcerated be-
fore trial.47 Thus, in State v. Cummings/8 the court noted that "the 
[trial] court's reluctance to allow defendant his liberty pending trial 
is readily understandable but illegal."49 In that case the supreme 
court further acknowledged that it did "not have before it the psychi-
atric reports available to the trial court" but felt that if incarceration 
were required on psychiatric grounds, "the legal provisions for such 
incarceration must be followed."50 Accordingly, the supreme court 
felt constrained to order that "[o]n the record before us any bail re-
quirement in excess of $50,000 would be excessive, and thus ordered 
reduction of the $200,000 bail."51 
C. Discovery 
One of the primary reasons for allowing a defendant to be released 
on bail 18 to enable him to more effectively prepare his defense.52 
HState v. Arbuckle, 162 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa 1968). 
45178 N.W .2d 319 (Iowa 1970). 
46 Id. at 320. 
47 State v. Cummings, No. 55294 (Iowa, Jan. 3, 1972); accord, Commonwealth 
v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829, 836-37 (1972): 
The Commonwealth also urges us to rule that bail may be denied to 
protect the community from further criminal activity on the part of the 
accused, or in order to safeguard the well-being of witnesses in the 
case . . . . The traditional decision to deny bail was not a means of 
keeping an accused confined to protect the public, it was a means of 
assuring he would appear at trial. . . . Thus, anticipated criminal acti-
vity alone cannot stand as a grounds for the denial of bail. This, how-
ever, is not to say it cannot be considered in setting the amount of bail 
in conjunction with the aforementioned elements in determining if the 
accused will flee. Moreover, it may be considered by the trial judge in 
setting the terms of bail, but as the sole ground for the absolute denial 
of bail it is invalid. Id. · 




52 See ABA PRoJECT ON Mnm.roM SrANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, SrANDARDS 
RELATING TO Pro:nuAL RELEASE 3 (Approved Draft 1968). 
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Even the most liberal pretrial release provisions may not ensure that 
an adequate defense is afforded without at least a rudimentary oppor-
tunity to make discovery. Except for a few scattered provisions re-
quiring disclosure of SJ>ecified basic items,53 however, Iowa has no 
statute either requiring, pennitting, or prohibiting general discovery 
by defendants in criminal cases. This means that there is no such 
thing as a discovery deposition in Iowa criminallaw.54 However, the 
Iowa Supreme Court, Jike most state appellate courts,55 has recog-
nized that the trial courts have the inherent power-indeed, in some 
instances, the duty-to order that certain evidence in the state's pos-
session be disclosed before trial in order to assure the defendant a 
fair triaP6 The court emphasized in · State v. Eads that the trial 
courts are to exercise sound judicial discretion in compelling disclo-
sure of evidence "when necessary in the interests of justice."57 Upon 
appellate review alleging an abuse of the court's discretion, "the ulti-
mate test against which our decision must be measured is that of a 
fair trial. Defendant is entitled to no mO'te, and he must have no 
less."58 Accordingly, th·~ trial court can abuse its discretion by order-
ing too much disclosure since "it is not only the defendant who is en-
titled to a fair trial. Society, too, represented by the prosecution, has 
an equal right to one."5') 
With these double-edged guidelines in mind, the supreme court has, 
on a case-by-case basis, determined what must be disclosed, what can-
not be disclosed, and what may, in the trial court's discretion, be or-
dered to be disclosed. ~rhe procedural vehicle triggering a disclosure 
inquiry is the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars.60 This stat-
utory motion may be made when the indictment, together with the 
attached minutes of evidence, "fails to inform the defendant of the 
particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his de-
fense, or to give him such information as he is entitled to under the 
Constitution of this state~ .... "61 However, the trial court may order 
the disclosure on its own motion, but the supreme court hfts held that 
failure to do so may not constitute an abuse of discretion. 62 
53 IoWA CoDE §§ 769.13, 77.2.4 (1973). (minutes of testimony the state expects 
to rely upon at trial); IowA CODE § 749A.4 (1973) (report of state criminalistics 
laboratory); IowA CoDE § 7'{5.8 (1973) (copy of indictment or information). 
54 State v. District Court, ~~3 Iowa 903, 910-12, 114 N.W.2d 317, 321-22 (1962). 
55 See Annat., 7 AL.R.3d 8, 36-43 (1966). 
5a State v. Eads, 166 N.W ~:d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969). 
57 Id. 
ss I d. at 771 (emphasis added). 
5o Id. 
6o See IowA CoDE §§ 773.6, .7 (1973). 
61 Id. § 773.6. 
a2 State v. Berenger, 161 U.W .2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1968). 
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The following have expressly been held by the Iowa Supreme Court 
to be discoverable by the defendant as a matter of right, thus leaving 
no discretion in the trial court to refuse to order their disclosure: (1) 
an autopsy report, 63 (2) contents of documents the state intends to use 
against the defendant,64 (3) any physical evidence the state intends to 
use against the defendant,65 and (4) exculpatory evidence.66 The fol-
lowing, while possibly not discoverable as a matter of right, can prop-
erly be ordered, in the trial court's sound discretion, to be disclosed: 
FBI laboratory reports,67 photographs,68 copies of statements of the 
state's witnesses,S9 and the names of any informants relied upon by the 
state.70 On the other hand, the trial court cannot order pretrial dis-
closure of police investigation reports,11 the names of investigating 
officers,T2 or any notes, memoranda, or correspondence constituting 
63 State v. Eads, 166 N.W .2d 766, 772 (Iowa 1969): 
Fundamental fairness requires the State to produce the report so that 
defendant may prepare to meet its findings in an orderly and effectual 
fashion. 
6~ The defendant "is also entitled to know the contents of documents the state 
intends to use against him." State v. White, 260 Iowa 1000. 1005, 151 N.W.2d 552, 
555 (1967). 
65 "[N]o reasonable rule justifies denial of an opportunity for defendant to 
examine the physical: evidence the State expects to use against him." State v. 
Eads, 166 N.W .2d 766, 771 (Iowa 1969). 
66 Cf. State v. Niccum, 190 N.W .2d 815, 826 (Iowa 1971). However, the de-
fendant's request therefore was "too broad and general to be Sustained." Id. 
sr State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 773 (Iowa 1969): ''We hold the trial court's 
order to produce these reports was a proper exercise of its discretion to assure 
defendant a fair trial." Id. 
68 See, e.g., State v. Niccum, 190 N.W .2d 815, 820 (Iowa 1971); State v. Galloway, 
167 N.W.2d 89, 90 (Iowa 1969); State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Iowa 1969). 
69 State v. Eads, 166 N.W .2d 766, 774 (Iowa 1969): 
We hold the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the State to 
deliver copies of the statements of all witnesses expected to testify at 
defendant's trial. 
We do not foreclose the possibility that a defendant may be entitled to 
a particular statement upon showing it is necessary to his proper defense. 
70 State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Iowa 1972); State v. Denato, 173 N.W .2d 
576, 578-79 (Iowa 1970) (disclosure was not ordered in these cases, however). 
71 State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 774 (Iowa 1969): 
We hold the [trial: court's] order requiring the State to produce copies of 
police reports was an abuse of discretion . . . thereby depriving the State 
of a fair trial. 
But see State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608, 613-14 (Iowa 1969) (in camera in-
spection by the judge after the officer testifies on direct with possible limited 
turnover to the defendant for purposes of cross examination). 
7 2 "[P]retrial discovery may be had in Iowa only for the production of specific 
documents which are shown to be in existence." State v. Redding, 169 N.W .2d 
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the prosecutor's "work p:mduct."73 
D. C<•mpetency to Stand Trial 
Regardless of anything else that occurs during pretrial proceedings 
the trial court must be sensitive to the possibility that the defendant 
may not be competent to stand trial The Code provides that when-
ever a defendant appears :in any stage of a criminal trial and "a reason-
able doubt arises as to his sanity," the proceedings must be suspended 
and a jury trial had upon the question of his competency to stand 
trial,7~ Quite unsurprisingly, although a defendant's failure to raise 
the question of his own competency may be a factor to be considered 
on review of a trial court's failure to consider the competency of that 
defendant/6 the statute has been construed as imposing a mandatory 
duty on the court "to act on its own motion if a doubt of defendant's 
present insanity arises."76 To aid the trial courts in. determining com-
788, 790 (Iowa 1969), citing State v. Kelly, 249 Iowa 1219, 1220-22, 91 N.W.2d. 562, 
563-64 (1958). 
73 See State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d. 766 (Iowa 1969) where the court, in reference 
to defendant's demands for pretrial discovery of statements made to police by 
persons expected to be called as state witnesses at trial, stated: 
• • • whether condemned. as "mere fishing expeditions," "attempts to 
rifle the prosecutor's ille," or "requests for the State's work product," 
the overwhelming weight of authority is against such disclosure. Id. 
at 774. 
To the same effect is People v. Powell, 49 Misc. 2d. 624, 626, 268 N.Y.S.2d 380, 
383 (Sup. Ct. 1965) : 
With respect to the Pollet~ or District Attorney's notes, stenographic or 
otherwise, of all such stau!ments ••• the Court is of the belief that such 
subject matter would not be a proper subject for discovery and inspec-
tion ••.• Id. 
This rule is more explicitly stated by the ABA project committee on criminal 
justice standards: 
Disclosure shall not be r-equired of legal research or of records, cor-
respondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain the 
opinions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members 
of his legal staff. ABA PROJECT ON Mnmlnrr.r STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Jus-
:riCE, STANDARDS REr.A:riNG TO DiscoVERY AND PRoCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 
2.6(a) (approved Draft 1970). 
See also State v. Allison, 206 N.W.2d. 893 (Iowa 1973) (expert witness' books not 
discoverable). 
74 IowA CoDE § 783.1 (1973). 
76 State v. Stoddard, 180 N.V1.2d 448, 450 (Iowa 1970). 
1a ld. at 449; see Hickey v. District Court, 174 N.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Iowa 1970). 
77 The supreme court gives great weight t0 the trial court's decision in this 
regard, noting in Stoddard thai; the facts 
should clearly suggest a <l!.Uestion of defendant's mental capacity before 
we reverse the trial court for failing to determine whether a reasonable 
doubt exists on his own motion. 180 N.W.2d at 452. 
This is generally because the trial court has the advantage of observing the 
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petency,77 the supreme court has formulated this three-part standard: 
"defendant's mental capacity to appreciate the charge against him, 
understand the proceedings, and conduct his defense."78 
Once a defendant's competency is questioned, the court abuses its 
discretion in proceeding without first ordering a jury's determination 
of whether there is a reasonable doubt about the defendant's compe-
tency to stand trial. Indeed, before accepti."lg a guilty plea, the court 
must be possessed of "sufficient and satisfactory evidence" of the ac-
cused's mental capacity.79 For example, the trial court in Hickey v. 
District Courfl0 abused its discretion m accepting the defendant's 
guilty plea without first ordering further inquiry into his sanity, even 
though the defendant raised the issue for the first time on appeal. 
The court-ordered presentence investigation report detailed Hickey's 
past commitment to a mental hospital but did not indicate a discharge 
therefrom. The supreme court held that there should have been a 
direct evaluation of defendant's present state of mental health "before 
the court could resolve the question of reasonable doubt as to de-
fendant's mental capacity to enter a plea of guilty."81 
When the trial court improperly proceeds with the trial rather than 
commencing a separate proceeding to determine whether there is a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency, it is, in effect, 
acting without jurisdiction over the defendant. 82 However, if the 
defendant seeks to appeal the trial court's action, he must contend 
with a presumption that the court retains jurisdiction, which pre-
sumption will only be rebutted if the defendant can show by a clear 
preponderence of the evidence that the court abused its discretion by 
acting illegally in proceeding further with the case. 83 The conse-
quences of a defendant's inability to sustain this burden are illustrated 
in State v. Milford.84 In that case, after the state rested, the defense 
defendant first hand. See State v. McCollom, 260 Iowa 977, 987, 151 N.W .2d 519, 
525 (1967). 
7SState v. McCollom, 260 Iowa 977, 987, 151 N.W.2d 519, 524 (1967). This test, 
o£ course, relates only to a defendant's sanity at time of trial and not his sanity 
at the time o£ the crime. State v. Hamilton, 247 Iowa 768, 774, 76 N.W.2d 184, 
187 (1956). 
A reading of the court's ruling on the motion gives the impression that 
in so ruling, it was passing upon the ultimate fact of insanity rather than 
upon the existence of facts insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt there-
of. Id. 
79Hickey v. District Court, 174 N.W.2d 406, 412 (Iowa 1970). 
so Id. See also State v. Thomas, 205 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1973). 
S1Jd. at 410; see State v. Bordorsky, 183 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1971). 
82See Hickey v. District Court, 174 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Iowa 1970). 
sssee id. 
84186 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 1971). 
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counsel moved for mental examination of defendant. That motion 
was denied, and on appeal, the supreme court noted that no evidence 
was submitted to support the contention of defendant's alleged para-
noia, uncooperativeness with his counsel, or of his hostility toward 
the court and his attorney. Quite the contrary, the defendant there-
after effectively testified in his own defense, apparently with "no 
difficulty in doing so."85 As a result, the actions of the trial court in 
continuing the proceedings were ruled to be proper and not an abuse 
of discretion. 
Just as it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to improperly 
continue the proceedings against a defendant whose competency has 
been questioned, however, so too may it be an abuse for the court 
simply to refuse to set a case for trial in such a situation. That is, 
the law prescribes but one course of action-suspension of the pro-
ceedings only for a trial on the issue of competency. Thus, in State 
v. Gaffney,86 the trial court's refusal to set aside its order continuing 
the case until defendant became sane, while refusing to fix a time for 
immediate trial either on the merits or on the competency issue, was 
reversed. 
E. Guilty Pleas 
When a defendant decides to plead guilty rather than stand trial 
and there is no reason to suspect his competency, the trial court :is 
faced with the immediate question of whether to accept the proffered 
plea or refuse it and order the defendant to stand trial In this regard, 
there appears to be at :most a limited power in the trial courts to 
accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offense over the prosecutor's objec-
tion. In what is apparerttly the only case directly on point, the Iowa 
Supreme Court noted: 
Where, as here, the court has no knowled~e other than the age of the de-
fendant and accepts a plea over the objection of the county attorney we 
are compelled to hold sud1 action is an abuse of discretion,87 
Exactly what type of fac~tual situation, if any, could justify an Iowa 
trial court in accepting such a plea :is not clear. 
On the other hand, although there are no Iowa cases on point, at 
least one federal court •:>f appeals has held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept a defendant's plea of 
guilty to a lesser offense.88 That court noted that the United States 
Supreme Court has specifically held that a trial judge is not required 
to accept every knowing and intelligent guilty plea and conversely 
s5 Id. at 592. 
sa 237 Iowa 1394, 1402-03, 25 N.W. 352, 354 (1946). 
87 State v. Koeppel, 250 Iovra 1052, 1054, 97 N.W .2d 926, 927 (1959). 
88 United States v. Melendrez-Salas, 466 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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that "[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under 
the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court."89 
The courts' discretion in the method in which they receive guilty 
pleas recently has been strictly confined through the federal constitu-
tional doctrine promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Boykin v. Alabama.90 and resultantly adopted by the Iowa Supreme 
Court in State v. Sisco.91 The Sisco guidelines require that whenever 
an accused pleads guilty to a felony or an indictable misdemeanor, the 
record must show that the trial court ascertained from the defendant 
that he was entering such plea voluntarily, with an understanding of 
the charge, and with knowledge of the consequences of his plea.92 
Moreover, the record must show a factual basis for the charge and 
for the defendant's guilt. Nevertheless, a trial court's interrogation 
of a defendant "need not follow a ritualistic or rigid formula," as long 
as there is substantial compliance with the Sisco guidelines.98 
Once the trial court has accepted a plea, it may subsequently be 
faced with the problem of deciding whether to allow the defendant to 
withdraw it. Iowa trial courts are statutorily accorded almost absolute 
discretion in determining whether to permit withdrawal of guilty pleas, 
since the statute provides: "At any time before judgment, the court 
ma.y permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn .... "94 As the Iowa 
Supreme Court has pointed out, this provision 
does not state that the defe-ndant may withdraw [his] plea of guilty. The 
word may refers to the authority of the court to permit such withdrawal: 
• • . . [D]iscretion is lodged in the court and does not give a defendant 
an absolute right to withdraw such plea.ss 
ss Id. at 862, quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.ll (1970). 
90 395 u.s. 238, 242-44 (1969). 
91169 N.W.2d 542, 550-51 (Iowa 1969). 
92 Id. Prior to Sisco, the same standard for accepting a guilty plea was fol-
lowed, but without the requirement that the determ:ination be made by the court 
itself and that it be made as part of the record. See, e.g., State v. Kellison, 232 
Iowa 9, 14, 4 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1942), see also State v. Thomas, 205 N.W .2d 717 
(Iowa 1973). 
93 State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1972); accOTd, State v. Slawson, 
201 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 1972) (Sisco colloquy completed during the sentencing 
colloquy is valid). But see State v. Clary, 203 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1973) (woe-
fully inadequate colloquy consisting solely of the judge stating for the record that 
the defendant wishes to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter guilty plea, with 
defendant so confirming) . 
94IowA CoDE§ 777.15 (1973). 
ssstate v. Krana, 159 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Iowa 1968) (emphasis added); accoTd, 
State v. Weckman, 180 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 1970); State v. Hellickson, 162 
N.W.2d 390, 395 (Iowa 1968). But see State v. Machovec, 236 Iowa 377, 381, 17 
N.W .2d 843, 845 (1945): 
We have heretofore held this statute and identical provisions of former 
statutes give to a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea of 
guilty at any time before judgment is entered in the record book. Id. 
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Accordingly, the supreme court has held that "the [trial] court may 
without abusing its disc:cetion refuse to permit its withdrawal" when 
a valid guilty plea has been entered.96 This doctrine has even been 
extended to a situation in which the defendant's motion for withdrawal 
was asserted to be based upon "substantial defense to the charge."91 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Santo bello v. New 
York08 could sharply curtail the courts' discretion in disallowing with-
drawals of guilty pleas that were the product of broken plea bar-
gains.00 Although Santobello's guilty plea to a lesser offense was pur-
suant to an agreement that the state would make no recommendation 
as to sentence, an assistant prosecutor other than the one who had 
negotiated the plea recommended the maximum sentence (which was 
imposed). Discounting the fact that "the breach of the agreement was 
inadvertent,"100 the Supreme Court said that when 
oa State v. Krana, 159 N.W .;!d 413, 415 (Iowa 1968). A less mechanistic approach 
is taken, for example, in Virginia where 
the rule is that the withdrawal of a guilty plea by a defendant is within 
the discretion of the trial court, but that it should be granted whenever 
there is the least evidence that the ends of justice would best be served 
by a plea of not guilty. :e:ggleston v. Slayton, 343 F. Supp. 221, 226 (W.D. 
Va. 1972). 
or State v. Krana, 159 N.W.2d 413, 415-16 (Iowa 1968). On the other hand, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court; has held that a lower court in fact abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea motivated by defense 
counsel's threat to withdraw from the case if defendant did not plead guilty. 
Commonwealth v. Forbes,-- Pa. --, 299 A~ 268, 270-71 (1973). The court 
said: 
These circumstances rendered involuntary appellant's decision to aban-
don his withdrawal request and continue with his original plea. What 
plea to enter is a decisic·n which must be made voluntarily and intelli-
gently by the accused • . . . A guilty plea . . . "induced by promises or 
threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void." Id. 
In seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, timeliness is of the essence. Consequent-
ly, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and sentencing is not 
timely. State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Iowa 1969). Moreover, the 
Iowa Supreme Court has he1d that "a guilty plea should [not] be set aside as 
involuntary in the absence of an allegation that defendant is in fact innocent." 
Id. at 903. This view accorcb 'villi the Pennsylvania court's, at least in theory: 
timely assertions of innocence offer a "fair and just'' reason for withdrawal Com-
monwealfu v. Forbes, supra,-- Pa. at--, 299 A~ at 272. 
08404 u.s. 257 (1971). 
oo Plea bargaining has been approved by the Iowa Supreme Court. State v. 
Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, £102 (Iowa 1969): 
There is nothing wrong with the universal practice of using plea bar-
gaining as a device for di:sposing of criminal cases. It is entirely proper 
to grant concessions to a defendant who enters a plea of guilty when the 
public interest is served thereby. Id. 
100 404 U.S. at 262. 
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a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or con-
sideration, such promise must be fulfilled."lOl 
The case was remanded to the state court, with the ultimate relief left 
to the discretion of the state court which is in a better position to decide 
whether the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific 
performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should 
be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state 
court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner, 
i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.1o2 
Santobello has already been interpreted by one federal court of ap-
peals as requiring that a defendant be able to withdraw his guilty plea 
if the plea was the product of plea bargaining followed by the court's 
refusal to accept the prosecutor's agreed-upon sentence recommenda-
tion.103 Conceding that it is still within the court's sound discretion 
"to determine whether the interests of justice will be served by accept-
ing the prosecutor's recommendation,"104 the court of appeals ruled 
that when the sentencing judge decides not to accept the government's 
sentence recommendation made pursuant to a plea bargain, then "the 
defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, particu-
larly where, as here, there is no Government claim of prejudice or 
harm."1os 
Nevertheless, subsequent to Santobello> the Iowa Supreme Court 
has held that during a guilty plea colloquy the trial court is not re-
quired "to question counsel regarding a plea arrangement."106 This 
approach appears undesirable in light of the possibilities it engenders 
for post-conviction attack on the plea if the bargained-for promises 
are not kept.107 A more realistic approach has been proposed by the 
Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee, which has recom-
lOl[d. 
1oz Id. at 263. 
l 03 United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972). 
1o4 Id. at 734. 
J.os Id. at 735; accord, People v. Barajas, 26 Cal. App. 3d 932, 103 Cal. Rptr. 405 
(1972): 
Where the prosecution repudiates its part of the plea bargain, the de-
fendant's remedy is to move to withdraw his plea of guilty in the trial 
court. Unless he makes such a motion in the trial court, he is precluded 
from obtaining relief on appeal. Id. at 937, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 408. 
1os State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1972). 
107 The task force for the courts of the National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recently recommended abolition of plea 
bargaining. NATIONAL ADVISORY COIIIM. ON CRillliNAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALs, 
WoRKING PAPER FOR THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE oN CRillliNAL JusTICE Standard 3.1, 
at Ct. - 42 to 45 (1973). The Commission also recommended interim measures 
to structure the transition period. Id. Standards 3.2-.8, at Ct.-46 to 64. 
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mended that "the court shall require the disclosure of the [plea bar-
gaining] agreement in open court at the time the plea is offered."108 
Then, if the court rejects the plea agreement, the defendant is af-
forded the absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea,109 and no refer-
ence to this withdrawn plea, nor to any of the plea discussions, can be 
made at trial.110 
F. Dismissals 
Iowa is one of several jurisdictions with statutory authority111 for a 
trial court's dismissal of a pending prosecution on its own motion and 
without the consent of the prosecutor.112 This power is to be exercised 
only when the court :finds such dismissal to be in the furtherance of 
justice,113 however, and under Iowa's particular statute, which also 
authorizes the court to di:;miss cases upon the application of the county 
attomey,114 no pending prosecution "shall be discontinued or aban-
doned in any other manner."115 
A dismissal under this statute is "a bar to another prosecution for 
the same offense if it is a misdemeanor"116 but not such a bar "if the 
offense charged be a felony."117 Nevertheless, "such power and discre-
1os Iowa Crim. Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, Iowa 
R. Crlm. P. 9(2) (1973). 
1oo Id. Rule 9(4). 
no Id. Rule 9(5). The committee struck from a subcommittee proposal a ban 
on the court participating in any of the plea discussions. See generally ABA 
PROJECT ON Mnmltullt STANDAFllS OF CRDIUNAL JUSTICE, ST.A.."''DARDS RELATING TO THE 
FuNCTION oF THE TiuAL JUDGE § 4.1(a) (Approved Draft 1972); Note, Judicial 
Participation in Guilty Pleas--A Search for Standards, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 151 
(1971) (analyzing cases generally disapproving of pre-plea judicial ratification of 
plea bargaining). 
111 IOWA CODE § 795.5 (1973). 
112 See F. MILLER, PRosEctr.L'ION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SusPECT WITH A 
CRll\IE 334 (1970). 
113Jd. See also IowA CODE § 795.5 (1973), requiring that the court state its 
reasons therefor in the order of dismissal and thus that they be entered of record. 
114 IowA CODE § 795.5 (197il). Iowa's procedure contrasts with that in some 
jurisdictions in which the prosecutor "may dismiss the proceeding on his own 
initiative." See MILLER, supru. note 112, at 14. Nevertheless, the requirement of 
the trial court's consent for the dismissal appears to be little more than a for-
mality in many jurisdictions. In fact, 
[t]he majority of American courts have interpreted the common law to 
mean that the prosecutor':; wish to dismiss the charge prevails regardless 
of the wishes of the judge." Id. at 308 n.50. 
115 IOWA CODE § 795.5 (1973). 
116 I d.; cf. State v. Reinhard, 202 Iowa 168, 209 N.W. 419 (1926). 
117 Id.; see State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 849, 850, 134 N.W.2d 908, 909 (1965) 
("the dismissal of the prior charge did not prevent the state from filing a second, 
within the limits of the statute on limitations," where the first charge had not 
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tion may not be exercised to harass a defendant nor to subject him to 
repeated and unwarranted prosecution."118 This type of dismissal stat-
ute has been liberally construed as "confer[ring] on the trial judiciary 
the same kind of discretion to prevent prosecution even on sufficient 
evidence [as that] normally held and exercised by prosecutors."m 
Nevertheless, the courts cannot exercise this power arbitrarily. For 
example, the Iowa Supreme Court120 has sharply denounced two muni-
cipal court judges' policy of dismissing all overloaded vehicle stml-
monses sua sponte because they questioned the wisdom of such a law 
being enforced in their court. The supreme court admonished: 
[J]ustice is not "furthered" by wholesale dismissals of cases with no op-
portunity for each side to be heard and for no better reason than that the 
presiding judge thinks the offended statutes are unfair in their applica-
tion.12l 
Declaring that arbitrary dismissals are not in "the interest of proper 
administration of the courts," the supreme court dictated that in sub-
sequent dismissals "a fair opportunity for each side to present its case 
must be afforded."122 
G. Pretrial Evidentiary Motions 
Although most questions of evidence are matters which are not dealt 
with until the trial itself, the trial court can be called upon to rule on 
some evidentiary matters before trial. Two of the major pretrial evi-
dentiary motions are the motion to suppress and the motion in lim-
ine,123 both of which are discussed below. 
1. Motion to Suppress 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is subject to 
close scrutiny upon appellate review.124 This is because constitutional 
issues are generally the guiding principles of law. The trial court 
yet been timely brought to trial). Dismissal of a felony charge after swearing 
of the jury, however, bars reprosecution, since the defendant has been put in 
jeopardy. State v. V:F.W. Post 1856, 223 Iowa 1146, 1149, 274 N.W. 916, 917 (1937). 
ns State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 1168, 157 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1968). 
119 Mn.r.ER, supra note 112, at 335. 
120 In re Judges of Cedar Rapids Mun. Court, 256 Iowa 1135, 130 N.W .2d 553 
(1964). 
121 Id. at 1137, 130 N.W.2d at 555. 
122 I d., 130 N.W.2d at 555. 
12a While both of these ordinarily are pretrial motions, yet they both can be 
made, under certain circumstances, during trial. See State v. Evans, 193 N.W 2d 
515, 518 (Iowa 1972) (motion to suppress); State v. Hollins, 184 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 
1971) (motion in limine). 
12~ While the appellate review ordinarily is by appeal after final judgment, cer-
tiorari can be taken before trial when the disputed matter involves law questions 
only and the supreme court thus would not be reviewing fact questions. In 
1042 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
nevertheless is granted considerable leeway in deciding disputed fact 
questions. This means, for example, that the supreme court ordinar-
ily will accept the trial eourt's finding of fact that consent was given 
for a warrantless search hut will interpose its own view as to whether, 
as a matter of law, consent could be given under such circumstances. 
For example, the supreme court said in State v. Shephard:125 
The question of whether consent was in fact given is a factual matter to 
be determined by the trial court and where the evidence is conflicting 
this court will accept the finding of the trial: court unless it is clearly un-
reasonable. 
The supreme court also stated: 
It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the consent was voluntary 
or coerced. The evidence in this instance must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the stat~. We are to determine if the evidence so con-
sidered is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that [defendant] 
gave his consent freely and voluntarily.12a 
Appellate review thus is not concerned with evaluation o£ "con-
tradictory factual questio:ns."127 The supreme court deems it "essen-
tial," however, that it make "an independent examination of the facts, 
findings, and record in order to determine whether relevant constitu-
tional standards have here been fully respected."128 
2. Motion in Limine 
An order granting a motion in limine, while not specifically author-
ized under Iowa's rules of criminal procedure, is considered to be 
within the trial court's inherent power to reasonably control the trial 
process so as "to insure a fair and just trial to each litigant."129 The 
general purpose of such an order is to "prohibit disclosure of question-
able evidence until the court during trial in the jury's absence has 
been presented an offer an.d objection."130 Thus, it could be used dur-
ing the voir dire of prospective jurors to prohibit the disclosure of 
"prejudicial matters which may compel declaring a mistrial."131 How-
State v. Holliday, the supreme court, noting that the instant petition by the 
state presented only questions of law, disagreed with the defendant's contention 
that 
the ruling of the trial court [sustaining the defendant's motion to sup-
press] was within his judicial discretion, and was not in fact an illegal 
ruling, such as to allow review by means of certiorari 169 N.W .2d 768, 
770 (Io\va 1969). 
12s 255 Iowa 1218, 1223, 124 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1963), quoting People v. Speice, 
23 Ill. 2d 40, 45, 177 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1961). 
12a Id. at 1222, 124 N.W .2d at 715. 
127 State v. Spier, 173 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 1970). 
12B[d. 
12o State v. Johnson, 183 N.W .2d 194, 197 (Iowa 1971). 
130 I d. 
131 I d. 
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ever, it "should not, except upon a clear showing, be used to reject 
evidence."182 
This is one of the few areas of the law in which the trial court need 
not exercise its discretionary powers. Thus, the court can properly 
refuse to even rule on the motion and such inaction merely "consti-
tutes a denial of the motion."133 Moreover, "a denial of a motion in 
limine (or failure to rule on the motion) cannot, in and of itself, con-
stitute reversible error,"134 even though the supreme court subse-
quently determines the ruling was incorrect.135 This is because "[t]he 
objectionable material has not yet reached the jury's ears. It may 
never reach the jury."186 Then if this evidence is offered at trial, the 
other party must object to its admission and thus "a proper record may 
be made for review on appeal."137 In other words, "[r]elief must be 
predicated on a record made during trial when the objectionable evi-
dence is sought to be introduced."138 Even though the trial court's 
denial of a motion in limine or its refusal to rule thereon may not be 
subject to appellate scrutiny, however, the trial court's granting of 
such a motion can result in reversible error even if no record is made 
at trial.139 The court's rationale in one such case was: 
[S]ince nothing occurred on the trial changing the admissibility or inad-
missibility [of the objectionable evidence], plaintiffs were not required 
to make a further offer of proof on trial to preserve the claimed error in 
ruling on the motion in limine.140 
The lesson from all of this appears to be that the trial court should 
use its motion in limine powers cautiously, and especially so when the 
resultant order would have the effect of excluding the evidence alto-
gether. 
H. Jury Trial 
The Iowa criminal code contains several rather explicit provisions 
governing the right of defendants to be tried by a jury rather than by 
the court. Thus, once the decision has been made to go to trial, the 
132 Id. See also State v. Tiernan, 205 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). 
133 State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1971). 
134Jd. 
135 "The overruling of the motion in limine, even though wrong, is not rever-
Sible error." State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972). 
136 State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1971). 
187 State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Iowa 1971). 
138 State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972). 
139 State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1971). 
140 Gustafson v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 1971). Al-
though Gustafson was a civil case, the rule therein has been expressely made 
applicable to criminal cases. See State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 818 (Iowa 
1972). 
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court is faced with the problem of proper application of the trial-by-
jury provisions of the Code to the instant defendant. In the case of 
felony prosecutions, this presents relatively little opportunity for the 
exercise of discretion since all felony charges which are not disposed 
of by a guilty plea must be tried before a jury141 notwithstanding ,a 
defendant's request to be tried before the court only.142 Although 
there is no absolute requirement of a jury trial on misdemeanor 
charges, the defendant has a right to a jury trial on an indictable mis-
demeanor. 
Prior to 1971, the Code did not have even this flexibility, and all 
trials on indictable misdemeanors had to be by jury.143 This statutory 
requirement was enforced in State v. Fagan1« in spite of the fact that 
the defendant, with the prosecutor's concurrence, had attempted to 
waive what he felt was his right.'-,{5 The supreme court affirmed the 
trial court's refusal to try the case without a jury, noting that the non-
waiver rule is founded "upon the authority of the legislature, under 
the constitution, to mandate the manner in which prosecutions shall 
be tried."146 The issue, in the supreme court's view, was "whether an 
absolute provision of the law may be set aside, and a power which the 
statute has withheld be conferred by agreement."147 Concluding that 
"it cannot be done,"148 the supreme court essentially took the position 
that a trial court cannot derive legislatively proscribed discretionary 
powers through mutual agreement of the parties to waive the statutory 
requirement. 
In 1971 the legislature removed the requirement that trials for in-
dictable misdemeanors he by jury and instead made the matter of a 
jury trial a right of the defendant.149 This may be waived in writing 
by the defendant, but he does not have an absolute right of waiver, 
since before allowing the defendant to sign the waiver, the presiding 
judge must determine that he is "fully aware of the fact that he is 
waiving his right to a jury trial ... "150 Once the judge has made this 
141See IowA CODE § 777.16 (1973): "Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, 
unless right to jury trial i:; waived by defendant pursuant to section 780.23." 
The latter section is limited to waivers in indictable misdemeanor charges. Id. 
§ 780.23. 
142 "Defendant's waiver of trial by jury and request for trial by the court was 
properly overruled." State v. Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1969). 
143 See IowA CODE § 777.16 (1971): "Issues of fact must be tried by a jury." 
144190 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa :L971). 
H5Jd, 
146 I d. at 801. 
147 Id., quoting State v. D.:mglass, 96 Iowa 308, 309-10, 65 N.W. 151 (1895). 
148Jd. 
140 See IowA CoDE § 780.23. (1973). 
15o I d. 
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determination, the defendant then "shall be allowed to sign the 
waiver. • . ."151 
There is no absolute right to a jury trial on nonindictable misde-
meanors, but the statute allows either party to the prosecution to make 
a written demand therefor.152 In light of interpretations of the statute 
before its latest amendment/53 it appears that failure of either party to 
demand a jury trial will operate as a waiver of the right to do so. 
One peculiar area of the law in which the courts heretofore have 
been allowed to proceed without benefit of a jury trial has been that of 
punishment for contempt.15~ Notwithstanding the fact that this crime 
is an indictable misdemeanor/55 the Iowa Supreme Court has pointed 
out: 
The power to proceed summarily, without a formal indictment and with-
out the intervention of a jury, to hear charges of contempt of court, and 
to assess punishment upon those found guilty, has been an attribute to 
all courts of record in every stage of the development of our system of 
procedure,15G 
The Iowa Supreme Court recently limited by implication the appli-
cation of this rule to cases in which the maximum authorized punish-
ment does not exceed imprisonment for six months.151 The court said 
151Id. 
152 I d. § 762.15 (1973). 
153 State v. Baker, 203 N.W .2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1973): 
We ..• elect to point out a jury trial may be waived . . . • Code set:tion 
762.15 ... required defendant to demand a jury trial before any evidence 
was taken. He made no such demand. He thereby waived any right to 
a jury trial. 
15~ IOWA CODE § 665.1 (1973). 
155 See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. 
1 56 Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 1342, 147 N.W 2d 886, 893 (1967), 
quoting Jones v. Mould, 151 Iowa 599, 605, 132 N.W. 45, 48 (1911). 
157 The Iowa Supreme Court noted in Sarich v. Havercamp, 203 N.W .2d 260, 
268 (Iowa 1972), that Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968), and Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970), direct state courts "to look to the penalty 
authorized for a particular offense in the determining whether it is serious or not 
•••. " 203 N.W.2d at 268. Duncan, applying the sixth amendment right to jury 
trial to the states, held that "[c]rimes carrying possible penalties up to six 
months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses 
.... " 391 U.S. at 159. Moreover, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1969) held 
that the "Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in state court prosecu-
tions for contempt just as it does for other crimes." Id. at 199-200. See also 
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966): 
[W]e rule further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal con-
tempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver 
thereof. Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
The Iowa Supreme Court also took note, 203 N.W.2d at 268, of the recommenda-
tion in the ABA STANDARDS FOR TRIAL BY JURY that the possibility of 6-months' 
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in Sarich v. Havercamp158 (a case involving 28 separate charges of 
contempt): 
We adopt the view the penalty involved, that is, the statutorily authorized 
maximum penalty shall be the relevant criterion as to the determination 
of a contemnor's right to a trial by jury, vis-a-vis the view the penalty 
actually imposed shall be determinative of the question.Iso 
In Iowa the maximum authorized penalty specified in section 665.4 
for one act of contempt is six months' imprisonment.160 Thus, there 
is no right to a jury trial when the defendant is charged with only one 
allegedly contemptuous act. The right attaches upon a multiple-count 
indictment charging two or more separate acts. However, the defend-
ant in the latter circumstance must still demand a jury trial in a timely 
manner or he may waive his right thereto. 
I. Severance 
Because Iowa law permits joint indictments of two or more defend-
ants,161 the trial court may be faced with a demand by a jointly in-
dicted defendant for a separate trial. Except for offenses under the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act,162 the Code gives such a defend-
ant an absolute right tiJ severance of a felony charge if he so re-
quests.163 Thus, in a felony case, at least, nothing is left to the court's 
imprisonment "should be the upper limit upon the definition of 'petty offenses' " 
when determining the right to a jury trial. See ABA PROJECT ON MINillrolll: 
STANDARDS FOR CRD\tiNAL JusnCE, TRIAL BY JURY § 1.1 (a), Comment, at 20-23 (Ap-
proved Draft 1968). 
1os 203 N.W .2d 260 (Iowa 3.972). 
lGD I d. at 268. 
160 IOWA CODE § 665.4 (197:1). 
161 IowA CoDE § 780.1 (197:l). 
102 Id. §§ 204.1 et seq. 
163 See id. §§ 204.408, 780.1. There is no right to a separate trial for any offense 
under Iowa's Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Indictments under this act 
may 
join one or more persons as defendants who it is alleged violated the 
same provisions in the same transaction or series of transactions and 
which involve common questions of law and fact. Id. § 204.408. 
However, the Act provides: 
The court may grant a severance and separate trial to any accused person 
jointly charged or indict·;d if it appears that substantial injustice would 
result to such accused person unless a separate trial was granted. Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The Iowa Crl.minal Code Review Study Committee proposed no changes in either 
the general severance statute or in the exception included in the controlled sub-
stances provision. See Iowa Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Iowa 
Criminal Code, Iowa R. Crim. P. 6(4) (b) (1973). See also ABA PROJECT ON 
MINnlroM STANDARDS FOR C!UN:INAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION 
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 3.9 (Approved Draft 1972): 
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discretion. In other cases, however, defendants jointly indicted "may 
be tried separately or jointly, in the discretion of the court."164 Be-
cause the severance statute expressly leaves the question of severance 
in nonfelony cases to judicial discretion/65 the supreme court has 
turned a deaf ear to appellants' contentions that a trial court has erred 
in overruling their motions for separate trials.166 
It should also be noted that the right to request severance in non-
felony cases does not rest exclusively in the defendant. On the con-
trary, the supreme court has interpreted the severance statute as 
permitting the state as well as the defendant to make an application 
for a separate trial on a nonfelony charge. This is illustrated in State 
v. Marvin/61 where, following the joint indictment of A and B, the 
state's key witness married A. Holding that the trial court had not 
abused its discretion in granting the state's motion for separate trials, 
the supreme court pointed out that the new husband "could not be a 
witness against his wife, and if a separate trial could not have been 
granted, the State would thus be deprived of its witness.168 
J. Changing Venue 
The Iowa Code lodges broad discretion in the trial courts when rul-
ing on applications for change of venue.169 It provides: 
The court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, must, when fully ad-
vised, decide the matter of the petition according to the very right of 
it,170 
Nevertheless, the supreme court has pointed out that this is "a judicial, 
not a personal discretion, and if improperly exercised it may be re-
The trial judge should order severance of offenses or defendants before 
trial on his own motion whenever it appears reasonably required to in-
sure the fairness of the trial or its orderly progress, if a severance could 
be obtained on motion of a defendant or the prosecutor. Id. 
164 IowA CoDE § 780.1 (1973). 
165 Id. "[T]he statute (Rev. § 4789) is express that the defendants 'may be 
tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the Court.'" State v. Gigher, 23 
Iowa 318 (1867). The statute there in quesiton is identical, save for punctuation, 
with the current version. Compare IowA CODE § 4789 (Rev. of 1860) with IowA 
CODE § 780.1 (1973). 
166 "In this there was no error, for the reason that the offense of which he 
was charged was not a felony, and 'it was within the discretion o£ the 
district court to refuse a separate trial." State v. Kirkpatrick, 74 Iowa 
505, 506, 38 N.W. 380, 381 (1888). 
16712 Iowa 499 (1861) . 
168 Id. at 502. 
169 Actually, change of venue is a misnomer since it is the place of trial that 
is being changed. See IowA CoDE § 778~ (1973). Venue as an element in prov-
ing the offense charged remains 'in the original county where the crime occurred. 
110 IowA CoDE § 778.9 (1973). 
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viewed ••.• "171 Moreover, the Code prese1ibes only two grounds for 
changing venue: prejudice of the judge and excitement and prejudice 
in the county.172 The state can petition for a change only in felony 
cases.173 
The general rule is that an application proper on its face "makes a 
prima facie case, which if uncontroverted entitles the applicant to the 
change."174 Nevertheless, failure of the other party to resist such ap-
plication 
does not rob the trial court of its discretion to determine, under the 
record made, the necessity or advisability of a change of place for trial.111; 
Indeed, although the statute is worded so as to impose an apparent 
mandatory duty on the courts, it is not reversible error for the court 
to fail to rule on an application, where the applicant goes to trial with-
out insisting on a ruling.176 
On appeal or certiorari, 177 the movant ''has the burden of showing 
the trial court abused i~; sound discretion in overruling the motion for 
change of venue."178 In determining when this burden is met, the 
supreme court makes "an independent evaluation of the circum-
stances,"170 including eyamining any relevant media publicity "with 
care."180 In making its own evaluation, the supreme court uses this 
standard: 
If the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable or 
unreasonable, if its action clearly amounts to a denial of justice, if clearly 
against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence it has abused its dis-
cretion.1S1 
Generally, the trial court's decision to deny a requested change of 
171 State v. Niccum, 190 N.W .2d 815, 824 (Iowa 1971). 
172IowA CODE§ 778.2 (1973). The state may only apply for change of venue 
on the latter ground. Id. § 778.4. 
173Id. § 778.1. 
m State v. Hephner, 161 :rr.w .2d 714, 716 (Iowa 1968). 
m State v. Loney, 163 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Iowa 1963). 
110 State v. Hephner, 161 N.W .2d 714, 717 (Iowa 1968). 
111 A trial court's order denying or granting a change of venue is reviewable 
either on certiorari, with the proceedings stayed, as in HaT1ULCk v. District Court, 
179 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Iowa 1970), and PollaTd v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519, 
520-21 (Iowa 1972); or an appeal as an assignment of error requiring reversal, as 
in State v. MeyeT, 181 Iowa 440, 448, 164 N.W. 794, 797 (1917). The supreme 
court's review is de novo whether the question is raised "on certiorari in advance 
of trial, or on direct appeal following judgment." State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 
443, 445 (Iowa 1972), overruling Harnack v. District Court, supra, as to this 
point. 
11BState v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa 1970). 
110 State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Iowa 1971). 
1so State v. Loney, 163 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 1968). 
1st State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 824-25 (Iowa 1971), quoting State ex Tel. 
Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 831, 238 N.W. 290, 294 (1931). 
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venue will be upheld i£ the supreme court determines that there was 
an inadequate showing o£ actu,al excitement or prejudice182 or that the 
allegedly prejudicial published material was not "so potentially preju-
dicial that prejudice must be presum.ed."183 In order to avoid trying 
the defendant "in the press"184 as in the celebrated Sam Sheppard 
case, 185 the general standard to be applied in determining whether 
publicity surrounding a trial has been sufficiently prejudicial to war-
rant granting a change o£ venue is whether it has been £actual, non-
infl.amm.atory,J-86 ordinary reporting o£ the incidents as they develop/87 
without continued reiteration/58 and especially not just before trial.189 
Such reports need not be absolutely correct; substantial accord with 
the £acts is sufficient.190 Moreover, a court can properly refuse to 
order a changing o£ venue even when there is publication o£ potentially 
prejudicial material i£ the court determines that no "reasonable like-
lihood" existed that defendant could not get a £air trial because o£ this 
publicity.191 
1s2 State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972). 
183 Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Iowa 1972), incorporating by 
refeTence ABA PRoJECT ON Mnm.roM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDAllDS 
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss § 3.2(c) (Tentative Draft 1968), which 
reads: 
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted when-
ever it is determined that because of the dissemination of potentially 
prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence 
of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. This determination may be 
based on such evidence as qualified public opinion surveys or opinion 
testimony offered by individuals, or on the court's own evaluation of the 
nature, frequency, and timing of the material involved. A showing of 
actual prejudice shall not be required. I d. 
184 "The situation did not approach the continued and inflammatory publicity in 
Sheppard or in Estes . . . . The articles were not infl=atory in tone • . . ." 
State v. Davis, 196 N.W .2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972). 
185 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
186 State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972). 
187 "The publicity here was nothing more than ordinary reporting which always 
accompanies any event such as this." State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 
1970). 
188 ''The articles were not inflammatory in tone, and the subject was not pur-
sued in subsequent issues of the papers." State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 
(Iowa 1972) . 
189 "No adverse publicity from June 2 to the date of the trial [August 21], more 
than eleven weeks later, is shown." State v. Loney, 163 N.W .2d 378, 382 (Iowa 
1968). The media accounts "appeared about 8 months before trial." State v. 
Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa 1970). 
190 See State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1972). 
191 State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972). Here, 
one small portion of the news article made reference to a parole viola-
tion as the reason defendant was not at liberty on bond. The court found 
that in all other respects the articles appeared to be simply statements 
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Continuing media publicity of an inflammatory nature, coupled with 
developments in another case, was the basis for the only Iowa Supreme 
Court reversal of a cowoiction because of a trial court's denial of de-
fendant's application for change of venue. In State v. Meyer,192 the 
defendant had been jointly indicted with her son for murder of her 
son's wife. The newspaper stories, which gave blow-by-blow accounts 
of developments from the time of the murder until the defendant's 
trial, were numerous and often inflammatory. The son was tried first 
and was convicted of second-degree murder. There was broad detailed 
reporting of the son's trial, with notations that the state would have 
basically the same case against the mother when she was tried.193 
Reversing the convictio:n for failure to change venue, the supreme 
court admonished: 
Though it might be possible to select twelve men who had no feeling or 
bias against the defendant on entering the jury box, yet the trial was to 
be had in the same com."nunity in which the other jurors found her son 
guilty, under practically the same showing that the State intended to urge 
against her.1s• 
Another case further iUustrates that pretrial publicity must be eval-
uated in the context of related events rather than merely as to ac-
counts focusing on the defendant. Pollard v. Dist:l'ict Court195 involved 
a flood of publicity about a state audit of a city's accounts, with con-
siderable media attentioJ:l. centered upon political bickering between 
the state auditor and disgruntled city councilmen. Nevertheless, the 
audit ultimately pointed to the defendant as the only wrongdoer among 
the city employees.196 Sustaining defendant's writ of certiorari follow-
. ing the trial court's refusal to change the venue, the supreme court 
pointed out that it could not "realistically isolate Mrs. Pollard and her 
publicity from the audit and its publicity."197 The court continued: 
When the spotlight's glare comes to a rest on a certain individual in a 
matter of large public interest involving widespread and intensive pub-
licity of a prejudicial nature, the test is whether a 'reasonable likelihood' 
exists that the voir dire jury examination or a continuance will not be 
sufficient to allow a fair triaL19S 
That the state is also entitled to a change of venue in order to re-
of fact, and conclude after an examination of the newspaper accounts 
and hearing the testimony offered, that there was an insufficient showing 
of excitement and prejudke in the community against the defendant so as 
to prevent his receiving a fair trial. Id. at 445. 
102131 Iowa 440, 164 N.W. 794 (1917). 
1oa I d. at 442-46, 164 N.W. at 795-96. 
1o4 I d. at 448, 164 N.W. at 7!!7. 
1os 200 N.W .2d 519 (Iowa 1972). 
1os I d. at 520. 
101 Id. at 521. 
lOSJd. 
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ceive a fair and impartial trial was made clear in State ex rel. Fletcher 
v. District C'ourt.199 This was a 1931 case in which the supreme court 
sustained the state's pretrial writ of certiorari following the trial 
court's refusal to order change of venue. Informations charging con-
spiracy and false pretenses arising out of the same series of transac-
tions had been filed against 26 defendants. Following acquittal of the 
first defendant in a highly publicized trial, the state alleged local ex-
citement and prejudice against the prosecution and moved for change 
of venue for the remaining cases. Noting the journalistic notoriety 
accorded the highly attended cases, the supreme court said that the 
state is entitled to a fair trial beginning with the calling of the jury 
from a community absent excitement and prejudice against the prose-
cution. 200 Otherwise, the state would be ''handicapped from the 
start"201 by unfair obstacles. 
The pinnacle of judicial discretion in this context was reached in 
Harnack v. District Court/02 in which the Iowa Supreme Court upheld 
the trial court's order changing venue to a county outside the judicial 
district in spite of the clear statutory mandate that such a change 
"must" be made to a county in the same district.203 Noting that the 
judicial districting scheme in the Iowa Code needed revision,2°4 the 
supreme court said that one- or two-county judicial districts rendered 
literal application of the statute impossible. Rather, it felt constrained 
to give a liberal construction to the statute so as to give effect to the 
legislative intent and thus "protect an accused's right to a fair and im-
partial tria1."205 Despite these sentiments, however, the court based 
its decision on 
the rule that when procedural legislation governing change of venue con-
flicts with basic constitutional rights to speedy trial by an impartial jury, 
to the extent the legislative enactment deprives accused of due process 
of law, such legislation must yield.2os 
On the other hand, the supreme court affirmed another trial court's 
order denying a change of venue to a county outside the judicial dis-
trict, in State v. Cunha.201 Conceding that the court could have exer-
cised its inherent powers to transfer the case outside the district "in 
order to insure a speedy, impartial trial,"208 the supreme court held 
199 213 Iowa 822, 829, 238 N.W. 290, 293 (1931). 
2oo Id. at 823, 833-35, 238 N.W. at 291, 295-96. 
2o1 Id. at 835, 238 N.W. at 296. 
202179 N.W .2d 356 (Iowa 1970). 
2oa I d. at 360-61; IowA CoDE § 778.10 (1973). 
204179 N.W.2d at 361. Cf. IowA CoDE § 602.18 (1973). 
205 Id., citing Turner v. State, 87 Fla. 155, 162-63, 99 So. 334, 336 (1924). 
2os I d. at 361. 
2o1193 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Iowa 1972). 
2os I d. 
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that failure to do so did not constitute reversible error on the record 
before it. The court noted that, other than the defendant's affidavit, 
the record was devoid of evidence of excitement or prejudice in the 
adjoining county to wh:.ch venue was transferred as opposed to the 
county where the crime was committed.209 
Once it has been determined that venue will be changed, the de-
cision as to the new situs lies in the trial court's sound discretion.210 
As the supreme court p:>inted out in Harnack: "A defendant on mo-
tion for change of venu·~ does not have a right to select a particular 
county for his trial."211 All the defendant or the state is apparently 
entitled to is a change o:f venue to a county in which he or it can get 
a fair trial, that is, one where the objectionable excitement or pre-
judice is lacking. 
K. Continuance 
Several statutory provisions establish guidelines for the courts to 
follow in granting or denying continuances before trial. 212 One such 
provision is inextricably bound up in the defendant's right to a speedy 
trial. 213 Although the Code provides that: 
If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been 
postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial within sixty days 
after the indictment is found, the court must order it to be dismissed .•. 214 
the defendant's right to a dismissal is not absolute, for the court has 
the authority, for "good cause ... shown" to refuse to dismiss the 
case215 and may, in its discretion, order the case continued for a max-
imum of 90 days. 216 
Two other provisions relate to possible continuances to allow the 
defendant to readjust his defense following notification of alterations 
2oo I d. at 109. 
210 Harnack v. District Court, 179 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Iowa 1970). 
211 Id. 
212 Among these are the relevant rules of civil procedure. The provisions 
of the Code of civil prc•cedure relative to the continuances of the trial 
of civil causes shall apply to the continuance of criolinal actions • • • • 
IowA CODE § 780.2 (1973). 
213 For a more detailed di~.cussion of the right to "speedy justice" and the im-
pact of the sixth amendment on Iowa criminal law see State v. Gorham, no. 59/ 
55433 (April 25, 1973) and State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W .2d 772 (Iowa 1973); 
Dunahoo & Sullins, Speedy .Tustice, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 266 (1973). 
214 IowA CoDE § 795.2 (1972.). A somewhat similar provision exists as to failure 
to indict in a speedy manner. Id. § 795.2. 
21u I d. § 795.2. 
216 Id. § 795.3. See also P...BA PROJECT ON MlNIMullt STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JusncE, STANDARDS RELA'l'ING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 1.4 (Approved 
Draft 1972) : "The trial judge has the obligation to avoid delays, continuances and 
extended recesses, except for good cause." 
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in the state's case. The right to a continuance because of an amend-
ment of the charge is qualified, however, by the statutory mandate 
that: "[N] o continuance ... shall be granted because of such amend-
ment unless it is made to appear that defendant should have additional 
time to prepare for trial because of such amendment."217 On the other 
hand, the defendant appears to have an absolute right to a continuance, 
upon request, when the state files additional minutes of testimony and 
the defendant has not been given timely notice of this proposed addi-
tional testimony.218 By the same token, the state is entitled to a con-
tinuance of up to 4 days when the defendant files notice of an alibi or 
insanity defense less than 4 days before the case is set for trial.219 
Another ground for continuance relates to a specific disclosure duty 
of the state. If any report of the state criminalistics laboratory is not 
given to the defendant at least 4 days before trial, "such fact shall be 
grounds for a continuance."220 This rule applies "whether or not such 
findings are to be used in evidence against him."221 
The defendant is entitled under the Code to at least 3 days in which 
to prepare for trial after entry of his plea.222 Beyond this 3-day min-
imal period, however, the question of either party obtaining any addi-
tional time after the scheduled trial date rests in the sound discretion 
of the trial court.223 
The trial court's discretion in granting or denying continuances is 
"very broad,"224 and this decision "rests largely in the sound discretion 
of the trial court."225 The breadth of this discretion is apparent from 
the statement, in State v. Elliston/26 that the trial court's ruling on a 
motion for continuance "will not be interfered with on appeal unless it 
211 IowA CoDE § 773.47 (1973). 
21s See I d. § 780.10-.12. For a discussion of whether, in the trial court's dis-
cretion, addition testimony can be given at trial by state's witnesses whose 
names were not endorsed on the indicbnent and for whom the four-day notice 
before trial requirement was not given see text accompanying notes 392-404 infra. 
219 IOWA CODE § 777J.8 (1973). 
22o Id. § 749A.4. 
221Id. 
222 Id. § 780.3. 
22s This, of course, is subject generally to constitutional and statutory guaran-
tees of speedy indicbnent and speedy trial. For an example of an abuse of dis-
cretion in requiring a defendant to go to trial within 14 days of her indicbnent, 
without adequate opportunity to locate known but unavailable witnesses for 
her defense, see People v. Bain, 4 lli. App. 3d 442, 443-44, 280 N.E.2d 776, 777 
(1972). 
224State v. McNeal, 261 Iowa 1387, 1393, 158 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1968). 
22s I d. at 1392, 158 N.W .2d at 133; accord, H. UNDERHILL, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF 
CRIMINAL EviDENCE § 456, at 433-34 (4th ed. 1935) (the granting or denying of a 
continuance is a matter of judicial discretion, with relief on review only if "there 
has been a palpable abuse of that discretion to his disadvantage"). 
226159 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1968). 
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clearly appear that the trial court has abused his discretion, and an 
injustice has resulted therefrom."221 In Elliston, the trial date was set 
for 9 calendar days after the defendant's plea, but the defendant did 
not employ counsel until the day before trial. Immediately before 
trial was to commence, the defendant moved for a continuance. 228 In 
upholding the trial court's refusal to grant the continuance, the su-
preme court implied that orderly administration of the court's business 
is a factor to be considered: 
Here trial had been set for more than a week, at least 15 night working 
police officers were pres·~nt to testify and other defendants involving the 
same incident were present and ready for trial.229 
Another consideration noted by the court was that the defendant had 
not acted in a timely manner, since the defense counsel could have 
made the motion for a continuance on the day he was employed instead 
of waiting until the day of trial. 
The supreme court has also countenanced the trial court's denial of 
a continuance where the defendant has failed to comply with the stat-
utory requisites therefor. In State v. MeN eal/30 the defendant had 
been granted a continuance on his assertion that his three alibi wit-
nesses were unavailable. 231 Upon granting a second continuance, the 
trial court asked for "supporting medical testimony, affidavits or docu-
ments,"232 as required by the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure,233 to sub-
stantiate the defendant's claim that his key witness was still too ill to 
appear in court to testify in his behalf. A requested third continuance 
was denied "because nothing in support thereof had been producecl."23~ 
221 Id. at 509, quoting State v. Maupin, 196 Iowa 904, 908, 192 N.W. 828, 830 
(1923) (emphasis added). Standards for determining when a defendant has 
suffered an injustice are suggested in H. UNDERHILL, supra note 225, § 456, at 935-
36: 
A refusal to grant a continuance, which results in [1] depriving the ac-
cused of his right to a fair and impartial jury trial, or [2] his right to 
procure and compel the attendance of witnesses, or [3] the opportunity to 
be represented by counsel, or [ 4] to have a reasonably full opportunity 
to consult with counsel, or [5] to have a reasonable time to prepare for 
his defense, may constitute reversible error. Id. 
22s Whether the time allowed counsel for a defendant for preparation for 
trial is sufficient will de:9end upon the nature of the charge, the issues 
presented, counsers familiarity with the applicable law and the pertinent 
facts, and the availability of material witnesses. Stamps v. United States, 
387 F.2d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1967), quoting Ray v. United States, 197 F.2d 
268, 271 (8th Cir. 1952). 
220 159 N.W.2d at 509. 
23o 261 Iowa 1387, 158 N.W.2d 129 (1968). 
231 Id. at 1389, 158 N.W.2d at 130. 
2a2 Id. at 1391, 158 N.W.2d at 132. 
233IowA R. Crv. P. 183(b). 
234 261 Iowa at 1392, 158 N. W.2d at 132. 
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Affirming, the supreme court noted that the record "fails to show com-
pliance with the rules for a continuance" and further that "such dis-
cretion as to continuance on the part of the trial court is very broad."235 
On the other hand, the supreme court in State v. Conley236 upheld 
the trial court's ordering of a continuance requested by the state on 
the day trial was set to commence. 237 In support of its application, the 
state filed an affidavit alleging that its chief witness, being out of state, 
had not appeared, thus rendering the state unable to proceed to trial. 
This was considered a valid reason for granting the continuance. 
Moreover, the application was not rendered ineffective because the 
state failed to follow the statutory requirement therein that the sub-
stance of the expected testimony of the absent witness be set out in 
the affidavit.238 Requiring this of the state, which must attach the pro-
posed testimony of its witnesses to the information,239 "would have 
necessitated a repititious account of her testimony with respect to 
which the defendant had already been apprised."240 In the final anal-
ysis, the supreme court could find "no prejudice to the defendant in 
the court's order sustaining the State's motion for continuance."241 
Conversely, the supreme court has held that the state also has the 
right to have its interests protected from undue prejudice. In an early 
case,242 the defendant had requested immediate trial following entry of 
his plea. The trial court overruled the state's motion for a continu-
ance until the next day, which motion was supported by an affidavit, 
stating that the state was unable to have its key witness ready to tes-
tify, and accordingly dismissed the case when the state was unable to 
proceed.2~3 Reversing the judgment, the supreme court noted that 
"[a] higher degree of diligence could scarcely have been exercised" by 
the state in preparing its case and securing attendance of its wit-
nesses.2H Accordingly, since "the State, as well as the defendant, was 
entitled to a reasonable opportunity to procure its witnesses and be 
prepared for trial,"245 the denial of the continuance was an abuse of 
discretion and the supreme court had no choice but to overrule it. 2~6 
235 I d. at 1393, 158 N.W .2d at 133. 
236176 N.W .2d 213 (Iowa 1970). 
237 Id. at 214-15. 
23SSee IowA R. CIV. P. 183(b). 
289 IOWA CODE § 769.4 (1973). 
2~o 176 N.W .2d at 215. 
241Jd. 
2~2 State v. Painter, 40 Iowa 298 (1875). 
243 I d. at 298-300. 
2H Id. at 300. 
245 Id. 
246 I d. 
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L. Amendment of Charge 
Unlike the original charging process, in which the court plays only 
a minimal role, 217 the process of amending the formal charge, whether 
an indictment or information/48 requires a court order. Because the 
statutory authoricy for ordering an amendment is stated in permissive 
rather than mandatory terms, 249 this decision lies in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court.250 There are statutory guidelines as to the gen-
eral classifications of permissible and nonpermissible amendments, 
however. Amendments "may" be ordered "to correct errors or omis-
sions in matters of form or substance,"251 thus leaving it to the court's 
discretion to refuse to order an authorized amendment. On the other 
hand, an amendment "shall not" be ordered when it will have "the ef-
fect of charging the accused with an offense which is different than 
the offense which was intended to be charged in the indictment [or in-
formation] .... "252 
Although an amendment may have been permissible at the time it 
was ordered, the fact that it was granted opens the door to subsequent 
developments which Ipay result in reversible error. For example, an 
amendment may have l1een orderly and timely when allowed, but 
error may result if the court fails to grant a continuance where "it is 
made to appear that defendant should have additional time to prepare 
for trial because of such amendment."253 Moreover, as a condition 
precedent to the granting of an otherwise permissible amendment, the 
defendant or his. attorney "shall be served [with a copy thereof] ... 
and an opportunity given the defendant to resist the same,"254 and it 
may be reversible error to subsequently refuse to strike the amend-
ment if service is not perfected.255 
m. CoNDUCT OF THE TniAL 
The next step in the trial process, indeed the focus of almost every 
247 See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 ZowA L. REv. 598, 605-09 (1972). 
2•s The same amendment rule applies to both indictments and informations. 
IOWA CODE§ 769.12 (1973). 
2•9 "The court may ... ord·=r the indictment [information] so amended .•.• " 
Id. § 773.43. 
260State v. Crutcher, 174 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Iowa 1970) (amendment during trial 
of case). 
261 IowA CoDE§ 773.43 (1973); see State v. Miller, 259 Iowa 188, 190, 142 N.W.2d 
394, 396 (1966) (typographical error can be corrected by amendment). 
2G2 IowA CoDE § 773.46. 
2G3 Id. § 773.47. 
2G4 I d. § 773.44. 
2GG See State v. Hyduck, 21{JI Iowa 736, 736-37, 231 N.W. 451 (1930) (reversible 
error to refuse to strike an amendment when application to amend is made be-
fore trial and the defendant i:; neither served with a copy thereof nor given an 
opportunity to resist it). 
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facet of the pretrial nianeuverings discussed above, is the trial itself. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss every op-
portunity the judge has to exercise his discretion during trial. One 
area, especially, that of making evidentiary rulings and controlling the 
examination of witnesses, has commanded innumerable multi-volume 
treatises, and will not be discussed herein.256 Rather, this section will 
be more selective than comprehensive, and will focus on selected 
problem areas that are illustrative of difficulties faced by the litigants 
and the court itself in setting the parameters within which the trial 
court may exercise its discretion. 
A. Order in the Courtroom 
Perhaps the logical place to begin the discussion of the trial process 
is with an examination of the trial court's inherent power to maintain 
decorum in the courtroom, a power essential to ensure that the trial 
proceeds in an orderly manner. Generally, courts have an almost un-
limited power to protect their orderly procedures. As succinctly 
stated by the United States Supreme Court: 
It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that d!gnity, 
order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our coun-
try. The :flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards 
of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.257 
As a general rule, therefore, a trial judge's courtroom rules, and his 
reasonable actions in defense thereof, appear to be beyond reproach 
when they "bear a reasonable relationship to contemporary conditions 
and ought to be imposed only after there is a reasonable foundation 
for the need of any rule."258 
The ABA Standards on the Function of the Trial Judge state this 
general principle as a positive duty of the court: "The trial judge has 
the obligation to use his judicial power to prevent distractions from 
and disruptions of the trial."259 Nevertheless, these Standards exhort 
tempered actions: 
If the judge determines to impose sanctions for misconduct affecting the 
trial, he should ordinarily impose the least severe sanction appropriate 
to correct the abuse and to deter repetition. In weighing the severity of 
a possible sanction for disruptive courtroom conduct to be applied during 
the trial, the judge should consider the risk of further disruption, delay 
256 For a more detailed and exhaustive discussion of the rules of evidence in a 
criminal trial see, e.g., B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EvmENCE IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 119-32, 321-32 (1973) ; H. RoTHBLATT, HANDBOOK OF EvmENCE FOR 
CRIMINAL TRIALs (1965); 3 F. WHARTON, WHARToN's CRIMINAL EvmENCE §§ 835-900 
(R. Anderson ed. 1955) • 
257 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
25BPeck v. Stone, 34 App. Div. 506, 507, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1969). 
259 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6.3 (Approved Draft 1972). 
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or prejudice that might result from the character o£ the sanction or the 
time of its imposition.2ec• 
The courts' inherent powers to preserve order in the courtroom 
may, under certain limited circumstances, even transcend constitu-
tional rights, such as th•a defendant's right to a public trial. 261 How-
ever, this rather sweeping authority must only be exercised in the face 
of individual circumstances necessitating strong corrective measures. 
It is clearly improper for the court to act arbitrarily in the guise of 
preserving order in the courtroom. o 
The balancing of interests between the court's need to act to pro-
tect the orderly process of the trial, on the one hand, and the right of 
the defendant to a public trial, on the other, was exhaustively dis-
cussed by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Lawrence, 262 a case in 
which the public was excluded from the courtroom during the reading 
of the instructions to the jury. The starting point in the court's anal-
ysis of whether the public can properly be excluded from a trial was 
its recognition that the constitutional right to a public trial "has never 
existed as a rigid, inflexible straight jacket upon the courts."263 In-
stead, this right has been generally viewed as being 
subject to the inherent power of the court to limit attendance as the con-
ditions and circumstancEs reasonably require for the preservation o£ 
order and decorum in the courtroom, and to reasonably protect the rights 
of parties and witnesses.2e4 
Accordingly, a judge may, in his discretion, ''exclude anyone from the 
courtroom who does not conduct himself properly."265 Conversely, 
however, spectators who do conduct themselves properly may not con-
stitutionally be "excluded from any major portion of a trial."266 To do 
so constitutes "arbitrary exclusion" which fails to meet the constitu-
tional guarantee of a public trial. 267 
Applying these principles to the facts in Lawrence, the supreme 
court reversed the conviction because it could find no necessity for the 
exclusion of the public in order to preserve order and decorum in the 
courtroom.268 Indeed, it appeared in Lawrence that the public was ex-
cluded as a result of a mistake or misunderstanding on the P<l!t of the 
bailiff, who evidently overreacted to the judge's directive during a re-
cess to not permit ingress or egress of spectators during the court's 
2eo Id. 
2o1 See 19 DRAKE L. REV. 204·, 205 (1969). 
202167 N.W .2d 912 (Iowa 19EI9). 
2oa Id. at 914. 
204ld. 
205 Id. 
200 Id. at 915. 
201 Id. 
2os Id. at 916. 
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subsequent reading of the instructions.269 While the judge's directive 
was a proper exercise of his discretion, the bailiff's total exclusion of 
the public was arbitrary. Because the state failed to overcome the 
implied prejudice resulting therefrom, the supreme court reluctantly 
reversed the conviction. 270 
The most sensational aspect of the courtroom decorum issue in-
volves the defendant who consistently disrupts the trial proceedings. 
While the Iowa Supreme Court has not yet faced this problem, t..lte 
United States Supreme Court has formulated some guidelines for the 
exercise of the trial court's discretion. 
In Illinois v. Allen/11 the Court said: 
[t]here are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial 
judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag 
him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; [or] (3) 
take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself prop-
erly.272 
The Court left it to the trial court to determine which of the above 
alternatives, if not others, is followed in a particular situation.273 
Consistent with the Allen guidelines, the ABA Standards Relating 
to the Function of the Trial Judge provide: 
A defendant may be removed from the courtroom during his trial when 
his conduct is so disruptive that the trial cannot proceed in an orderly 
manner. Removal is preferable to gagging or shackling the disruptive 
defendant. If removed, the defendant should be required to be present 
in the court building while the trial is in progress, be given the oppor-
tunity of learning of the trial proceedings through his counsel at reason-
able intervals, and be given a continuing opportunity to return to the 
courtroom during the trial upon his assurance of good behavior. The re-
moved defendant should be summoned to the courtroom at appropriate 
intervals, with the offer to permit him to remain repeated in open court 
each time.2H 
Similarly, it is suggested in the ABA Standards Relating to Trial by 
Jury that physical restraint of the defendant (or witnesses) should oc-
cur only when "reasonably necessary to maintain order" and that the 
jurors accordingly should be instructed that "such restraint is not to 
be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt."275 
Despite the flexibility that AUen accords the trial court, it is advis-
able for the court to exercise its powers with care, for at least one 
state appellate court has reversed a conviction because a trial court 
269 Id. 
21o Id. at 919. 
271 397 u.s. 337 (1970). 
272 Id. at 343-44. 
21a See id.. at 347. 
2u ABA PRoJECT ON Mnm.ro1.t STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDs RE-
LATING TO THE FuNcTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6.8 (Approved Draft 1972). 
2 75 ABA PRoJECT oN M:rNn.ro:M STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1968). 
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took premature remedial actions under the Allen standards. 276 The 
trial court, upon observing a scuffie in the courtroom between the de-
fendant and four depu1ies, ordered shackling and gagging of the de-
fendant for the trial, although the scuffie had occurred prior to con-
vening of court.277 During the trial, however, there was no disruptive 
or unruly behavior, and accordingly both the shackles and gag were 
removed, but only after a substantial portion of the trial had been 
completed. 278 Reversing the conviction, the appellate court held that 
the Allen standards did not authorize the trial judge to act without 
first warning the defendant, at trial, to abstain from obstreperous be-
havior and then only if the defendant subsequently flouts this order.279 
In other words, mere "potentially disruptive" conduct is not enough 
to justify shackling and gagging a defendant.280 
B. 'l'he Jury Selection Process 
In addition to the trial court's general obligation to maintain de-
corum, it has innumerable, more highly structured responsibilities that 
are no less crucial to the conduct of the trial. One such duty is that 
of overseeing the jury SE!lection process, an area in which its discretion 
is almost as unfettered as it is in maintaining order in the court. 
1. Drawing the Jury 
In Iowa, jury selectio:n is done on a random basis with the clerk of 
court called on to "prepare and deposit in a box separate ballots con-
taining the names of all persons returned or added as jurors."281 From 
this box, the clerk is to select 16 names, but the court may, in its dis-
cretion, decide to wait for the return of the entire jury panel before 
directing the drawing of the prospective jurors for another case. 282 
Thus, while "litigants ordinarily are entitled to have the names in the 
drum of all the then-serving and available jurors," the supreme court 
nevertheless has held that a litigant "is only entitled to a fair and im-
276Jones v. State, 11 Md. App. 686, 693-94, 276 A.2d 666, 670 (1971). 
277 Id. at 688, 276 A.2d at 667. 
278 I d. at 688-89, 276 A.2d at 668. 
210 I d. at 694, 276 A.2d at 6'10. 
2so Various aspects relating to another alternative, citation for contempt, are 
discussed elsewhere in the Article. See text accompanying notes 149-60 supra. 
See generally ABA Pao.n:CT ON M1::NnlroM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO THE FuNcTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 7.1-.5 (Approved Draft 
1972). 
2Bl!owA R. CIV. P. 187(a); see IowA CoDE § 779.1 (1973). 
2s2 IowA R. CIV. P. 187. '!'he rule provides in part: 
Before drawing [of the trial jury] begins, either party may require that 
the names of all jurors be called, and have an attachment for those absent 
who are not engaged in other trials; but the court may wait for its return 
or not, in its discretion. 
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partial jury" rather than to "any particular jurors."283 Consequently, 
jury selection can proceed although some names drawn for a previous 
jury "inadvertently" are not replaced in the drum "and no harm is 
shown to have occurred."284 
2. Scope of the Voir Dire Examination 
Once the jury panel has been drawn, the litigants have the right,285 
as interpreted by the supreme court, "to examine prospective jurors on 
voir dire in order to enable them to select a jury composed of persons 
qualified and competent to judge and determine the facts in issue with-
out bias, prejudice or partiality."286 The scope of counsels' examina-
tion "cannot be governed by fixed rules, but is subject to the sound 
discretion of the trial court," the exercise of which will not be inter-
fered with on appeal "unless abuse is shown."287 The trial court ac-
cordingly can grant wide latitude to counsel in their voir dire exam-
ination provided, of course, that counsel do not use the examination as 
a convenient forum for placing inadmissible or prejudicial evidence 
before the jury.288 Within these strictures, counsel essentially are 
free to discuss practically anything relevant and can even attempt to 
curry favor with the jurors.289 
283 State v. Jones, 193 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa 1972). 
284 I d. 
285 Elkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 49, 148 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1967). But see 
People v. Crowe, lOS Cal. Rptr. 359, 506 P.2d 193 (1973) (voir dire can be con-
fined, in the court's discretion, to examination by the judge with requested writ-
ten questions submitted by counsel). Id. at 375-78, 506 P.2d at 199-202. See also 
ABA PROJECT ON Mnm.roM STANDAIU>S FOR CRllln:NAL JUSTICE, STANDAIU>S RELATING 
TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 5.1 (Approved Draft 1972): 
The judge should initiate the voir dire examination by identifying the 
parties and their respective counsel and by referring to the charge against 
the accused, and by putting to the prospective jurors questions touching 
their qualifications, including impartiality, to serve as jurors in the case. 
The judge should also permit such additional questions by the defendant 
or his attorney and the prosecutor as he deems reasonable and proper. 
286EJkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 49, 148 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1967), citing 31 AM. 
JUR. Jury§ 136 (1967), 50 C.J.S. Juries§ 2756 (1947). But see State v. Cunha, 
193 N.W.2d 106, 110-11 (Iowa 1972) (no error in trial court's granting of state's 
pretrial motion in limine to prevent defense attorney from asking questions on 
voir dire about prospective jurors' knowledge of jucy verdict in defendant's 
accomplice's case). 
2S7Elkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 50, 148 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1967). 
288 For example, the prosecutor may not imply that the defendant plans to 
exercise his constitutional right not to testify. See State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 
965-66, 151 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1967) (record not preserved here, however). 
289 See Anderson v. City of Council Bluffs, 195 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972) 
(not an abuse of discretion to permit plaintiff's counsel in civil case to ask 
prospective jurors, "is there anybody on the panel who is going to have a hard-
ship of l::Ome kind, a personal hardship, if they are selected to serve as a juror in 
this case?"). 
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Traditionally, one aspect of this flexibility has been a broad range 
of judicial discretion in detennining the scope of voir dire as to the 
possible racial prejudic.:s of prospective jurors. This discretion was 
sharply curtailed by the United States Supreme Court recently in 
Ham v. South Carolina. 29° Claiming that the possession--of-marijuana 
offense with which he was charged was nothing but a ruse to enable 
the police "to get him," the defendant, a black civil rights worker, re-
quested the judge to utilize voir dire to ask prospective jurors two 
specific questions relating to racial prejudice against Negroes.291 De-
clining to do so, the trial court instead asked three general questions 
about bias, prejudice, or partiality as prescribed in the state statute. 292 
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment required the judge in this case to interrogate the jurors upon the 
subject of racial prejudice."293 
Nevertheless, the high court agreed that the trial judge 
was not required to put the question in any particular form, or to ask 
any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because re-
quested to do so by petitioner,294 
In other words, despite the fact that due process demanded that cer-
tain questions be asked, the trial court was afforded a "broad discre-
tion"296 as to the form and number of those questions. In addition, the 
Court agreed that the trial judge's refusal on voir dire "to inquire as 
to particular bias agairu.t beards, after his inquiries as to bias in gen-
eral, does not reach th•: level of a constitutional violation."296 The 
Supreme Court reasoned: 
2oo 93 S. Ct. 848 (1973). 
291 These were: 
1. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and dis-
regarding the defendant's race? 2. You have no prejudice against negroes? 
Against black people? You would not be influenced by the use of the 
term "black"? ld. at 84!) n.2. 
292 These included: 
1. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant, Gene Ham? 
2. Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him? 
3. Can you give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial? 
Id. at 850 n.3. 
293JcJ.. at 850. The Court noted that its holding in Aldridge v. United States, 
283 U.S. 308 (1931) which reversed a negro's conviction for the murder of a 
white policeman because of the trial court's refusal to interrogate prospective 
jurors about any racial prejudice, "was not expressly grounded upon any con-
stitutional requirement." 93 S. Ct. at 849-50. See also United States v. Rivers, 
468 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1972) (harmless error rule applied to violation of 
Aldridge v. United States). 
294 93 S. Ct. at 850. 
29G Id. at 851, citing Aldric1ge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). 
296Jd. 
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Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in 
conducting voir dire, . . . and our inability to constitutionally distinguish 
possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar 
prejudices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were 
violated when the trial judge refused to put this question.297 
Another aspect of the trial courts' broad voir dire discretion is evi-
denced by their relatively unrestricted right to rule on motions for 
segregated, individualized voir dire of the jury panel. In this regard, 
no Iowa case has been found in which it has been successfully alleged 
that a court has erred in refusing to order such voir dire nor has the 
supreme court condemned the granting of such an order.298 In State 
v. Elmore/09 for example, the defendant claimed that pretrial excite-
ment and prejudice against him were engendered by a "constant bar-
rage"300 of stories in a local newspaper and over a local radio station. 
Declining to order segregated voir dire, the trial court also restricted 
counsel's freedom to ask what the prospective jurors had read or 
heard. Instead, each prospective juror was asked, in the others' pre-
sence, if he had read or heard any news accounts of the incident in 
issue, and, if so, if he had formed an opinion as to the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. The trial court based this approach on the theory 
that "the real issue was whether any of the prospective jurors has 
formed or expressed an opinion . . . which would prevent them from 
being fair and impartial jurors."301 Affirming, the supreme court noted 
that "[a] wide discretion must be left to the judgment of the trial 
court"302 in dealing with these situations. Conceding "[t]here is merit 
in the American Bar Standards . . . that under some circumstances 
each juror should be examined out of the presence of other jurors,"303 
the court nevertheless reiterated that "this has never been the prac-
tice in Iowa."304 
By way of contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reversed 
a defendant's conviction because of the court's refusal to order sepa-
rate voir dire for each juror outside the hearing of other jurors in a 
case involving a barrage of inflammatory pretrial publicity with strong 
297 Id. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has refused to 
accord an absolute right for a defendant in an abortion case to have prospective 
jurors questioned about any religious prejudices which could affect their de-
cision-even though the Roman Catholic Church takes a strong stand against 
abortion. Commonwealth v. Kudish, 289 N.E.2d 856, 858-59 (Mass. 1972). 
zgsSee State v. Cunha, 193 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 1972). 
299 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972). 
3oo Id. at 444. 
301 Id. at 446. 
302 I d., quoting Holub v. Fitzgerald, 214 Iowa 857, 859, 243 N.W. 575, 576 (1932). 
3os State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Iowa 1972), quoting State v. Albers, 
174 N.W2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1970). 
304Jd. 
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racial overtones. 305 A few weeks before the trial, the defendant was 
arrested for attacking a police officer during a scuffie at a city council 
meeting.306 The sensationalist reporting of that incident included the 
banner headline: "BLACK MOB BEATS TOP COP KELL Y,"307 and 
defendant, a black militant, was singled out in this and other accounts 
of the incident. Determining that the court's refusal to order segre-
gated voir dire was an abuse of its express authority to do so,308 the 
supreme court reversed, saying: 
When there is present m a case inflammatory pretrial publicity which 
creates the possibility that a trial could be prejudiced, there are exactly 
those circumstances pre:;ent which require each juror to be questioned 
out of the hearing of the other jurors.so9 
In addition, this approach would facilitate the development of possible 
challenges for cause based upon the specific infonnation that each 
juror retained. This approach appears more plausible than that taken 
in ElmoreJ which, in effe,~t, allows each juror to detennine if he is prej-
udiced. The Elmore approach precludes the possibility of a defendant 
being able to challenge a juror for what he had retained, since the 
juror is not required to answer what he had heard or read. 
3. Challenges for Cause 
Once the jurors have 'been examined, trial courts have "a large, but 
not unlimited, discretion."310 under the Iowa Code311 in ruling upon 
challenges of prospective jurors for cause. Thus, for example, a court's 
denial of a defendant's <:hallenge for cause has been affinned where 
the challenged juror admitted knowing both parties involved and hav-
ing heard the case discussed, but nevertheless pledged to give each 
party a "fair deal."312 Likewise, it is within the trial court's C4scre-
tion to refuse to disqualify a prospective juror who admits that he 
might have fonned some opinions about the case, but indicates he will 
listen to all of the evidence before actually making up his mind.313 
In marked contrast to 1he limits placed on the court's power to deny 
a motion to strike for cause, its power to permit striking for cause ap-
pears to be essentially unlimited. For example, the defendant in State 
v. Grove314 claimed that the reason he waited until filing a motion for 
305 Commonwealth v. Johru;on, 440 Pa. 342, 351-52, 269 A2d 752, 757 (1970). 
2oa I d. at 344, 269 A.2d at 75:J. 
307 Id., 269 A.2d at 753. 
sosPursuant to PA. R. CRillt. P. 1106(b), voir dire "may be conaucceu beyond 
the hearing and presence of other jurors." 440 Pa. at 352, 269 A2d at 757 (em-
phasis added). 
aoo 440 Pa. at 352-53, 269 A2d at 757. 
310 State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 232, 46 N.W 2d 20, 23 (1951). 
311 See IowA CoDE § 779.5 (1973). 
312 State v. Sommer, 249 Iowa 160, 175-76, 86 N.W 2d 1l5, 124-25 (1957). 
313 State v. McClain, 256 Iowa 175, 182, 125 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1963). 
314171 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1969). 
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a new trial to challenge jurors for cause was that any timely challenge 
would have been unavailing since his particular objection, that five of 
the jurors had served on the jury on defendant's other charge, would 
not come within any of the statutory grounds for dismissal for cause.m 
Rejecting this contention, the supreme court said: 
We do not take such a restricted view of that section. It would be strange 
i..'ldeed if the trial court were powerless to prevent before trial a known 
injustice which could later be the basis for granting a new trial.'116 
Accordingly, trial courts "should use the utmost caution in overrul-
ing challenges for cause in criminal cases where there appears to be a 
fair question as to their soundness."317 In this regard, the supreme 
court 
see[s] no occasion in the ordinary administration o£ the criminal law in 
this state for the close rulings on the qualifications of jurors . . . . Al-
though a ruling may be technically right, if it must be so doubtful as to 
raise a fair question as to its correctness, it is far better to give the ac-
cused the benefit of the doubt .•.. 318 
4. Peremptory Challenges 
There is also considerable discretion in the way the court permits 
the parties to make their peremptory challenges. 319 As a guiding 
principle, the right to exercise any unused peremptory challenges con-
tinues until the jury is sworn. In State v. Brown,S20 the supreme court 
opined: 
We think the court might very well permit a party to exercise his right 
at any time before the jury is actually sworn, provided such party is act-
ing in good faith, and not with intent to gain advantage, or to delay the 
trial of the cause.s21 · 
Because there was no rule of court, statute, or decision supporting the 
defendant's contention that consecutive waivers of peremptory chal-
lenges by both parties amounted to acceptance of the jurors already in 
the box, the supreme court in Brown held that the trial court was free 
to exercise its discretion in deciding to permit the state to subsequently 
exercise a peremptory challenge rather than having to use one of its 
strikes.322 Because the trial court, from its vantage point, "thought 
3 15 I d. at 519-20. 
316 Id. at 520. The supreme court continued: "Actually the trial court has con-
siderable discretion in acting on challenges to prospective jurors. We believe it 
is easily broad enough to have justified the excuse of these jurors upon proper 
challenge." Id. 
317 State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 238, 46 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1951). 
318 I d. at 238-39, 46 N.W.2d at 26, quoting State v. Teale, 154 Iowa 677, 682, 135 
N.W. 408, 410 (1912). 
319 See IowA CoDE § 779.10 (1973). 
320 253 Iowa 658, 113 N.W.2d 286 (1962). 
321 I d. at 665, 113 N.W.2d at 291. 
322 Id. at 665-66, 113 N.W.2d at 291; see IowA CoDE § 779.11 (1973). 
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the prosecutor did not a•::t in bad faith nor for the purpose of delaying 
the trial,"323 the supreme court refused to intervene. Accordingly, ab-
sent any bad faith, it should be an abuse of discretion for a trial court 
to refuse to allow the taking of peremptory challenges after consecu-
tive waivers by the opposing parties.824 
5. Excusing a Juror 
Once a juror has been accepted by both parties he can still be ex-
cused from serving if the court so chooses. The supreme court has 
said that the statutory E!Xemptions from jury service "are not exclu-
sive"326 and accordingly, the trial court can even discharge a juror who 
offers strictly personal reasons to being sworn onto the panel. 326 The 
exercise of this discretionary power "will not be interfered with unless 
it is clearly shown to have been abused to the actual prejudice of the 
complaining party."327 Indeed, "it will be presumed, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, that the action of the court was based upon 
sufficient grounds."32s 
6. ImpaneUing Alternate Jurors 
The courts have exprE!SS statutory authority to impanel one or two 
alternate jurors,820 but tb.e exercise of this power rests strictly in the 
court's discretion.330 Nevertheless, the impanelling of at least one al-
ternate juror would seem to be in the interest of sound administration 
as a protection against losing a juror through illness331 or other suffi-
cient cause. 332 
7. Sequestration of the Jury 
Upon swearing of the jury or at any time thereafter during the trial, 
the court may order it sequestered. 333 The decision to permit the 
jury to separate or to have them kept together throughout the trial is 
a matter resting in the trial court's discretion,33!l and the statute no 
323 253 Iowa at 666, 113 N.W.2d at 291. 
324 Indeed, the supreme court has held erroneous a trial court's ruling that 
one party's waiver of his first peremptory challenge constituted a waiver of his 
remaining challenges. State v. Hunter, 118 Iowa 686, 690, 92 N.W. 872, 873 (1902). 
s2u State v. Critelli, 237 Iowa 1271, 1280, 24 N.W.2d ll.3, 118 (1946). 
32o Id., 24 N.W.2d at 118. 
327 Id. at 1281, 24 N.W.2d at 118. 
328 I d., 24 N.W.2d at 118. 
320 IowA CoDE § 779.18 (19'13). 
330 1946 REPORT OF ATrY. Gm~. OF IoWA 211, 212. 
331 See IowA CODE § 780.18 (1973). 
332 Cf. State v. Coffee, 18:! N.W.2d 390, 395 (Iowa 1970) (bias displayed by 
juror during recess in trial). 
333 IowA CODE§ 780.19 (197a); see State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 653-55 (Iowa 
1970) (sequestration of jury during its deliberations). 
334 IowA CODE § 780.19 (1!}73); see State v. Lowder, 256 Iowa 853, 864, 129 
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longer requires the court to sequester the jury upon either party's re-
quest.335 The court's election presumably would be subject to scrutiny 
only upon a strong showing of actual prejudice to the party who un-
successfully sought sequestration or separation. 336 
C. Motion for a Mistrial 
Another instance of the trial court's continuous responsibility to su-
pervise and control the conduct of the trial process involves the motlon 
for a mistrial, which may be made at any time during the trial. The 
purpose of the motion is to terminate the instant proceeding, without 
barring retrial, whenever it becomes apparent that the defendant can-
not or will not get a fair trial because the jury-or individual jurors-
has been exposed to prejudicial matter.337 
Perhaps the most common ground for granting such a motion is 
prosecutorial misconduct.338 It must be emphasized, however, that not 
N.W.2d 11, 18 (1964); cf. ABA PROJECT ON Mnm.roM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE§ 5.2 (a) (App. 
Draft 1972) : 
The trial judge should take appropriate steps ranging from admonishing 
the jurors to sequestration of them during trial, to insure that the jurors 
will not be exposed to sources of information or opinion, or subject to 
influences, which might tend to affect their ability to render an impartial 
verdict on the evidence presented in court. 
335 For an example of how the statute sharply limited judicial discretion before 
its amendment in 1969 see State v. Giudice, 170 Iowa 731, 742, 153 N.W. 336, 340 
(1915): 
This statute permits the separation of the jury at any time before the final 
submission of the cause to them "except where one of the parties objects 
thereto." . . . Upon the request of either party, the jury must be kept 
together, and it is error not to do so." 
The phrase "except where one of the parties objects thereto" was deleted in 
1969. See IowA ConE § 780.19 (1966). 
336 See generalLy State v. ~owder, 256 Iowa 853, 129 N.W.2d 11 (1964). In that 
case, some of the jurors sat on other juries during the 1 month continuance 
granted in the midst of Lowder's trial The supreme court, noting that the 
defendant never objected to separation of the jury, concluded: 
No matter of prejudice of any nature appears in the record by reason of 
the service in civil cases of some of the members of the jury on de-
fendant's trial. Appellant's counsel contends prejudice is presumed from 
the facts herein. Prejudice can only be presumed if it appears clearly 
that some substantial rights of defendant have been transgressed • . • • 
The record does not disclose that a substantial right of defendant was 
denied him. Id. at 863-64, 129 N.W.2d at 17 (citations omitted). 
337 State v. Wright, 203 N.W .2d 247, 251 (Iowa 1972). 
338 The presiding judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "estimates that 
at least 60 percent of the cases that come before his court involve a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, although he adds that only occasionally is the claim 
well founded." Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972). 
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all prosecutorial misconduct will support a motion £or a mistrial. 
Rather, it is only that misbehavior which "appears to [be] so preju-
dicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial."339 In making its deter-
mination of whether the prosecutorial misconduct is such that a mis-
trial should be declared, the trial court is afforded substantial leeway, 
and its decision will not. be interfered with "unless it clearly appears 
there has been a manifest abuse of such discretion."34° Clearly, how-
ever, the discretion is not unbounded. 
It mm:t be utilized fairly and impartially, not arbitrarily, by application of 
relevant legal and equitable principles to all known or readily available 
facts of a given issue or cause to the end that justice may more nearly 
be effectuated.an 
Within these parameters, even when the trial court agrees that a 
mistrial might otherwise be ordered, it is still free, as a general rule, 
to take some alternative action. The most common palliative measure 
is to order the objectionable matter stricken £rom the record and to 
admonish the jury, specifically and clearly,342 to disregard it. The su-
preme court has said repeatedly: 
Ordinarily the striking of improper testimony cures any error . . • . Only 
in extreme instances where it is manifest that the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence on the jury remained, despite its exclusion, and influenced the 
jury is the defendant denied a fair trial and entitled to a reversal.343 
The court "may exercise its discretion on its own motion to strike 
evidence it deems erroneously admitted,''344 notwithstanding the de-
fendant's contention that the court's sua sponte action "placed undue 
emphasis on the testimony and was prejudicial error."345 However, it 
appears that a trial court should not order a mistrial on its own motion 
where the defendant does not consent thereto.346 
330 State v. Barton, 258 Iowa 924, 931, 140 N.W .2d 886, 891 (1966); accord, State 
v. Schmidt, 259 Iowa 972, 980··81, 145 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1966) . 
MO State v. Hephner, 161 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Iowa 1968). 
341 State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Iowa 1973). 
342 State v. Coffee, 182 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1970). 
343 State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1971). 
aH State v. Shimon, 182 N.W .2d 113, 115 (Iowa 1970). 
345 I d. 
346 See United States v. Horn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971): 
The Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial 
judges not to foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise 
of judicial discretion leads. to the conclusion that the ends of public justice 
would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. 
See also People v. Gardner, 1!)5 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972): 
We believe that a trial court's declaration, sua sponte, of a mistrial can-
not be grounded on "a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion" where 
under the circumstances of the case it fails to consult the defendant be-
fore summarily aborting the proceedings. 
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This strike-and-admonition approach is inappropriate when the ob-
jectionable evidence has constitutional undertones, however; a mistrial 
is mandated as a matter of law in such situations. In the recent case 
of State v. W are,S41 the defendant's oral confession was introduced at 
trial before it became known during cross examination that the con-
fession had been obtained in violation of the defendant's so-called 
Miranda rights. 348 Although the testimony was thereupon stricken 
and a comprehensive admonition was given the jurors to not consider 
it, the supreme court reversed. In so doing, it proposed the follow-
ing standard: 
[P]rejudice inherent in the constitutionally proscribed evidential display 
of defendant's inculpatory statement [is] not dissipated by trial court's re-
quest that the jury disregard it.s49 
This principle apparently applies also to the use of the defendant's 
tacit admissions, for the Iowa Supreme Court has also said: 
[W]e now hold, evidential use of "tacit admissions" by an accused offends 
the [self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment] and is therefore no 
longer permissible in criminal trials within this jurisdiction.s5o 
Another way that the trial court can deal with a mistrial situation, 
under certain circumstances, is to deny the motion and permit the 
examination to continue in order to show the context of an otherwise 
highly prejudicial remark. As a general rule, 
reference to a defendant's prior criminal record is frequently so preju-
dicial as to require a mistrial, but it does not follow that mere mention 
thereof always dictates that result.s51 
Accordingly, it was properly within the trial court's discretion in 
State v. Kendrick to allow the state "to show the entire transaction."352 
On cross examination, the defense attorney had elicited from the 
police officer that the defendant had remained free overnight before 
being arrested and then had implied that the police obviously had 
considered the defendant to be trustworthy. On redirect, the officer 
noted that the defendant had a "past record." Overruling the defend-
ant's motion for mistrial, the trial court then allowed the prosecution 
to bring out the entire conversation in which the officer had said that 
he had been reluctant to leave the defendant free overnight because 
of his "past record." With the benefit of this additional information, 
the trial court had sufficient basis to deny the motion for mistrial 
347 205 N.W 2d 700 (Iowa 1973). 
348 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
349 State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Iowa 1973). 
s5o State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972). 
351State v. Kendrick, 173 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Iowa 1970). 
352 Id. at 563. 
1070 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
The courts generally accord wide latitude to counsel in their argu-
ments to the jury. Accordingly, the prosecutor 
is entiUed to some latitude in analyzing the evidence admitted in the trial, 
and he may draw conclusions and point out permissible inferences and 
weaknesses in ... testimony.asa 
The trial court still has "the duty to see that the arguments are kept 
within proper bounds," however.354 
One recent case355 provides an example of an abuse of discretion in 
refusing to order a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct both 
in the opening and the closing arguments. In the opening argument, 
the prosecutor said he knew the defendant was guilty. The supreme 
court said "he improperly commissioned himself an expert witness, 
then exceeded his prerogative as such by expressing an impermissible 
opinion as to defendant's guilt."356 On closing argument he undertook 
to inflame the passions of the jurors by "inferentially urging the jurors 
to place themselves and members of their families in a hypothetical 
position of peril created by a drunken, car operating defendant."357 
Both of these arguments were countenanced by the trial court, which 
not only refused to orde.r a mistrial, but also refused to admonish the 
jury to disregard these remarks. It appears, however, that even an 
admonition would not h6.ve sufficed since the supreme court observed: 
"Prejudice flovving therefrom is sel£.evident."358 
The Iowa Supreme Court's express adoption of one section of the 
ABA Standards Relatins.T to Fair Trial and Free Press359 recently in 
State v. Bigley360 has removed one aspect of the trial courts' discretion 
in matters of interrogati.J:1g jurors concerning the prejudicial effect of 
in-trial publicity. Until Bigley, the Iowa rule was that the decision 
whether or not to interrogate the jurors rested in the sound discretion 
of the trial court.861 Indeed, the court's refusal to do so was upheld 
in Bigley, and the new rule given only prospective application.862 In 
Bigley, the trial court examined the improper newspaper account but 
refused the defendant's request that he question each juror about it-
because of the court's earlier standard admonition to the jury not to 
ass State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 340, 149 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1967). 
as4 I d., 149 N.W.2d at 196. 
~r.s State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973). 
3so I d. at 751. 
357 Id. 
3ss Id. 
35D ABA Pnon:cT oN Mnmlvnr STANDARDS FOR CRII\IINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO FAm TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.5 (f) (Approved Draft 1968). 
360 202 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa 1972). 
:3°1 I d. at 57. 
362 I d. at 58. 
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discuss the case or to read accounts of it, as well as because there was 
no evidence that this admonition had been violated.363 
In all trials begun after November 15, 1972, however, the trial court 
must interrogate each juror, outside the presence of the others, upon 
the motion of either party, and may do so upon its own motion. This 
examination "shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accu-
rate record of the examination shall be kept."364 The test for excusing 
a juror challenged for such exposure is governed by standard 3.4 (b) 
of the fair trial-free press guidelines. 
Guidelines for excusing jurors exposed to prejudicial publicity oc-
curring during trial were also adopted in Bigley, with the supreme 
court once again looking to the ABA Standards. These standards 
leave little to the court's discretion in deciding a challenge for cause. 
For example, a juror "shall be excused" if he is exposed to material 
which would have required declaration of a mistrial were that evi-
dence introduced at trial.365 Likewise, a juror who states that he will 
be unable to overcome any prejudicial conceptions engendered by 
this extrajudicial publicity "shall be subject to challenge for cause no 
matter how slight his exposure."366 Moreover, a juror who was ex-
posed to and remembers reports of inadmissible incriminatory matters 
"shall be subject to challenge for cause without regard to his testi-
mony as to his state of mind."367 On the other hand, if a juror is 
exposed to and remembers admissible (but extrajudicial) evidence or 
inadmissible evidence that is not highly prejudicial, his acceptability 
"shall turn on whether his testimony as to impartiality is believed."368 
In that connection, if he has formed an opinion then he "shall be 
subject to challenge for cause unless the examination shows unequiv-
ocally that he can be impartial."369 Whether or not a showing of un-
equivocality has been made presumably would be left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, but in making this determination, the 
trial courts must consider "[b] oth the degree of exposure and the ... 
juror's testimony as to his state of mind .... "370 
D. Amendment of Charge 
The Code permits the trial court to order amendment of the indict-
363 I d. at 57. 
364 I d. at 58, citing ABA PROJECT oN Mnm.ruM STANDARDS FOR CRil\IINAL JusTICE, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS§ 3.5(£) (Approved Draft 1968). 
36G I d., citing ABA PROJECT ON Mnmlrm.t STANDARDS FOR CRil\IINAL JUSTICE, 





s1o I d. 
1072 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
ment or information during the trial. 871 Whether to do so is left to 
the trial court's discretion, but it nevertheless can only act on the 
state's motion,372 and then only "to correct errors or omissions in 
matters of form or suhstance."373 In no instance can it order an 
amendment which would have the effect of charging a new offense. 374 
Amendments ordered during trial most commonly become necessary 
in order to conform the charge to the proof adduced from testimony 
at trial. However, they are also made before introduction of any 
evidence, as, for example, to allege the specific manner or mode of 
the commission of the offense charged, 375 to strike surplusage from the 
charge,376 or to substitute the name of the true owner of the property 
involved. 311 Regardless of whether they are ordered before or during 
trial, however, as long as the court confines the amendments to the 
correction of errors or omissions, its decision to allow amendment will 
not, absent special circumstances, be an abuse o£ discretion. 
However, the court's characterization of the effect of a particular 
amendment as doing nothing more than correcting errors or omissions 
is subject to appellate review. The court may also abuse its discretion, 
in certain circumstances, by ordering an otherwise proper amendment 
but refusing to grant the defendant a continuance to respond to it.318 
State v. Young379 is an illustration of a trial court's properly order-
ing an amendment even though it destroyed one of the defendant's 
theories of the case. The amendment corrected the date of the alleged 
rape to conform the charge to the proof. The defendant theretofore 
had been prepared to prove that the apartment where the alleged rape 
took place was not leased by prosecutrix on the date listed in the 
county attorney's information, but this defense was rendered worthless 
by the amendment because she had leased the apartment by the sub-
sequent date. The supre~me court remarked: 
While it must have bEen disappointing to see this defense evaporate 
when the date was correeted, the state is not bound to an incorrect date 
because defendant could have shown the crime could not have occurred 
on the original date.sso 
The court conceded, however, that the situation "might have been 
311 See IowA CoDE §§ 773.43-.47 (1973). 
a12 See id. § 773.43. 
373 I d. 
au I d. § 773.46. 
37o State v. Crutcher, 174 N.W.2d 449, 451-52 (Iowa 1970). 
370 State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.:!d 879 (Iowa 1973). 
377 State v. Osborn, 200 N.W .2d 798, 807 (Iowa 1972). 
378 See IowA CODE § 773.47 (1973); see text accompanying notes 431-438 infra. 
370 172 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1969). 
3BO I d. at 129-30. 
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different"381 if the defendant could have established an alibi for the 
corrected date but "had no opportunity to do so because of the belated 
amendment."382 The defendant had made no such claim, however. 
If he had, the supreme court suggested that the proper remedy would 
have been the granting of a continuance. 383 
In order for the amendment to be impermissible on its face, it must 
have the effect of charging a new offense. An appellant who either 
cannot show prejudice because of the court's refusal to grant him a 
continuance thereafter, or one who was in fact granted a continuance, 
thus must assert that the amendment had such an effect. This argu-
ment has been successful, for example, when the information was 
amended during trial to change the offense from forgery to uttering 
a forged instrument,384 as well as when the amendment changed an 
indictment to charge second offense OMVUI instead of first offense 
OMVUI.ass 
Because the Code merely provides that an amendment may be 
ordered "during the trial,"386 the question is left open as to how far 
along in the trial process an amendment may be ordered and still be 
"during the trial." Amendments ordinarily are made some time dur-
ing, or at the close of, the state's case. Whether or not an amendment 
can be ordered at the close of all evidence has not been decided by 
the Iowa Supreme Court. This would appear to be possible, but only 
where the need for the amendment has been occasioned by evidence 
adduced in the defendant's case. 
Parenthetically, it is arguable that it would be an abuse of discretion 
for a court, during any stage of the pretrial or trial process, to refuse 
to order an amendment that clearly does nothing more than correct 
the form of substance of the indictment or information. Because of 
the defendant's qualified right to a continuance following the ordering 
of such an amendment, 387 the court could protect the defendant from 
being prejudiced thereby, while at the same time protecting the inter-
ests of the state. 
E. Continuances 
Continuances may be granted during trial in the court's discretion 
rather than as a matter of right.388 Thus, the court's decision to grant 
381 Id. at 130. 
382 Id. 
383 I d.; see IowA CODE § 780.12 (1973). 
384State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330, 334-36 (Iowa 1969). 
385 State v. Herbert, 210 Iowa 730, 731, 231 N.W. 318 (1930). 
38s IowA CODE § 773.45 (1973). 
387 Id. § 773.47. 
3sssee IowA R. Crv. P. 182-84; IowA CoDE§ 780.2 (1973). 
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or deny a requested continuance is likely to be upheld on review 
unless the appellant can demonstrate not only that the court acted 
arbitrarily, but also that its actions were prejudicial. 
One common ground :for seeking a continuance is that of unavaila-
bility of witnesses. When the trial court determines whether to grant 
a continuance on such a basis, two principal questions are presented 
for the court's determination. These are whether the movant has 
demonstrated due diligence in attempting to secure the missing wit-
ness' attendance and whether this witness' testimony would be ma-
terial to the movant's case. These two principles coalesced in State v. 
King,339 in which the supreme court approved the half-day continu-
ance during trial that wru granted the state because its expert witness, 
an FBI agent, was testifying in another case.390 The supreme court 
concluded: 
Certainly the one-half day continuance to enable a witness to attend trial 
was not unreasonable and did not in and of itself deny defendant due 
process.391 
On the other hand, the supreme court has upheld a trial court's 
denial of a continuance to permit the defendant to belatedly interpose 
an alibi defense. 392 After the state had rested, the defendant filed 
notice that he was going to rely on an alibi defense. He moved for 
a 4-day continuance to permit the state the same time to prepare for 
this new development, just as if the standard 4-day notice had been 
given before trial.393 Afiirming the trial court's refusal to utilize a 
continuance during trial to offset the defendant's failure to meet a 
statutory pretrial requisite, the supreme court said, "We also think 
the language of the [alibi-notice] statute clearly means the notice 
must be filed before commencement of the trial."394 This statement 
appears a bit too broad or generalized, since it is possible that the 
defendant would not turn up an alibi witness until after the trial has 
started. A better approa·ch would be to follow the same procedure 
as that for allowing testimony by additional state's witnesses (whose 
names were not endorsed on the indictment nor included in a pretrial 
4-day notice of additional testimony).395 
In State v. , Moline, 396 for example, the prosecutor learned of new 
state's witnesses during the voir dire examination of jurors.397 He 
389191 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 1971). 
390 I d. at 657. 
391 I d. 
392 State v. Rovnick, 245 Iowa 319, 324-25, 60 N.W .2d 529, 531-32 (1953). 
393 I d. at 322, 60 N.W .2d at 5HO; see IowA CoDE § 777.18 (1973). 
394 I d. at 324, 60 N.W.2d at 531. 
39G See IowA CoDE§§ 780.10-.12 (1973). 
aoa 164 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 196H). 
307 Id. at 155. 
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then filed a motion for leave to introduce additional testimony under 
section 780.11,398 which generally requires a two-pronged showing that 
the evidence is so newly discovered as to permit insufficient time for 
the state to give the standard 4-day pretrial notice of additional testi-
mony and that diligence has been shown in attempting to discover 
such evidence in a timely fashion. 399 The state is required "to show 
the same diligence as is required to support a motion for a continu-
ance,"400 and determination of the state's diligence is a matter in which 
the trial court has wide discretion.401 Indeed, the supreme court has 
said, 
Matters concerning due diligence are so much in the discretion of the trial 
court that we cannot say the ruling was improper. We will not interfere 
unless an abuse appears.402 
The defendant has an absolute right to a continuance if the court 
grants this motion.403 Upon the defendant's failure to elect a continu-
ance, the witness is then allowed to testify when called.404 
F. Motion for a Directed Verdict 
The defendant commonly makes a motion for a directed verdict at 
the close of the state's case and, if unsuccessful, then again at the close 
of all the evidence. No error can be predicated on the court's failure 
to sustain the motion when made at the close of the state's case.405 The 
court may, of course, sustain the motion and terminate the case at 
that time. 
If the court overrules the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, 
and the jury returns a verdict of guilty, it must be determined on 
appeal whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to generate 
a jury question on "each essential element of the crime."406 In making 
the initial determination, the trial court is to consider whether the 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial/07 "raise [s] a fair inference 
of guilt"408 and it is not enough that the state's evidence merely 
398Jd. 
399 IowA CoDE § 780.11 (1973). 
4oo 164 N.W.2d at 155. 
401 Id. at 156. 
402State v. Gilliland, 252 Iowa 664, 669, 108 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1961). 
403 IowA ConE § 780.12 (1973). 
404Jd. 
4°5 State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 1972). 
40GState v. Williams, 179 N.W.2d 756, 758 (Iowa 1970). 
407 A special problem arises whenever the state is relying solely on circum-
stantial evidence, in that this evidence "must be entirely consistent 'l.vith defend-
ant's guilt and wholly inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of defendant's 
innocence .... " Id. at 760 (reversal of conviction because of error in denying 
motion for directed verdict). 
4os Id. at 758. 
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"raise[s] a suspicion, speculation or conjecture."409 If the court finds 
"there is substantial evidence reasonably tending to support the charge 
the issues should be submitted to the jury."410 If not, then the courl 
should direct a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. 
Determination of the sufficiency of the evidence thus is essentially 
a matter for the fact finder, whose function it is "to decide disputed 
questions of fact and to draw permissible inferences therefrom .... "411 
This determination is subject to review only to the extent of determin-
ing whether there was a substantial basis for the court's determination. 
In making this limited review, the supreme court views the evidence 
"in the light most favorable to the state" and "consider[s] only the 
supporting evidence whether contradicted or not."412 Thus, the trial 
court's determination is binding unless the supreme court concludes it 
"is without substantial support in the evidence or is clearly against the 
weight thereof."413 
G. Reopening the Record 
One way the trial court can properly avoid immediately directing a 
verdict when it determines that there is insufficient evidence in the 
record is to order reopE>ning of the record to give the state an oppor-
tunity to correct such defect. Additionally, this privilege would also 
apply to the defendant who prematurely rests his case. "[A]llow[ing] 
a litigant to reopen aft•:!r he has rested"414 is another area in which 
trial courts are accorded broad, but structured, leeway.415 While the 
Rules of Civil Procedure416 authorize the courts to reopen the record, 
the supreme court has added: "[E]ven in the absence of statute we 
could see no tenable ground for denying existence of inherent court 
power to order reopening in the furtherance of justice."417 Neverthe-
less, reopening is structurally confined by statute to correction of "an 
evident oversight or mistake," and must be done before "final submis-
sion of the case."418 Moreover, the court is empowered to impose "such 
terms as it deems just" when ordering a reopening of either party's 
case.410 
<I09Id. 
410 I d. 
411 State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 334, 149 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1967). 
412 State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879, - (Iowa, 1973). 
413 State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 334, 149 N.W .2d 190, 192 {1967). 
m State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa 1972). 
416 "We have allowed wide leeway in reviewing discretion of trial court in 
permitting a case to be reopened." Id. 
no IowA R. CIV. P. 192. 
417 State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 1972). 
418 IowA R. CIV. P. 192. 
U9Id. 
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The Iowa Supreme Court has encouraged reopenings when neces-
sary for a full and complete hearing on the matter, and has said: 
But it must not be forgotten that the primary purpose of the trial was 
neither the acquittal nor the conviction of the defendant, but to ascertain 
with the requisite degree of certainty the truth of the matter charged in 
the indictment. To that end, as a general rule, all competent and ma-
terial evidence was admissible.420 
Put differently, the supreme court believes that no <:onvicticn or ac-
quittal should be based on false or mistaken testimony "when the mis-
take is discovered before the case is closed and submitted."421 
Reopenings have been upheld on appeal where necessary: to estab-
lish proof of venue;422 to correct testimony on direct examination;423 
to reiterate previous testimony after the judge indicated he did not re-
call any evidence on a particular aspect of the case;424 and to allow a 
witness to clarify his previous testimony.425 Reopenings have also 
been approved for introduction of an exhibit into evidence after a 
proper foundation therefore was laid during the state's case but the 
exhibit was not introduced because of mere oversight/26 as well as for 
reintroduction of an exhibit into evidence after a determination that 
the state had prematurely offered such evidence during its case.427 
The breadth of judicial discretion in permitting reopening of the 
record was demonstrated in State v. Thomas,428 in which the state was 
permitted to reopen after completion of the defense counsel's closing 
420State v. Thomas, 158 Iowa 687, 692, 138 N.W. 864, 865 (1912). 
421 Id. at 692, 138 N.W. at 866. 
422 State v. Anderson, 209 Iowa 510, 514, 228 N.W. 353, 355 (1929). 
423 State v. Thomas, 158 Iowa 687, 690, 138 N.W. 864, 865 (1912). 
424State v. Martin, 199 Iowa 643, 647, 200 N.W. 213, 215 (1924). 
425 State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 295-96 (Iowa 1972); accord, State v. Shean, 
32 Iowa 88 (1871) (permissible to recall witness whose previous testimony was 
"misunderstood by the court, counsel or jury'' or "when counsel differ as to the 
evidence given, and the court is unable to determine the precise statements of 
the witness.") Id. at 93. 
426 State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1972). The supreme court noted 
that the Moreland situation was remarkably similar to a case in which the Tenth 
Circuit stated: 
The government first presented expert testimony relating to the chemi-
cal composition of the drug. A chain of custody was established from 
the time of seizure of the drug until the time it was brought into court. 
The jury heard testimony concerning the article and saw it. The only 
thing remaining to he done before the drug was admissible in evidence 
was for the prosecution to offer it. Nothing in the record indicates that 
the government's £allure to do so was the product of anything other than 
mere inadvertence. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say 
that the trial court abused the wide discretion committed to it with re-
spect to permitting a party to reopen after resting. United States v. 
Keine, 424 F.2d 39, 40 (lOth Cir. 1970). 
427 State v. Johnson, 162 N.W.2d 453, 456-57 (Iowa 1968). 
428 158 Iowa 687, 138 N.W. 864 (1912). 
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argument.429 The recalled state's witness thereupon corrected her 
previous testimony as to the date that certain events occurred.430 
After receipt of this con·ected testimony, however, the judge permitted 
the defense counsel to make another closing argument. The supreme 
court affirmed, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that he was 
prejudiced because of his undue emphasis in the original closing argu-
ment that he could not possibly have committed ·the crime since his 
alibi witnesses placed him elsewhere on the incorrect date.431 
State v. Edwards432 illustrates that timeliness of a motion for re-
opening the record is al:;o an important factor to be considered in rul-
ing thereon. In that bootlegging case, which was tried to the court, 
the state moved to reopen on the day following the submission of the 
case, when the court was about to render its decision. The county at-
torney claimed he previously was unaware of the availability of the 
proffered evidence concerning illegal transportation, but the court re-
fused to reopen the rec:ord, and subsequently acquitted the defend-
ant.433 Upon a state's appeal, the supreme court affirmed, noting: 
To reopen the case at this juncture would be to open up the case to a 
retrial, rather than to a momentary correction of a mistake or oversight. 
It cannot be assumed tl:at such testimony would go undenied. It might 
become necessary to seco·k additional witnesses on the issue.434 
The one instance in which the Iowa Supreme Court has found an 
abuse of discretion in this area involved a refusal (in a civil case) to 
order reopening of the record.435 Both parties had rested at the end 
of the day, and upon the court's convening the ne>..i: day the appellant 
asked leave to reopen the case for the purpose of cross examining cer-
tain witnesses regarding statements contained in records appellant had 
discovered the night before.436 Noting that "[d]ue diligence must al-
ways be shown11437 to discover evidence sought to be introduced in 
12o Id. at 690, 138 N.W. at 865. 
1ao I d. at 691, 138 N.W. at 865. 
·131 I d. at 693, 138 N.W. at 866. 
432 205 Iowa 587, 218 N.W. 266 (1928). 
433 I d. at 588, 218 N.W. at 277. 
434 Id. at 591, 218 N.W. at ~;78; cf. Schipfer v. Stone, 205 Iowa 328, 218 N.W. 568, 
rehearing denied and opinion modified on anothe-r point, 219 N.W. 933 (Iowa 
1928) (notation in this case of abuse of discretion in refusing to order reopening 
of case where further examination would have taken but a few minutes). 
435 Schipfer v. Stone, 206 l:>wa 328, 218 N.W. 568, rehearing denied and opinion 
modified on another point, 219 N.W. 933 (1928). 
43o I d. at 331, 218 N.W. at 570. 
437 Id. at 331, 218 N.W. at !)70; cf. State v. Edwards, 205 Iowa 587, 218 N.W. 266 
(1928): 
The only showing of diligence and excuse for failure to offer the testi-
mony at the trial was that the county attorney did not know that such 
evidence was available. But the captain of police ... did know it. Id. 
at 591, 218 N.W. at 268. 
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such an application, the supreme court determined there was an abuse 
of discretion in the court's refusal to reopen this case since there was 
such a showing of diligence.438 Moreover, the supreme court seem-
ingly put another condition on reopening, namely, that the evidence 
sought to be introduced must be material, since it noted: "The showing 
of materiality was sufficient .... "439 
H. Judicial J>.letice 
The taking of judicial notice of certain facts is a second way in which 
the trial court, under certain circumstances, can avoid directing the 
verdict because of insufficiency of evidence relating to an essential ele-
ment of the crime charged. One of the most common uses of judicial 
notice at this stage of the proceedings is in the setting of venue, when 
the testimony itself does not establish that the alleged events occurred 
in the county where venue lies. 
Because venue is a jurisdictional element which the state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, judicial notice must be more re-
strictively used in this situation than it is generally. That is, while the 
taking of judicial notice during trial operates to establish a fact with-
out the production of evidence, the taking of judicial notice in venue 
situations is much more limited in scope. The state's case has already 
been closed and the taking of judicial notice must be founded on the 
evidence in the record. This may be accomplished if the courts take 
"notice" that a certain city is within that county and thus raise the 
evidence to the level necessary to generate a jury question on venue. 
A condition precedent to this taking of judicial notice, of course, is the 
existence of testimony in the record placing the events in or near that 
city or other well-known landmark.440 The supreme court has noted 
that: 
[T]he application of judicial notice is more and more becoming a matter 
resting in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court with the real test 
being whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact involved, so as to 
make it safe and proper to assume its existence without specific proof.441 
The general standard for determining whether or not judicial notice 
of venue can be taken was expressed in State v. Conley: 
This court has repeatedly held courts will take judicial notice of the 
geography of the state and a witness need not testify in words that the 
crime was committed in the county in question, but that such fact, if 
fairly inferable from the testimony given, is sufficient to carry the question 
of venue to the jury.442 
438 206 Iowa at 332, 218 N.W. at 570. 
439 Id., 218 N.W. at 570. 
440 State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa 505, 508, 117 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1962); State v. 
Brooks, 222 Iowa 651, 652-54, 269 N.W. 875, 876-77 (1936). 
441 State v. Ladd, 252 Iowa 487, 490, 106 N.W.2d 100, 101 (1960). 
442176 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Iowa 1970). 
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As to the quantum of direct or circumstantial evidence which is re-
quired as a foundational basis, the supreme court has said: 
[T]he state can generate a jury question on the issue of venue by pro-
ducing evidence which is either direct or circumstantial from which it 
may be inferred. No positive testimony that the violation occurred at a 
specific place is required, it is sufficient if it can be concluded from the 
evidence as a whole that the act was committed in the county where the 
indictment is found. Circumstantial: evidence may be and often is stronger 
and more convincing than direct evidence. 
. . . If, from the facts and evidence, the only rational conclusion which 
can be drawn is that tl:.e crime was committed in the state and county 
alleged, the proof is sufficient .. ,443 
That the Iowa Supreme Court does not leave the matter of setting 
venue by judicial notice entirely to the trial court's discretion has been 
made clear in at least two cases, in which no towns, geographical 
boundaries, or discernible places were mentioned. Instead, the testi-
mony in one case444 merely named certain st-reets and buildings with-
out locating them in a city or the county. Reversing the conviction on 
the issue of the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice, the 
supreme court determin•~d that the mere naming of streets and build-
ings was an insufficient foundation to support the trial court's locating 
them by inference in the county where the crime was alleged to have 
taken place. The court pointed out that in establishing venue by in-
ference, it is necessary that "the place where the offense was com-
mitted was identified as being in a certain town, or within a certain 
distance of a town within the county."445 Likewise, the supreme court 
said in the second case: "We do not take judicial notice of the location 
of banks or their names in various places."446 
It is arguable that, in certain circumstances, the trial court must 
take judicial notice and that refusal to do so would constitute an abuse 
of discretion. Such an extreme approach should only be taken in in-
stances where the alleg;ed site of the crime is clearly within the 
county, as where the witness expressly testifies that the events occur-
red within the city limits of Des Moines but neglected to add that Des 
Moines is in Polk County. Although the supreme court has never 
been faced with this issue, the conclusion finds some support in the 
language of cases in which the supreme court has upheld the trial 
court's taking of judicial notice. For example, the court has said: 
"Where the fair inference under the testimony is that the crime 
was committed within the county, a jury question on venue is pre-
sented."441 The court has even stated: 
443 State v. Wardenburg, 261 Iowa 1395, 1403, 158 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1968). 
4H State v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 651, 653, 269 N.W. 875, 876 (1936). 
HG I d. at 653, 269 N.W. at 8.76. 
44G State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa 505, 508, 117 N.W .2d 816, 818 (1962). 
H7 State v. Stumbo, 253 Iowa 276, 279, 111 N.W.2d 664, 665 (1961) (emphasis 
added). 
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[W]here a witness locates the place of the commission of a crime at a cer-
tain number of miles in a certain direction from a city or town, the court 
shall take judicial notice that such point falls within or without the 
boundaries of the county in which the crime is charged to have been 
committed.44S 
IV. JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE JURY STAGE 
Once the prosecution and defense have rested, the trial enters the 
jury stage, the period during which the jury considers the evidence 
presented and attempts to return a verdict. In this stage of the trial 
process, the court has the duty to properly instruct the jury and sub-
mit the case to it for deliberation. In addition, the court has the con-
tinuing duty during the jury's deliberations to exercise proper discre-
tion in taking whatever actions it deems necessary to protect the pro-
priety of the jury process and assure that justice is done. 
A. Instructing the Jury 
The trial court has the duty to instruct the jury as to the points of 
law applicable to the evidence developed as part of the record in the 
instant case. 449 This must be done fairly and impartially, but with an 
adequate explanation of the principles concerning the issues that are 
essential to proper submission of the case.450 
1. Evidentiary Basis 
The trial court has no authority to give an instruction on a matter 
for which no evidence at all was introduced at trial. This happened 
recently in State v. Mays,451 in which the jury was given an instruc-
tion on aiding and abetting although there was no evidence that "any-
one else had anything to do with the crime."452 Reversing the convic-
tion for breaking and entering, the supreme court explained that the 
unwarranted instruction "opened up to speculation participation by 
others, without any proof of such participation."453 Because this 
situation fell under the principle that "an instruction submitting an 
issue unsubstantiated by evidence is generally prejudicial," it did not 
matter to the supreme court that "under the evidence, defendant was 
the only one who could possibly be convicted of committing the 
448 State v. Caskey, 200 Iowa 1397, 1398, 206 N.W. 280, 281 (1925) (emphasis 
added). 
449 For examples of such jury instructions, see IOWA STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL 
COMlll. ON UNIFORM COURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 
1.2, 1.4 (1960). 
450 State v. Cunha, 193 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Iowa 1971). 
451204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973). 
452 I d. at 864. 
453 I d. at 865. 
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crime."464 The mere possibility of jury speculation was enough to 
warrant a reversal.405 
The trial court has some discretion in deciding whether to submit 
an instruction on the defendant's affirmative defense, but this discre-
tion is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to warrant such an instruction. Once the court determines that 
there is such evidence, the instruction must be given. In State v. 
Broten, 456 for example, the supreme court held that an instruction on 
self-defense 
is not required in every case involving an argument or pushing such as 
we have here. It is only when the evidence. taken as a whole, raises a 
substantial issue of self··defense that an instruction on the subject need 
be given.457 
In the same case, the supreme court indicated that the standard of 
review of the decision not to give the requested !instruction may be 
somewhat more stringent than is usually the case in matters involving 
the exercise of discretion, since it said that it would give the record 
"careful examination to determine if the denial of the defendant's 
request was justified."458 In Broten, however, the only applicable evi-
dence indicated that the defendant was the aggressor and thus, since 
self-defense was not available to him as a defense, the court's refusal 
to give the instruction was proper. 
2. Lesser Included Offenses 
The trial court also .has some discretion in deciding whether to 
submit instructions on lesser included offenses.459 Under a new stand-
ard announced recently by the Iowa Supreme Court, "the evidence 
of the case must be considered in determining whether one offense 
454 I d. 
4GG I d. Under certain circumstances, however, the trial court can give an in-
struction on aiding and abetting another in the coillililision of an offense even 
though the defendant was specifically charged, instead, as the principal perpe-
trator and the latter was th1l state's theory of the case at trial Upholding such 
an instruction in State v. Hamilton, 179 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1970), the supreme 
court noted that 
the pos~ibility of the wrongful act having been committed by the de-
fendant's companion LeE.• was interjected into the case by the defendant 
himself while testifying in his own behalf. Id. at 371. 
456 176 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1970). 
mId. at 831. 
4GSJd. 
4GO If the court, under the (•vidence, would be justified in directing a verdict 
for either one of said offenses, then said offense need not be submitted. 
State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Iowa 1968). 
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is includable within another."460 Pursuant to this standard, " 'the 
evidence must justify the submission of the included offense,' "461 and 
i£ there is such an evidentiary justification, then it is reversible error 
to fail to instruct the jury on the appropriate lesser offenses.462 
Accordingly, i£ the trial court determines that there is " 'no evidence 
from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the included 
offense, then such included offense need not be submitted.' "463 Con-
versely, it is also permissible to refuse to give a lesser included offense 
instruction i£ the evidence shows that the defendant is clearly guilty 
of the offense charged or is not guilty of any offense.464 
3. Theories of the Case 
The court has somewhat more discretion in deciding whether to 
give a party's requested instruction concerning his theory of the case 
than it does with either the affirmative defense or the lesser included 
offense. Accordingly, it is proper for a court to refuse to give an 
instruction that a "defendant's action in turning himself in to the law 
enforcement officials [is] evidence of innocence."465 Similarly, the 
trial court can refuse a defendant's request to call the jury's attention 
to the fact that the defendant had not confessed nor made any other 
admission of guilt.466 Nor does the court have to instruct the jury 
that the state, although contending that the defendant had attempted 
an armed robbery, did not introduce a gun into evidence.467 These 
matters can be left to the parties' arguments.468 
Notwithstanding this latitude, the court must be careful that it 
remains impartial in determining what it will tell the jury concerning 
either party's theory of the case. Thus, the instructions given the jury 
should not argue the case for either side or call special attention to mat-
ters of evidence thought to be favorable to one party, at least without 
mention of related matters favorable to his adversary.469 
Neither can the court give instructions casting doubts upon a party's 
evidence or motives. Rather, it must confine itself to outlining the 
law and leave the matters of weighing the evidence and determining 
the credibility of the witnesses to the jury free from any judicial 
460 State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973). 
461 Id. 
462 See State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Iowa 1968). 
463 State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973), quoting State v. Mar-
shall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106 (1928). 
464Jd.; see State v. Franklin, 163 N.W2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1968). 
465 State v. Cunha, 193 N.W 2d 106, 111 (Iowa 1971}. 
466 State v. Gillespie, 163 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Iowa 1969). 
467 Id. 
468 I d. 
469 Id. 
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suggestions.470 For example, in State v. McCarty/11 the trial court 
committed reversible error by instructing that "[t]be evidence of an 
alibi should be scanned with caution."472 The supreme court con-
cluded that this type of instruction 
none too subtly suggest[s] that evidence of alibi is easily manufactured 
and is, therefore, singling out one facet of the record evidence for special 
mention, and invades the province of the jury in its function as sole judge 
of the credibility of all of the witnesses.473 
4. Cautionary Instructions 
The g1vmg of a particularized cautionary instruction is another 
action that "rests largely in the discretion of the trial court,"4H and 
the supreme court has indicated that a general instruction for the jury 
to act impartially, without bias, sympathy, or prejudice in favor of or 
against either party/75 should be sufficient "in almost all instances."476 
It is up to the trial court, in its discretion, to determine if "something 
arise[s] during the trial which might indicate a need for a specific 
instruction ..•. "477 Thus, in the absence of special circumstances, it is 
proper for a court to refuse to give a black defendant's proffered in-
struction that the law is the same for blacks and whites,478 since there 
is no general requirement that a court instruct the jury on "all matters 
which might incite prejudice against a defendant in specific areas."479 
One major exception to this general rule leaving cautionary instruc-
tions to the trial court's discretion is the matter of jury instructions 
concerning prior felony c·onvictions of defendants who testify in their 
own behalf. Although it is clear that if a defendant admits, on cross-
examination, that he has been convicted of one or more felonies prior 
to the instant prosecution, such an admission may be used "to impeach 
the witness and for no other purpose."480 However, until the recent 
decision of State v. May~:,481 it was not clear whether a court had to 
give an instruction to thE~ jury to that effect. In :Mays, however, the 
supreme court made it clear, albeit in dictum, that, prospectively from 
HO See generally IowA STAi'E BAR Ass'N Sl'ECIAL CoMM. oN UNIFORM CoURT IN-
STRUCTIONS, IowA UNIForu.t JuRY INsTRUCTION No. 1.3 (1960). 
471179 'N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1£170). 
472 I d. at 553. 
473 I d. See generally IowA STATE BAR Ass'N Sl'EC:U..L Coli!Jit. ON UNIFORM CouRT 
INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM ,TURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.5 (1960). 
414 State v. Shepard, 255 Io·;va 1218, 1231, 124 N.W .2d 712, 719 (1964). 
47G IowA STATE BAR Ass'N SI•ECIAL Col\IJ\t, ON UNIFORM CoURT INsTRUCTIONs, IowA 
UNIFORllt JURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.6 (1960). 
476 State v. Shepard, 255 Iowa 1218, 1231, 124 N.W .2d 712, 720 (1964). 
mId., 124 N.W .2d at 720. 
11s I d. at 1230-31, 124 N.W.2d at 719. 
HoI d. at 1231, 124 N.W.2d at 719-20. 
4SOState v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Iowa 1968). 
481 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973). 
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February 21, 1973, "such an instruction must be given by trial courts 
on their own initiative."482 
5. Verdict-Urging Instructions 
It is also proper, although not required, for a court to give a verdict-
urging instruction,483 provided the court does not in any way imply 
what the verdict should be.484 In State v. Hackett/'85 the trial court 
cautioned the jurors that '~[a]n inconclusive trial is always highly 
undesirable," and that they should "not hesitate to re-examine [their] 
own views and change [their] opinions if convinced it [sic] is erro-
neous."486 The supreme court approved this admonition, noting that 
because the instruction was given to the jury before it began deliberat-
ing, the charge was "not subject to the abuses said to attend the giving 
of an 'Allen' charge,"487 the so-called "dynamite" charge given to 
deadlocked juries to encourage them to reach a verdict.488 
B. Jury Deliberations489 
Once the trial court has instructed the jury and committed the case 
to it for deliberation, it is still under a continuing duty to supervise 
the conduct of the trial and ensure the integrity .of the jury process. 
To this end, it must be continually aware "that the jury is to be above 
suspicion and that any practice which brings its proceedings under 
suspicion is to be prohibited."490 However, concomitant with this 
responsibility, it must also recognize the general rule that "misconduct 
482 I d. at 867. 
483 See IOWA STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL CoMM. ON UNIFORM COURT INSTRUCTIONS, 
IowA UNIFOIU\1 JURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.1 (1960). A verdict-urging instruction as 
part of the original instructions is endorsed in ABA PRoJECT ON MINIMm.t STAND-
ARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(a) (Ap-
proved Draft 1968). Included in the commentary thereto is the statement: [I]t is 
most appropriate for the court to instruct the jury initially as to the nature of its 
duties in the course of deliberations, and section 5.4(a) so provided. Id., Com-
ment. 
484 See geneTally IowA STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL CoMM. ON UNIFORM CoURT IN-
STRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION No. 1.3 (1960). 
485 200 N.W .2d 493 (Iowa 1972). 
486 Id. at 496. 
487 Id. 
488 But see text accompanying notes 515-29 infra. 
489 See ABA PROJECT ON Mnmro1.t STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS 
RE:r.ATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 5.12(a) (Approved Draft 1972): 
The trial judge should provide assistance to the jury during deliberation 
by permitting materials to be taken to the jury room and responding to 
requests to review evidence and for additional instructions, under ap-
propriate safeguards as provided in ABA Standards, Trial by Jury §§ 5.1, 
5.2 and 5.3. Id. 
490 State v. Carey, 165 N.W .2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1969}. 
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with respect to the jury, whether it be by litigant, counsel, or officer 
of the court, will not be grounds for a new trial unless prejudice is 
shown."491 
State v. Carey492 is an example of a case in which a conviction was 
reversed because of the appearance of possible improper influence on 
the jury. The bailiff had placed a sign in the jury room: "Coffee will 
be furnished in the jury room by the county clerk and the county 
attorney."493 It appeared that the county attorney had intended to 
make the coffee available to anybody in the courthouse and that the 
sign had been placed the:re without his consent or knowledge. Although 
absolving the county attorney of any misconduct, the supreme court 
felt that "the result unfortunately is nevertheless the same. As far 
as the jury was concerned, coffee was furnished with the compliments 
of the prosecutor for the State."494 The supreme court reiterated: "All 
blandishments, or apparent blandishments, all attempts to ingratiate 
one side or the other with the jury must be prevented."495 The fact 
that only a cup of coffee was involved in Carey was immaterial, "for 
tomorrow something of perhaps greater value might be tendered."496 
The fact that the conduct was innocent was also considered imma-
terial. The effect would be the same on a juror or a member of the 
public as if it had been "an intentional attempt to secure favor" with 
the jurors.497 Thus, a defendant's conviction was reversed in State v. 
Faught, 498 where the sheriff and his deputy, both of whom had been 
key state's witnesses at the trial, transported the jurors during their 
deliberations from the jury room to a restaurant where they visited 
with the jurors both before and during the meal. Recognizing there 
was no allegation of intentional wrong, the supreme court neverthe-
less pointed out: 
it was imperative that the verdict be based solely on the evidence and the 
court's instructions. To permit the sheriff and his deputies, under the 
facts here, to associate with the jurors after the case was submitted, be-
fore, during and after the evening meal, was not conducive to this end.499 
Not every outside contact with the jurors during their deliberations 
necessitates a new trial, however. In State v. Bruno,S00 for example, 
the record indicated that the sheriff "may have spoken to one of the 
401 Id. 
402165 N.W.2d 27 (Iowa 1£69). 
403 I d. at 28. 
404Id. at 29. 
405 Id. at 30. 
406 I d.; see State v. Neville, 227 Iowa 329, 331-32, 288 N.W. 83, 84-85 (1939). 
407165 N.W.2d at 30. 
498 254 Iowa 1124, 120 N.W.2d 426 (1963). 
4oo I d. at 1134, 120 N.W .2d at 432. 
uoo 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973). 
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jurors" while unlocking the door to the jury room, but "there was no 
further contact between the sheriff and the jury."501 Affirming the 
defendant's conviction, the supreme court said: 
While the sheriff's conduct was objectionable and avoidable, his slight en-
counter with the jurors does not appear to constitute the requisite con-
duct that gives rise, or appears to give rise, to the kind of "doubt or dis-
respect" indicating prejudice.5o2 
As a part of its aforementioned eontin:uing supervisory responsibili-
ties, it is proper for the trial court to make periodic inquiries of the 
jury to determine whether they are making progress towards reaching 
a verdict. The Iowa Supreme Court takes the position that a trial 
court properly can inquire "as to whether there is ariy likelihood the 
jury can reach a verdict,'' after the jury has been deliberating "for 
some time."503 It also recognizes, however, that "too many inquiries 
in a short period of time might raise an inference of undue pressure 
and amount to an abuse of the trial court's discretion."504 State v. 
McConnell505 indicates that reversible error on this point requires an 
affirmative showing that the court's inquiries resulted in an unfair 
trial The supreme court noted, for example, that "there were no 
affidavits of jurors which even suggested they were aware of the 
court's concern as to the time of their deliberation."506 Accordingly, 
since no prejudice was shown, there was no basis for overturning the 
defendant's conviction. 
In addition to inquiring of the jury whether they are making prog-
ress toward reaching a verdict, the court, in its discretion, may give 
additional instructions while the jury is deliberating.507 However, this 
can only be done "in the presence of or after notice to counsel," and 
the entire procedure is governed by the same rules applicable to the 
giving of instructions prior to jury deliberation.508 
Both the correct and incorrect ways to give additional instructions 
have been illustrated in recent decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court. 
In State v. Broten,509 the jury requested an additional instruction after 
deliberating for some time. The instruction was given after defense 
counsel had examined it for any objections as to its content. The 
supreme court affirmed, overruling the defendant's principal contention 
501 Id. at 885. 
502 Id. 
503 State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Iowa 1970). 
504[d. 
505 I d. at 390-91. 
sos Id. at 390. 
soT IowA R. Crv. P. 197. 
50S[d. 
509176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970). 
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that the court had forestalled its discretion to give this additional in-
struction because it refused to include it in the original instructions. 510 
In marked contrast, ti.J.e judge in State v. Grady511 recalled the delib-
erating jury himself and gave an additional instruction, without notify-
ing the defendant or his counsel. 512 Reversing, the supreme court said 
this procedure deprived the defendant of his right of personal presence 
at his trial.m Noting 1hat the additional instruction was given after 
10 hours of jury deliberation and that a verdict of guilty was reached 
within an hour thereafter, the supreme court determined that "the 
conduct described is so tainted with suspicion as to constitute preju-
dicial error requiring a new trial."5u 
One particular type of additional instruction deserves special atten-
tion since it is given to a deadlocked jury.515 The so-called Allen or 
"dynamite" charge516 is used to urge a jury to break its deadlock and 
thus to reach a verdict by encouraging each dissenting juror, in no 
uncertain terms, to rea~:sess his position with a view to adopting the 
position held by the majority jurors, if such can be done without viola-
ting individual conscience.517 Although some appellate courts have 
recently condemned its ·use, m the Iowa Supreme Court recently rea£-
!i10 Having concluded undt~r this record [that the defendant] was not. en-
titled to an instruction on self-defense, the failure to permit him to 
argue that issue before the jury was in no way prejudicial to him. Id. at 
832. 
UU183 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa :l971). 
512 Id. at 709. 
513Id. at 710; see IowA ConE § 777.19 (1973). 
m 183 N.W.2d at 710. 
515 For an example of such a jury instruction see IowA STATE BAR Ass'N 
SPECIAL Cor.mt. ON UNIFORM CoURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
No. 1.1 (1960). But see the restrictive language in ABA PROJECT ON Mnm.ror.! 
STANDARDS FOR CRDIID-lAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FuNCTION OF THE 
TRIAL JUDGE§ 5.1l(b) (Approved Draft 1972): 
The court may recall the jury after they have retired and give them 
additional instructions in order: (i) to correct or withdraw an erroneous 
instruction; (ii) to clarify an ambiguous instruction; or (iii) to inform the 
jury on a point of law which should have been covered in the original 
instructions. Id. 
The standard in § 5.12 (b) leaves no doubt: 
In dealing with what appears to be a deadlocked jury, the trial judge 
should avoid instructions which imply that a majority view is the correct 
one, by complying with ABA Standards, Trial by Jury § 5.4. Id. § 
5.12(b). 
616 See Allen v. United Sta·:es, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896). 
517State v. Quitt, 204 N.W.:?d 913 (Iowa 1973). 
51SSee Evans v. State,- Ark.--, 478 S.W.2d 874, 875-76 (1972). See also 
ABA PROJECT ON Mnur.ror.r STANDARDS FOR CRDIIINAL JusTicE, STANDARDS RELATING 
'1'0 TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(b) (Approved Draft 1968). This definitive statement is 
made in the commentary accompanying § 5.4(a): 
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firmed, in State v. Qu,itt,519 that the giving of the Allen charge, fol-
lowed by a conviction, does not per se deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial. Instead, the trial court "has considerable discretion in deter-
mining whether it should be given .... "520 However, once the court 
has given the Allen charge, the supreme court will determine after the 
fact whether the giving of this instruction was appropriate, based upon 
its subsequent effect. The ultimate test upon appellate review is 
whether the giving of a verdict-urging instruction [after the jury bas he-
gun its deliberation] forced or helped to force an agreement, or merely 
started a new train of real deliberation which ended the disagreement.521 
This means that the trial court, in exercising its discretion to give 
the instruction, must give special consideration to the length of the 
deliberation at this juncture. If the duration has been extraordinarily 
lengthy at the time that a deadlock is reported, the trial court should 
carefully consider whether the length of the deliberation can be attrib-
uted to any special circumstances, such as complexity of the issue, 
amount of the evidence to be considered, a jury's request for addi-
tional instructions ori substantive points, or whether it stems from a 
substantial dispute over the correct inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence submitted. If the latter, the court should be reluctant to 
give the Allen charge because of its potential for "browbeating" those 
jurors who happen to be in the minority, however reasonable their 
position may be. This cautious approach is advisable in light of the 
supreme court's observation in State v. Pierce522 that: 
[W]here the disagreement is of more than ordinary and usual duration, 
and after the giving of such an instruction as this, a verdict is reached in 
a time short in comparison with the duration of the disagreement, a pre-
sumption arises that the instruction was prejudicial; that, . . . • there 
should be a reversal where in such circumstances, "there is no competent 
evidence in the record to indicate that the jurors . • . were brought to a 
final agreement resulting in a verdict, other than through the coercive 
influence of this instruction, and the long hours of involuntary servitude 
to which they were subjected, with the tentative suggestion of longer 
confinement in the event they failed to agree."523 
Upon appeal, "each case must be decided on its own circumstances."52~ 
One factor the supreme court considers is "the total elapsed time be-
tween the giving of the verdict-urging instruction and the return of 
[T]he Advisory Committee has concluded that the [Allen charge] should 
not be given to a jury which has been unable to agree after some deli-
berations. Id. § 5.4(a), Comment. 
519 204 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973). 
520 I d. at 914. 
521 Id. 
522178 Iowa 417, 159 N.W. 1050 (1916). 
523Id. at 427, 159 N.W. at 1055 (citations omitted). 
524 State v. Quitt, 204 N.W.2d 913, 914 (Iowa 1973). 
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the verdict."625 In Stat~~ v. Quitt, this period was approximately 4 
hours, and the supreme court concluded that this "rather demonstra-
tively negatives" any suggestion of coercion since this interval "indi-
cates the jury gave additional consideration to the record before a 
verdict was reached."626 
The specific content o£ the verdict-urging instruction can also be 
crucial. The supreme court has "intimated strongly" that such instruc-
tions are erroneous at t:he time they are given if "their language 
(1) indicates an intention to coerce into agreement, or (2) suggests 
that the jury would be kept together until it agreed."527 However, the 
language in the Iowa Bar's Uniform "verdict-urging" instructions, 
which was approved in State v. Quitt/28 refers to "the desirability of 
agreement if possible," a:; well as the direction for the jury to retire 
to the jury room "and try to arrive at a verdict."529 
The special considerations attending the use of the Allen charge 
aside, the general problems of marathon jury deliberations are a 
matter left to the trial court's sound discretion. The length and late-
ness of deliberation are c~ontrolled neither by statute nor by judicial 
fiat. Instead, the trial court can exercise its discretion in the particu-
lar circumstances as to both "the total length of jury deliberation" 
and "the length of deliberation without normal time to sleep and 
rest."aso Nevertheless, th,e supreme court, reversing the conviction in 
State v. Albers, 531 has opi:.'led that "unreasonably late deliberations by 
a jury are not conducive to a fair trial." Thus refusing to leave the 
matter entirely in the trial court's discretion, the supreme court laid 
down this guideline: "Th•e criterion is not the number of hours which 
a jury uses in deliberatio.n, but the conditions under which such de-
liberation takes place."532 
525 Id. 
526 Id. 
527 State v. Pierce, 178 Iowa 417, 424, 159 N.W. 1050, 1054 (1916). 
628 204 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973). 
52o See IowA SrATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL Col\m. ON UNIFOror CoURr INsraucrroNs, 
IowA UNIFORllt JURY !NSl'RUCl'ION No. 1~ (1960). 
530State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Iowa 1970). 
531Jd. at 655; accord, State v. Kittelson, 164 N.W.2d 157, 167 (Iowa 1969). 
632174 N.W.2d at 653, quoting State v. Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 1387, 121 N.W.2d 
89, 93 (1963). By way of contrast with State v. Albers, the supreme court in two 
civil cases has upheld the trial court's exercise of their discretion in granting 
new trials because of late-hour deliberations of the jury. See Kracht v. Hop-
pner, 258 Iowa 912, 140 N.W .2d 913 (1966); Coulthard v. Keenan, 256 Iowa 890, 
129 N.W.2d 597 (1964). In a related development, the supreme court has held 
(in a civil case) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
the jury "to deliberate into Sunday before being discharged." While not recom-
mending deliberation on Sunday, the court noted that such practice seemed 
statutorily permissible. Lesserlhop v. Norton, 261 Iowa 44, 57, 153 N.W.2d 107, 
1973] JUDICIAL DISCRETION 1091 
Subject to the concurrence of both the defendant and the state, the 
trial court, in its discretion, can excuse a juror during deliberation 
even though this results in submitting the case to less than a statu-
torily prescribed full jury. As pointed out by a federal appellate 
court: 
The defendant here did not waive • . . his right to a unanimous verdict. 
He did have a unanimous verdict. His waiver, knowingly and advisedly 
given, was of his right to a jury of 12.533 
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has declared it 
settled doctrine in this State that a defendant in a criminal action, with 
the consent of the State and court, may waive a statute enacted for his 
benefit.534 
Although such an expeditious procedure has been followed most 
commonly when a juror has become ill,535 it has even been allowed 
when a juror, while not disclosing how the jury was leaning, reported 
that he was the primary holdout and would not change his mind. 536 
This latter case, however, may not be persuasive in Iowa, since the 
juror was dismissed pursuant to a federal procedural rule permitting 
the parties to stipulate to a jury of less than 12 at any time before its 
rendition of verdict.537 
C. Taking the Verdict 
Once the jury has returned a verdict, either party may have the jury 
polled before the court accepts the verdict. 538 The court must do so, 
if either party requests it, and the statutory scheme provides that 
"each member thereof shall be asked whether it is his verdict."539 
Nevertheless, in light of State v. McConnell,540 the trial court seem-
ingly is granted some latitude in the way it actually polls the jury. In 
McConnell, rather than addressing the jurors individually, the court, 
on its own initiative following the defense counsel's decision not to poll 
the jury, addressed the jury as a body: "Is this your unanimous ver-
dict? I£ so, raise your right hand."541 Because it was clear that every 
115 (1967). The statutory authorization for such a practice can be derived from 
IowA CODE § 605.18 (1973). 
533 United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1971). 
534State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 579, 2 N.W. 275, 275-76 (1879). 
535 See State v. Browman, 191 Iowa 608, 633, 182 N.W. 823, 833-34 (1921); State 
v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 2 N.W. 275 (1879). 
536United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698, 700-01 (2d Cir. 1971). 
537 Id. at 701; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). 
538 IowA CODE § 785.15 (1973). 
539 I d. If any jury member answers negatively, "the jury must be sent out 
for further deliberation." Id. 
540 178 N.W.2d 386 (Iowa 1970). 
541 I d. at 390. 
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juror raised his hand, the supreme court considered the polling re-
quirement "substantially complied with."642 However, the court added 
that the defense couns·=l had apparently waived any irregularity, so 
it is not clear that the supreme court will uphold "substantial com· 
pliance" in all circumstances. 
D. Rendering Judgment on a Verdict of Not Guilty 
Upon the jury's retmn of a verdict of not guilty and the court's ac-
ceptance thereof (following the polling of the jury, if any), the court 
"must render judgment of acquittal immediately."548 If, however, the 
jury's verdict of not guilty is based upon a finding of insanity, this fact 
must be stated in the verdict.544 The trial court is then authorized to 
determine whether a defendant acquitted on this ground should be 
commited to a mental institution. The court may do this if it finds that 
defendant's discharge would be "dangerous to the public peace and 
safety."545 This determination is made by the court without the re-
quirement of a jury trial.S46 This determination is essentially one of 
fact, and the supreme court does not interfere with the determination 
made so long as the trial court shows some factual basis therefore.547 
V. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND PRESEN'XENCE APPLICATIONS 
In contrast with the requirement that a court enter a judgment im-
mediately upon acceptance of a verdict of not guilty, if the defendant 
has been convicted, upon a plea or verdict~ the court is required by 
statute to fix a time for pronouncing judgment.543 The statutory wait-
ing period between conviction and sentencing permits the defendant to 
file any presentence motions he desires, and also gives the court an 
opportunity to obtain a presentence report. In this section, we will 
discuss the presentence motions a defendant may file. The presentence 
report, being an integral part of the sentencing process itself, is dis-
u42 I d. 
543 IowA CoDE § 789.1 (19:13). 
544 I d. § 785.19. This special verdict form is one of the few exceptions to the 
standard general verdict fc•rms (of either "guilty'' or "not guilty'') prescribed 
by law. I d. § 785.1; see State v. Fagan, 190 N.W .2d 800, 802-03 (Iowa 1971) (pro-
per for trial court to refuse to submit requested verdict form of "not guilty be-
cause of entrapment''). 
545 IowA CoDE § 785.19 (W73). 
546 The constitutionality o.f the nonjury trial proceeding was upheld in Hansen 
v. Haugh, 260 Iowa 236, 244-47, 149 N.W.2d 169, 174-75 (1967). 
541 State v. Allan, 166 N.V7.2d 752, 759 (Iowa 1969). The court's :finding is in-
fluenced by a presumption that insanity, once established, continues until the 
contrary is shown by the party asserting a return to sanity. Id. at 758. 
548 IowA CODE § 789.2 (1973); see notes 611-15 infra and accompanying text. 
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cussed in the immediately following section, "Judicial Discretion in 
the Sentencing Process."549 
A. Bill of Exceptions 
As a prelude to, or concomitant with, the filing of any presentence 
motions, either the defendant or the state may file a bill of excep-
tions. 550 This bill, which may also be used to lay a foundation for a 
subsequent appeal or application for postconviction relief, is designed 
"to make the proceedings or evidence appear of record which would 
not otherwise so appear."551 Because "it is not necessary to except to 
any action or decision of the court so appearing of record,"552 the bill 
of exceptions is applicable only when either party wishes to have here-
tofore unrecorded oral evidence made part of the record. 553 Because 
the general practice is not to record the voir dire examination of pro-
spective jurors,554 the opening and closing argument of counsel,555 or 
the polling of jurors after the verdict/56 any assignment of error based 
upon incidents or rulings during these proceedings will not be consid-
ered unless the objectionable portion thereof is made part of the record 
through such a bill (or a bill of bystanders) .557 Neither an affidavit 
by counse!S58 nor by the official court reporter559 is sufficient. 
Although the bill of exceptions allows the incorporation into the 
record of allegedly objectionable evidence, it serves only that purpose 
and is not an after-the-fact curative measure that can be substituted 
for the party's failure to object to an alleged impropriety in a timely 
manner. In State v. Horsey,560 for example, the defendant waited un-
549 See notes 622-56 infra and accompanying text. 
550 IowA CODE § 786.3 (1973). 
551 I d. § 786.1. 
552 I d. § 786.2. 
553 For the grounds for exceptions see id. §§ 786.3, .4. One such ground for 
exception is the court's alleged improper action "[i]n deciding any matter of 
law, not purely discretionary on the trial of the issue." I d. § 786.3 ( 4). 
554 See State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 965, 151 N.W .2d 496, 501 (1967). 
555 See State v. Horsey, 180 N.W .2d 459, 460 (Iowa 1970). 
556 See State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819, 823 (1969). 
557 State v. Hemrick, 62 Iowa 414, 414-15, 17 N.W. 594 (1883): 
The only way oral evidence introduced on the trial of a cause can be 
preserved and identified, for the purposes of an appeal to this court, is 
by a bill of exceptions, signed by the trial judge. 
But see IowA ConE § 786.6 (1973) (bill of bystanders). 
55s State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 966, 151 N.W.2d 496. 501 (1967). 
The alleged objectionable remarks cannot be regarded as a part of the 
record when set out simply in an affidavit attached to a motion for new 
trial. The language alleged to be objectionable should be presented in 
a bill of exceptions. 
559 See State v. Hemrick, 62 Iowa 414, 17 N.W. 594 (1883). 
56o 180 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1970). 
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til filing a motion for new trial to bring to the court's attention the 
matter of misconduct by the prosecutor in the unrecorded closing 
argument. The defendant set out the objectionable part of the argu-
ment in his bill of exceptions, but he made no objection at trial. The 
trial court overruled the defendant's motion for new trial and the rul-
ing was affirmed on appeal. The supreme court said: 
We have permitted alleged impropriety in final arguments to be set out 
in this fashion. • . . However . . . the fact that such matter may become 
part of the record by way of bill of exceptions does not eliminate the 
necessity for having made proper objection at the time the error alleg-
edly occurred.5Gl 
The only opportunity for the exercise of judicial discretion in rela-
tion to the bill lies in the trial court's decision whether to sign it. The 
Code provides that the eourt "shall sign it if true,"562 thus leaving the 
court some latitude if it is not convinced of the truth of the matters 
set out in a bill presented for its signature. When the court refuses 
to sign the bill of exceptions, the moving party can substitute a bill of 
bystanders/63 which must be signed by at least two attorneys or other 
officers of the court or 'by two or more disinterested bystanders. 564 
It is not clear what effect the trial court's refusal to sign the bill of 
exceptions will have in every case, but the fact that the court refused 
to sign was given some consideration in State v. Horsey.565 The de-
fendant set forth in a bill of exceptions the objectionable remarks by 
the prosecutor in closing arguments, but the court refused to sign it. 
The defendant then pro,::eeded on a bill of bystanders-which must 
state that the judge refused to sign the bill of exceptions.566 Comment-
ing on the trial court's refusal to sign the bill of exceptions, the su-
preme court said: 
Neither can we disregard the fact that there is serious disagreement over 
the language actually used [in the closing arguments]. The trial court 
refused to sign the defendant's bill of exceptions. . . . Quite obviously 
court and counsel were at odds over the accuracy of the recitations in the 
661Jd. at 460 (citations omitted); accord, State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 967, 151 
N.W.2d 496, 502 (1967) : 
Defendant made no objections when the incident occurred. Objections to 
claimed improper conduct in argument must be made at the time. They 
are too late when raised for the first time in motion for new trial. 
562 IowA CoDE § 786.5 (1978) (emphasis added). 
563Jd. § 786.6. 
564Jd. 
The bill cannot be signed and sworn to by an attorney for the defense 
after the judge's refusal to do so. State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 967, 151 
N.W.2d 496, 502 (1967). 
u6u180 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1S70). 
u66 IowA CODE § 786.6 (1973). 
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bill. This is, at best, an unsatisfactory record to ask our acceptance of 
defendant's disputed version of what was argued.567 
B. Motion in Arrest of Judgment 
Unlike the bill of exceptions, which serves an essentially appellate 
purpose, that is, to clarify and amplify the existing trial record with a 
view to prosecuting an appeal, there are several presentence motions 
on which a trial court may be called to rule which serve primarily to 
give the court an opportunity to correct any alleged errors while the 
case is still at the triai level. One such motion is the motion in arrest 
of judgment, an application to the trial court that no judgment be ren-
dered upon the verdict or plea of guilty. This motion may be made 
by the defendant, either before or after judgment. The trial court 
shall grant it "when upon the whole record no legal judgment can be 
pronounced."568 In addition, the court may arrest the judgment sua 
sponte on the same grounds.569 
It is immaterial that the statute authorizing the motion contains no 
specific grounds delineating the situations where "no legal judgment 
can be pronounced," since this is a matter of law determinable gen-
erally through other statutory guidelines and case law. For example, 
the supreme court has said: 
Thus if upon the whole record here it is determined, as defendant con-
tends, that the plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered, but was pro-
cured by undue influence, coercion and fraud, no valid judgment or sen-
tence could be pronounced herein.570 
On the other hand, the motion in arrest of judgment "cannot be sus-
tained upon the grounds which would be grounds for demurrer."571 
Thus, the remedy in situations of this type is an appeal from the final 
judgment. In other words, a motion in arrest of judgment is too late 
for the defendant to raise such issues as defects in the· presentment of 
the indictment. 572 
In making its determination whether "no legal judgment can be pro-
nounced," the court is given some latitude. As a starting point, the 
defendant's motion "must point out wherein the deficiency exists."578 
Assuming that the alleged ground is sufficiently particularized, the 
court must then determine whether this ground would, as a matter 
567180 N.W .2d at 461. 
568 See IowA CoDE § 788.1 (1973). "The motion may be made at any time before 
or within ninety days after judgment." Id. § 788.2. For a discussion of the 
peculiar aspects of a motion in arrest of judgment made after judgment see text 
accompanying notes 759-67 infra. 
569 IowA CoDE § 788.3 (1973). 
570State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103,107,111 N.W.2d 255,257 (1961). 
571 State v. Bading, 236 Iowa 468, 472, 17 N.W .2d 804, 807 (1945). 
572 See id., 17 N.W.2d at 807. 
573 State v. Stennett, 220 Iowa 388, 395, 260 N.W. 732, 736 (1935). 
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of law, constitute a bar to pronouncement of legal judgment. If the 
court decides that it would not, then the motion must be overruled 
and final judgment ente!red.674 If, on the other hand, the trial court 
determines that the motion does raise an issue which is a proper 
ground for barring pronouncement of a legal judgment, the court 
would abuse its discretion by overruling the motion without first hold-
ing a hearing, if requested, to permit the defendant to present evidence 
in support of his contentions,575 
Once the controverted. matters have been adequately placed before 
the trial court, it can 1hereupon exercise its discretion in deciding 
whether the evidence indicates that no legal judgment can be pro-
nounced.576 If it overrules the motion, appellate review of its action 
is quite limited, since the supreme court confines its task on appeal 
to determining "only whether there is substantial evidence supporting 
the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court . . . ."577 On 
the other hand, if the trial court concludes that no legal judgment can 
be entered, then it has no discretion; under the statute, it must grant 
the motion. 578 After granting it, the trial court must arrest the en-
tering of the judgment of conviction, and, in its discretion, after arrest-
ing the judgment, order that the defendant be "held to answer the 
offense in like manner as upon a preliminary examination,"579 which 
574 This decision is appealable, even without the entry of the final judgment. 
See State v. Alverson, 105 Ic•wa 152, 156, 74 N.W. 770, 771 (1898). See also text 
accompanying notes 576-84 infra. 
57u See State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Iowa 1968); State v. Bastedo, 
253 Iowa 103, 106, 111 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1961). The state must also be -afforded 
an opportunity to rebut the defendant's evidence. However, the fact that the 
state offers no resistance to a defendant's motion in arrest of judgment "does not 
mean defendant's testimony stands alone or uncontroverted." State v. Hellick-
son, supra, at 394. 
n1a State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 1138, 125 N.W. 2d 242, 246 (1963): 
These matters were placed before the court at the time of the hearing 
on the motion in arrest of judgment. That it found them 'vithout merit 
is shown by the fact that motion was denied. In such circumstances, the 
trial court's findings of fact are binding upon us. 
577 State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Iowa 1968); accord, State v. Bas-
tedo, 253 Iowa 103, 107, 111 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1961): 
If the court accepts and considers the competent and material testimony 
introduced and, after weighing the same, finds it is either sufficient or 
insufficient to sustain the burden of proof necessarily devolved upon ap-
plicant, that determination is usually binding upon us. 
578 IOWA CODE § 788.1 (1973). 
579Id. § 788.4. In State v. Alverson, 105 Iowa 152, 74 N.W. 770 (1898), the rec-
ord showed that the trial court sustained the motion in arrest of judgment 
and ordered the defendant held to appear before the next grand jury. 
The ruling on the motion put an end to all proceedings on that indict-
ment . . . . [T]he ruling did operate to discharge the defendant from 
further prosecution in the pending case •..• Id. at 156, 74 N.W at 771. 
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could lead to recharging and reprosecution. 
Because an order in arrest of judgment "serves to place a defendant 
in the same situation or position as he was before commencement of 
the prosecution,"580 the court cannot make its arrest of judgment 
operate as an acquittal.581 This was done in State v. Deets,582 and the 
supreme court declared that the trial court's entry of a post-conviction 
judgment of acquittal "was totally void and of no legal force or effect 
because not permitted by law."583 Accordingly, the case was re-
manded "for entry of lawful judgment . . . ."584 
C. Motion for a New Trial 
In contrast to the trial court's rather limited discretionary authority 
in ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment, it has considerable dis-
cretion in ruling upon a motion for a new trial,S85 especially when the 
motion is heard by the judge who presided at the trial.586 This motion, 
which can only be made by the defendant,587 must be made before 
judgment. 588 When a new trial is granted, the parties are placed "in 
the same position as if no trial had been had,"589 except that a new 
trial on the same indictment is specifically authorized for "re-exami-
nation of the issue in the same court before another jury."590 
The trial court can grant a new trial only on one or more of eight 
statutorily enumerated grounds. These include: (1) in a felony pro-
secution, trial without the defendant's presence; (2) out-of-court 
580Stat.e v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1972). 
581 This means that relief in the trial court from a verdict of guilty (or guilty 
plea) is limited to arrest of judgment, .a new trial, or postconviction relief. Id. 
at 124. 
5s2 195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1971). 
sss I d. at 125. 
584 Id. 
585 State v. Wheelock, 218 Iowa 178, 182, 254 N.W. 313, 316 (1934): 
The matter of granting a new trial for alleged misconduct of counsel 
and the many incidents that happen in the trial of a case is peculiarly 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
586 State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 410, 72 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1955). 
5S7IowA ConE§ 787.2 (1973). In civil cases, on the other hand, either party 
can file a motion for a new trial and the granting of a new trial can be reversed 
upon appeal with the case remanded for reinstatement of the verdict and judg-
ment in favor of the appellee. See Lind v. Schenley Industries, 278 F .2d 79, 88-90 
(3d Cir. 1960); accord, Meyer v. Noel, 206 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1925) (not officially 
reported) (burden on appellant, in attempting to get overturned a motion grant-
ing a new trial, to show that the lower court's action was not warranted under 
any of the grounds specified in the motion). 
588 IOWA ConE § 787.2 (1973). 
589 Id. § 787.4. 
590 Id. § 787.1. Cf. note 579 supra. 
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receipt, by the jury, of unauthorized evidence; (3) juror misconduct; 
(4) use, by the jury, of unauthorized means to reach a verdict; (5) 
misdirection of the jury on a material matter of law by the court; (6) 
verdict contrary to the law or evidence; (7) re.t."Usal, by the court, to 
properly instruct the jury; and (8) failure of the defendant to receive 
a fair and impartial trial "from any other cause."591 Most of the mul-
titudinous issues which can be raised under the guise of one or more 
of these eight categories are discussed on an individual topical basis 
elsewhere in this Articl•:, but three others are included here for illus-
trative purposes. 
1. Newly Discovered Evidence 
One ground on which a motion for a new trial may be based is that 
newly discovered evidence has come to light which has a bearing on 
the question of the defendant's guilt. The problem of newly dis-
covered evidence bears on the question of whether the defendant has 
received a fair and impartial trial, 502 and although such motions "are 
not favored in the law and should be closely scrutinized and granted 
sparingly,"593 the trial court hearing such a motion is afforded wide 
discretion, the exercise of which will not be interfered with unless "it 
is reasonably clear that such discretion was abused."594 
In determining whether to grant a motion for new trial because of 
newly discovered evidence, the trial court must determine 
"whether [the new evidence] is sufficient to justify the trial court, in the 
exercise of legal discretbn, in concluding there is a reasonable probabil-
ity of a different result upon another trial."sos 
In effect, the trial courf; must determine whether the new evidence 
adds anything that is both new and materially different than the evi-
dence introduced at trial. 
2. Mati;ers Inhering in the Verdict 
Influence on the verdic-t through juror misconduct is another ground 
which can support a motion for a new trial, and it is "within province 
of the [trial] court to deny a new trial for such alleged misconduct."596 
!lOl I d. § 787 .a. 
502 State v. Com piano, 261 Iowa 509, 516, 154 N.W.2d 845, 849 (1967). 
5os Id., 154 N.W.2d at 849. 
uo1 Id. at 515-16, 154 N.W.2d. at 849. 
505 Id. at 520, 154 N.W.2d at 851, quoting Westergard v. Des Moines Ry., 243 
Iowa 495, 500, 52 N.W.2d 39, 43 (1952). 
5oo State v. Reynolds, 201 Iowa 10, 13, 206 N.W. 635, 636 (1925); see State v. 
White, 205 Iowa 373, 376, 217 N.W. 871, 872 (1928): 
We have held ... that statements of fact [made] by a juror during de-
liberation, bearing on a material issue in the cause and made of the 
juror's personal knowledge, constitutes error that will vitiate the verdict. 
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Limiting this discretion, however, the supreme court has held that 
jurors' affidavits cannot impeach a verdict.597 Nor can it be shown 
"in such [a] manner, to avoid the verdict, that a juror did not assent to 
it, misunderstood the com·fs instrnctions or the testimony, was unduly 
influenced by statements of fellow jurors, was mistaken in his calcula-
tions or judgment, or other matters resting alone in the juror's breast. 
These all inhere in the verdict."59~ 
In one case, for exa..rnple, some jurors took an unauthorized inspection 
of an area material to the case and then discussed it in the jury room. 
The trial court held a hearing after three other jurors filed affidavits 
to this effect, but overruled the defendant's motion for new trial.590 
In reviewing, the supreme court said that "[c]ertainly if this discus-
sion had been prejudicial to defendant, it would have been set out in 
the affidavits,"600 thus it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse the 
new trial motion. 
3. Instructions to the Jury 
The third ground for a new trial which we will consider is the 
contention that the jury was improperly instructed.601 The supreme 
court has interpreted the Code602 as permitting a defendant in a cri-
minal case to raise this objection for the first time in a motion for a 
new trial. In State v. Lelchook, 603 for example, the supreme court 
reversed a trial court's refusal to grant such a motion because the 
instruction improperly omitted a material matter of law. Even where 
the instruction complained of does materially misstate the law, how-
ever, the defendant has no absolute right to have his motion for a 
new trial granted: 
[T]his right is subject to exceptions. [It] may expressly be waived, or if 
the instruction was correct as given but not as explicit as the defendant 
might have desired, he is required to request an additional instruction 
before the jury is charged.604 
4. Appellate Re-view 
Appellate review of the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial is 
597 State v. Washington, 160 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1968): 
It is not competent to show by statements of jurors what influenced the 
verdict. That is a matter of opinion which inheres in the verdict. See 
also State v. White, 205 Iowa 373, 376, 217 N.W. 871, 872 (1928). 
598State v. Washington, 160 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1968), quoting State v. 
Brown, 253 Iowa 658, 671, 113 N.W.2d 286, 294 (1962). 
599 State v. Little, 164 N.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Iowa 1969). 
600 I d. at 83. 
601 See text accompanying notes 449-89 supra. 
602 IowA ConE § 787.3 (1973). 
603186 N.W.2d 655, 655-57 (Iowa 1971). 
so4 State v. Hamilton, 179 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Iowa 1970). 
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limited in scope, and the defendant must overcome a presumption in 
favor of the court's ac:tion.605 This burden is "heavy,"606 since the 
trial comt's finding on conflicting evidence, being a matter within the 
court's discretion, is controlling on appeal if there is sufficient factual 
basis upon which the court could have made the challenged finding.607 
The supreme court's most definitive statement in this regard is found 
in State v. Compiano:60s 
The rule is finnly established that to be entitled to a new trial as a matter 
of law, the rulings of the trial: court must appear to have been so preju-
dicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. However, a fair trial does 
not necessarily mean a perfect trial .•. . We 'TIULY disagree with the trial 
court on close questions of this nature, but must uphold its ruling if not 
clearly erroneous. 
The court continued: 
Although defendant's ccounsel attacked the court's stated reasons for this 
disbelief, and it seems some of those reasons would not be proper, we 
are bound by the rule that if the court could properly find as it did, its 
ruling must stand.ooo 
Nevertheless, the supreme court has said it " 'will interfere more 
oos For example, the supreme court has said that the burden is on the appel-
lant to show an abuse of judicial discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. To 
carry this burden, he must disclose and prove facts which would have- seen 
sufficient to sustain the trial court's action had the motion for a new trial been 
granted. Hutchinson v. Fort Des Moines Community Services, Inc., 252 Iowa 536, 
540, 107 N.W.2d 567, 570 (1961) (a civil case). 
ooa State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 410, 72 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1955): 
Defendant's burden here is heaVY. In order to obtain a reversal of the 
trial court's action in overruling his motion for a new trial, he must show 
clearly that counsel ..• was so incompetent ••• as to make the proceed-
ing a farce and mockery of justice, or that it so prejudiced him that sub-
stantial justice was not done. 
eor State v. Ebelsheiser, 2-t! Iowa 49, 60, 43 N.W .2d 706, 713 (1950): 
There was no such impropriety or error nor did the court abuse its dis-
cretion in overruling the motion. There was a disputed question of fact 
involved and the trial court's decision, upon conflicting evidence, is con-
trolling. 
This standard applies also to disputes over the existence of evidence, as il-
lustrated by State v. Robinson, 183 N.W .2d 190, 192 (Iowa 1971). In Robinson, 
the defendant, moving for a new trial, contended that the verdict was contrary 
to the evidence because there was no evidence in the record to rebut the defend-
ant's testimony that he had in fact given some notification. The supreme court, 
affirming the denial of the motion for new trial, concluded: 
There is considerable evidence which, if believed, would establish that 
defendant deliberately avoided giving the department head such notifica-
tion . . • . Id. (emphasis added). 
oos251 Iowa 509, 521, 154 N.W.2d 845, 852 (1967) (emphasis added). 
ooo Id. at 520-21, 154 N.W.2cl at 851. 
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readily with a verdict, because contrary to the weight of evidence, in 
a criminal case than in a civil case.' "610 
VI. JUDICIAL DIScRETION IN THE SENTENCING PRocEss 
Assuming the defendant's presentence motions, if any, have been 
resolved in favor of the state, the trial court must then proceed to the 
sentencing stage. 
A. Time for Judgment After Conviction 
No fixed maximum time after conviction is statutorily prescribed in 
Iowa for the imposition of sentence. Instead, section 789.2 merely 
places specific minimum time limitations on the sentencing process by 
providing that after conviction the court 
must fix: a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least three 
days after the verdict is rendered, if the court remains in session so long 
.•. but in no case can it be pronounced in less than six hours after the 
verdict is rendered, unless defendant consents thereto.en 
As the above quoted por-tion of the statute indicates, a convicted de-
fendant who prefers "to get it over with" may waive his right to the 
6 hour minimum period between conviction and sentencing.612 Indeed, 
although the supreme court has discouraged such practice,613 a defend-
ant may even plead guilty and be immediately sentenced at his 
arraignment, if he so requests.614 Once the defendant has requested 
immediate sentencing however, he has the burden, on appeal, of 
establishing that "the disposition of his case with such dispatch is a 
circumstance entitling him to prevail in [his application for postcon-
viction relief] ."615 
At least in part because there is no set time when a sentence must 
be imposed, the widespread practice of deferred sentencing upon a 
plea of guilty developed among Iowa trial courts, starting in 1964.616 
610 State v. Carlson, 224 Iowa 1262, 1265, 276 N.W. 770, 772 (1937), quoting State 
v. McKenzie, 204 Iowa 833, 834, 216 N.W. 29, 30 (1927). 
611 IOWA CODE § 789.2 (1973). 
s12 See State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 1140, 125 N.W .2d 242, 247 (1963) (waiver 
to avoid undesirable publicity drawing crowds to separate sentencing proceed-
ing). 
613 State v. Kephart, 202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972). In that case, the court 
said: 
We cannot conclude here the trial court acted improperly, although ar-
raigning the defendant, accepting his plea, and imposing sentence all 
at one hearing and on the same day is not a procedure that should be 
followed. Id. 
614 State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 1140, 125 N.W.2d 242, 247 (1963). 
615 State v. Kephart, 202 N.W .2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972). 
616 See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 IowA L. REv. 598, 612-13 (1972). 
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Under deferred sentencing, the trial court would accept the defen-
dant's guilty plea but would not enter the judgment or impose sen-
tence. Instead, the court would set sentencing for some time in the 
future and place the defendant on probation in the interim. Following 
the defendant's successful completion of probation, the court would 
allow withdrawal of the guilty plea and the case would then be dis-
missed. Upon violation of probation,' however, the court would enter 
a judgment of guilty a:nd proceed to impose the sentence. 
This practice was rec:ently declared invalid in State v. Wright611 on 
the ground that there was no statutory authority for it. Since a 
court's authority to defer imposition of a criminal sentence "is not 
inherent but is regulat•;!d by statute and can only be exercised in ac-
cordance with the terms of the statute,"618 and since Iowa's probation 
statute619 "refers only to a suspended sentence and has no application 
to a deferred sentence," the supreme court concluded that the trial 
court was "without judicial power to defer imposition of sentence and 
place defendant, who had been convicted by plea of guilty, on pro-
bation .... "620 
R Presentence Hearing 
Although the Wright case invalidated the use of deferred sentences 
as an alternative method of sentencing, it specifically approved the 
practice of deferring pronouncement of judgment for other purposes. 
In discussing section 789.2, the opinion said that a court 
has judicial power to defer the pronouncement of judgment for the pur-
pose of hearing and determining motions for a new trial or in arrest of 
judgment or for such 1·easonable time as may be necessary to complete 
[a presentence investigation),621 
The Iowa Supreme Court considers it the trial court's duty "to as-
certain any and all facts that would assist in the proper exercise of 
its discretion in :fixing defendant's sentence, whether in or out of the 
record."622 Accordingly, the court has said: 
The trial court and we on review should weigh and consider all pertinent 
matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the of-
fense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and pro-
pensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to the public 
as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punish-
ment should fit both the crime and the individua1.a2:: 
011 202 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 1972). 
618 Id. at 76. 
019 IOWA CODE § 247.20 (1973). 
o2o 202 N.W.2d at 79. But see ch. 295, [1973] Iowa Acts (deferred sentencing 
authorized). 
021 Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
o22 State v. Kendall, 167 N'.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa 1969); State v. Myers, 241 Iowa 
670, 672, 42 N.W.2d 79, 80 (1950). 
023 State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1967). 
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In ascertaining the facts necessary to ensure that the punishment 
does "fit both the crime and the individual," a trial court need not 
rely solely on a formal presentence investigation and report. Al-
though this is the "recommended" method, the supreme court observed 
in State v. Patterson624 that the sentencing court can discharge its 
duty of informing itself "as to matters important to the proper exer-
cise of its sentencing discretion" in other ways. For example, it was 
held, in State v. Myers,62s that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in permitting the county attorney at a presentence hearing to 
read a statement by the sheriff concerning the latter's investigation of 
the facts surrounding the defendant's commission of another offense 
subsequent to the entry of his guilty plea on the instant charge. Ap-
proving the trial court's actions, the supreme court said: 
In exercising that discretion it is not error for the court to ascertain any 
and all facts that will assist it in the proper exercise of that discretion, 
whether it [sic] be in or out of the record.G26 
Although a presentence report is not required, the supreme court 
frequently alludes to any such report when reviewing the severity of 
a sentence or the refusal to grant probation. For example, the obser-
vation was made in State v. Brace: ccThe presentence report was certi-
fied to us as part of the record and has been helpful in comprehending 
the reasons for the sentence imposed."62i Thus, a trial court would 
be well advised to order such a report in those cases where there is 
good likelihood that a severe sentence will be imposed on a crime with 
a broad-ranged penalty or that probation will not be granted.628 
The Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee has proposed 
changing the law to make the ordering of a presentence investigation 
mandatory when the offense is a felony.629 A better approach may 
624 161 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Iowa 1968). 
625 241 Iowa 670, 672, 42 N.W.2d 79, 80 (1950). 
626 I d., 42 N.W.2d at 80. 
627 181 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa 1970). This was in accordance with the ABA 
PROJECT ON Mnmlnmt STANDARDS FOR CRn.tiNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 2.3, at 42 (Approved Draft 1968) . 
628 See generally United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 744 (2d Cir. 1972): 
It would be wise . . . for trial judges, in those rare cases in which they 
dispense with the pre-sentence report, to state on the record the reasons 
for failing to make use of a tool which has proven helpful in individual-
izing and thus improving the sentencing process. Such a requirement 
will provoke thought about the decision to bypass this potentially valu-
able step in the criminal process. 
G29 Iowa Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, ch. 
3, § 103 (1973). The nature of the investigation is spelled out in detail in section 
104: 
Whenever a presentence investigation is ordered by the court, the in-
vestigator shall promptly bquire into the characteristics, circ=tances, 
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be to assure the defendant's right to have such an investigation made, 
but to permit him to waive this right. In its discretion, the court 
would still be free to order one to prevent the defendant from con-
cealing an undesirable past. A recent Michigan case630 illustrates 
the folly of a mandatory, no-exceptions statute. In that case, the 
sentencing judge erred in pronouncing sentence without ordering a 
presentence report, even though the defendant himself did not want 
one.631 By way of contrast with such an inflexible approach, a federal 
appellate court632 has held that a trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by skipping a presentence report where the defendant did not 
want one, in spite of the circuit rule of "adopting a restrictive view of 
the trial judge's discretion to impose sentence without taking ad-
vantage of presentencing procedures."633 
When a presentence :report is prepared, the Iowa Supreme Court 
prefers to leave the scope of inquiry concerning a proper sentence in 
the hands of the sentencing judge. 634 Positing that "sentencing pro-
cedures are governed by different evidentiary rules than the trial it-
self," the supreme court, in State v. Cole,S36 said that the sentencing 
judge should obtain "the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant's life and characteristics" and thus he should not be denied 
"an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by requirement of 
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to 
the trial."636 Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, 
presentence reports "may rest on hearsay and contain information 
bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant 
is charged."637 Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded in 
Cole: 
Defendant may not successfully challenge the soundness of the trial court's 
discretion even though involved therein were conclusions or matters not 
ordinarily admissible.oas 
needs, and potentialities O:)f the defendant; his criminal record and social 
history; the circumstances of the offense; the time defendant has been 
in detention; and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the 
community. All local and state mental and correctional institutions, 
courts, and police agencies shall furnish to the investigator on request 
the defendant's criminal record and other relevant information. With the 
approval of the court, a physical examination of the defendant may be 
ordered, or the defendant. may be committed to a psychiatric facility for 
an evaluation of his personality and mental health. The results of any 
such examination shall b(~ included in the report of the investigator. 
o3o People v. Amos, 202 N.VT.2d 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). 
o31Jd. at 489. 
632 United States v. Spadoni, 435 F .2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
633 Id. at 449. 
034 State v. Cole, 168 N.W.2d 37,42 (Iowa 1969). 
03G I d. 
o3o I d. at 40, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
oa7 Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969). 
6as 168 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Iowa 1969). 
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Once the trial court has obtained a presentence report, it is assumed 
that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court used the 
report in a proper manner and did not consider anything "based only 
upon rumor or at a stage prejudicial to the defendant."639 There are 
some limits on the kind of information that may be considered by the 
court in setting the punishment, however. The United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. T'UCker,640 while conceding that the presen-
tence inquiry can be "broad in scope, largely limited either as to the 
kind of information [considered], or the source from which it may 
come," nevertheless held that a sentence cannot be based, even in 
part, upon "misinformation of constitutional magnitude."641 In T'UCker, 
the tainted information utilized by the sentencing court in its decision 
to impose the statutory maximum penalty included two prior felony 
convictions obtained when defendant was unconstitutionally denied 
his right to assistance of counsel. 642 
There is no federal constitutional requirement for disclosure of the 
contents of a presentence report,S43 nor is there such a requirement 
under Iowa law. Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. 
Delano, 644 without judicially imposing such a procedural rule, made 
several references to statutory and case law in other states and to 
model legislation that either afford disclosure as a matter of absolute 
right or that qualify the right to disclosure only in deference to the 
need to maintain a probation officer's coD:fidential sources.645 It con-
cluded: 
As a note of caution it has been suggested "Kent ... and Specht ••• read 
together, seem to indicate that some fonn of hearing or opportunity to 
639 State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Iowa 1968); accord, State v. Cooper, 161 
N.W 2d 728, 732 (Iowa 1968). 
640 404 u.s. 443 (1972). 
64J. Id. at 446-47. 
642 Id. at 444. At least one lower federal court has construed Tucke-r strictly, 
refusing to apply it to an applicant who had not made a Tucker-type argument 
until after Tucke-r was announced. Mitchell v. United States, (N.D. Fla., Nov. 
7, 1972), noted in 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2304 (1973). 
643 Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969): ''Pre-sentence reports are 
documents which the rule does not make available to the defendant as a matter 
of right." Accord, Thompson v. United States, 381 F 2d 664, 666-67 (lOth Cir. 
1967) (due process of law not violated by government's refusal to disclose pre-
sentence investigation report). But see United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775, 
778 (D.C. Cir. 1971): 
We hold that the discretion whether-and to what extent-defendant or 
his counsel is to have access to the presentence report . . • must be exer-
cised in each individual case. 
644161 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1968). 
G45 See, e.g., United States v. Fischer, 381 F .2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1967) (Where 
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rebut matters in confid,;ntial reports which significantly affect important 
dispositional or sentenclng decisions may emerge as a constitutional ne-
cessity in the not too distant future."646 
On the basis of the United States Supreme Court's determination 
that the sixth amendment right of confrontation is inapplicable at the 
sentencing stage, 647 the Iowa Supreme Court has also concluded, in 
State v. Cole, GJs that a defendant had "neither constitutional nor statu-
tory right" to examine the investigating officer as to the validity of 
the officer's conclusion, in his presentence report, that defendant was 
not a fit subject for pi:obation. The supreme court reasoned that 
since probation is only l:l matter of grace, and not a "right," and since 
the trial court's source of information concerning determination of the 
sentence is unlimited, "it follows that it was not error to refuse exam-
ination into the validity of a recommendation [by the parole agent] 
the court was in no way bound to accept."649 Noting that the defend-
ant was allowed to testify in his own behalf, as well as to call other 
witnesses, at the present•~nce hearing/50 the supreme court determined 
there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to require 
cross-examination conce1:ning the presentence report. 
The supreme court's two opinions in State v. Boston651 illustrate that 
a trial court "has a du~r to hear an application for a parole but has 
material in no manner relates to a confidential declaration, there is little reason 
to avoid disclosure of what is reported to the sentencing judge. ''This is a 
matter, however, which must rest in his sound discretion."); MoDEL PENAL CoDE 
§ 7.07 (5) (1963): 
Before imposing sentence, the Court shall advise the defendant or his 
counsel of the factual contents and the conclusions of any pre-sentence 
investigation or psychiatric examination and afford fair opportunity, if 
the defendant so requests .. to controvert them. The sources of confidential 
information need not, however, be disclosed. 
046 State v. Delano, 161 N.W .2d 66, 72 (Iowa 1968), quoting Bach, The De-
fendant's Right to Access to F'resentence Reports, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 160, 167 (1968). 
The cases referred to were Kent v. Vnited States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) and Specht 
v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
047 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606-08 (1967). 
648168 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Iowa 1969). 
640 I d. 
6GO Id. at 40. Because a defendant is entitled to present relevant evidence con-
cerning his claim for leniency or mitigation of sentence, State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 
1249, 1258, 11 N.W.2d 407, 411 (1943), the supreme court has implied that he 
must do so before sentencing. In State v. Patterson, 191 l\.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1971), 
the supreme court discounted a defendant's claim that the trial court did not 
have before it evidence of his cooperation in the trials of his two co-conspirators, 
noting that the defendant had been represented by counsel throughout the trial 
process and that the court had received a presentence report. Id. 
6~1 234 Iowa 1047, 14 N.W.2d 1376 (1944); 233 Iowa 1249, 11 N.W.2d 407 (1943). 
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wide discretion in what must be considered in granting or denying 
the application."652 In that case, the trial court refused to hold a hear-
ing to consider a defendant's application for a bench parole. This re-
fusal was pursuant to the trial court's personal policy of never allowing 
a parole. Vacating the sentence of imprisonment and remanding, the 
supreme court ruled that the defendant was entitled "to have his appli-
cation considered on its merits."653 On remand, the same judge held 
a hearing at which the defendant's witnesses testified as to his personal 
history, the circumstances surrounding his commission of the crime, 
and his character and reputation.654 Again refusing to grant proba-
tion, the court nevertheless received evidence supporting defendant's 
application and subsequently issued a written ruling detailing the con-
siderations for such refusal. Thus, even though the trial court did not 
change its original decision, the second denial of parole was affirmed. 
In so ruling, the supreme court pinpointed the significance of properly 
exercised judicial discretion, saying: 
The record abundantly shows that the court decided fairly and impar-
tially, and having done so, that decision is not open to question. Whether 
the decision was as some other court would have decided is beside the 
point.Gss 
In the final analysis, once significant information has been brought 
to the court's attention, the court must exercise its discretion in select-
ing the proper sentence on an individual basis, as per the peculiar 
facts of the specific situation. The Iowa Supreme Court, emphasizing 
the necessity for individualized sentencing, has said: 
Each case must be decided upon its peculiar facts and there is no hard 
and fast rule by which the punishment of those convicted of crimes must 
be determined within the limits of the governing statutes.~56 
That trial courts cannot bind themselves to prescribe uniform mini-
mum sentences when the statutes set no such limits was made clear 
recently in State v. Jackson. 657 In that case, the judges in one judicial 
district entered into a written agreement that each would impose a 
minimum, mandatory penalty for every conviction for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (OMVUI) of 20 
days' imprisonment in the county jail, subject to probation in individ-
ual cases.658 However, the statutory penalty for a first OMVUI offense 
652 State v. Cole, 168 N.W .2d 37, 40 (Iowa 1969). 
653 233 Iowa at 1258, 11 N.W.2d at 411. 
65·1 State v. Boston, 234 Iowa at 1048-49, 14 N.W.2d at 677-78. 
655 Id. at 1053, 14 N.W .2d at 680. 
656 State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916, 921-22, 109 N.W .2d 18, 21 (1961). 
657 204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973). 
658 The agreement, styled GENERAL ORDER, provided: 
In all O.M.V.U.I. cases on a plea of guilty or conviction the penalty im-
posed will be a mininum sentence of imprisonment for twenty (20) days 
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is either a fine or a jail sentence "for a period of [sic] not to exceed one 
year," or both, but without a minimum ptmalty or a mandatory term 
of imprisonment.6 fi9 
Pointing out that the setting of upper and lower limits for criminal 
penalties is a matter of legislative prerogative, the supreme court said: 
When judges adopt a general order that a minimum penalty shall be dif-
ferent than a statute prcovides, they are changing the statute, for they are 
depriving themselves of the discretion to impose the minimum provided 
by the statute.eoo 
Since no statutory minimum is prescribed in the OMVUI statute, the 
exact amount of imprisonment, if any, is left to the court's discretion 
and may range from 1 day to 1 year. Indeed, no amount of imprison-
ment is required at all, since the court can select a fine as the alterna-
tive mode of punishment. 
Stressing that the court must exercise its discretion in sentencing 
on a case-by-case basis, the supreme court, quoting from a New York 
case,661 said that sentencing" 'under a predetermined fixed policy can-
not satisfy a statutory requirement for the exercise of discretion.' " 
Rather, what is required is " 'an actual exercise of judgment upon the 
part of the [individual] court' "; that is, " 'a consideration by the court 
o£ the facts and circumstances which are necessary to make a sound, 
fair and just determination.' " 662 Refusing to demean sentencing con-
ferences to broaden judges' knowledge about sentencing to reduce 
unwarranted discrepancies,663 the supreme court nevertheless con-
cluded: 
But in the end no judge can abdicate his individual responsibility to pass 
sentence in each case according to his lights, within the statutory limits. 
Each judge must grapple with the facts and circumstances in the case be-
fore him and arrive at the sentence he regards as right.e64 
Thus, had the judge in the instant case exercised his discretion and 
not considered the ge~eral order as binding, then the sentence imposed 
and a fine in the sum of $300.00. The foregoing must be understood as 
minimums. 
Consideration bearing on suspension of a sentence of imprisonment and 
parole will depend in these as in other cases on the circumstances sur-
rounding each individual case. 
The foregoing policy is effective as to all sentences on and after January 
3, 1972. Id. at 916. 
eGo IowA CODE § 321.281 (1!173) (emphasis added). 
66o 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). 
661 Application of Frazzita, 147 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16-17 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
aoz 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). 
664 See, e.g., ABA PROJECT CIN M:IN:nlrmlt STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDUl!ES1 §§ 7.1-7.3 (Approved 
Draft, 1968). 
664 204 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1973). 
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would not have been erroneous even though the general order itself 
was invalid. 
C. Allocution 
Irrespective of whether the defendant has exercised his prerogatives 
to file any of the aforementioned presentence motions or whether he 
has simply proceeded directly to sentencing-either after the normal 
delay or, upon his request, immediately-the court must afford him 
the right of allocution before imposing the sentence. 665 
A defendant's right of allocution when appearing for judgment is 
statutorily prescribed in detail, with the court directed to ask the 
defendant "whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment 
should not be pronounced against him."666 However, while a court 
ordinarily has no discretion to skip this stage of the sentencing process, 
the supreme court recently held, in State v. Christensen, 667 that the 
opportunity for a defendant to make a statement need not be verbal-
ized in the precise words of the statute, it being sufficient for the court 
to ask: "Is there anything you would like to say to the court before 
I pronounce sentence ?"668 
Similarly, the supreme court held, in State v. Patterson,669 that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in pronouncing sentence al-
though merely allowing the defendant as well as the defense counsel 
to "make a statement" rather than specifically referring to the p;re-
scribed inquiry concerning allocution. Noting that the court's extended 
question-and-answer colloquy with defendant prior to sentencing had 
afforded ample opportunity for the defendant to volunteer such in-
formation, the supreme court determined: "The important thing is 
665 See generally Comment, 48 IowA L. REv. 172 (1962). Although the de-
fendant must be afforded the right of allocution, it is clear that it can be waived. 
Two ways that the requirement of allocution may be waived were discussed in 
State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W .2d 242 (1967). First, the court noted 
that the general rule is that "the answer of counsel is binding on the accused," 
and thus it is sufficient that defense counsel (rather than defendant) answered 
that there was no "legal cause" why sentence should not be imposed. Id. at 1134, 
125 N.W.2d at 246. Secondly, the court observed: 
So, where accused moves for a new trial, assailing the verdict for several 
reasons, and is afforded every opportunity to interpose objections to the 
judgment, he cannot complain that the court, in pronouncing sentence, 
fails to inform him of the verdict, and to ask him to show cause why 
judgment should not be pronounced. Id. at 1140, 125 N.W.2d at 247, quot-
ing 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1576 (1961). 
Apparently, the same rule would apply on a motion in arrest of judgment. 
666 IowA CODE § 789.6 (1973). 
667 201 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1972). 
668 Id. at 460. 
669 161 N.W .2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1968). 
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whether defendant had his chance to point out any reason for with-
holding judgment."670 The court added: "[N]othing appears in the 
record to suggest defendant in fact had any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed."611 
Notwithstanding the possibility that a court may have some flexibil-
ity in wording its offer of the right of allocution, it is still advisable to 
adhere to the standard sentencing colloquy. This was illustrated in a 
recent case in the District of Columbia.672 Before sentencing a defend-
ant convicted of possession of narcotic drugs, the court told the de-
fendant that if he divulg;ed the name of the supplier "it might possibly 
make a difference in tht; type of sentence that I impose in respect to 
the user."673 After the defendant stood silent, the court decided not to 
grant probation,6H and s·antenced the defendant to 180 days in jail, one-
half the 360-day statutory maximum. Vacating the judgment and re-
manding for resentencing, the appellate court observed: 
What is demonstrated, therefore in this record, is not so much an abuse of 
discretion as a failure tt> exercise discretion in the sentencing process.s7s 
Even though the actual sentence was only half the maximum author-
ized sentence, the appellate court said that "the error in the sentencing 
process was so egregious as to require that the sentence be vacated."676 
D. Determination of the Specific Penalty 
The trial court's determination of the specific penalty, where such a 
determination may be made from within a range of permissible alter-
natives, is the one staga in the criminal trial process in which the 
exercise of judicial discretion will most likely be left undisturbed upon 
appellate review. Although the supreme court has the statutory duty 
to determine whether the punishment imposed was too severe, and 
may reduce it if it is found to be excessive,677 it will not interfere with 
the lower court's determination 
[u]nless there is an error in the sentence by reason of failure to follow a 
specific statutory provision or there is an abuse of discretion .•• ,s1s 
When the sentence imposed is faulty because it fails to comply with 
statutory guidelines, the supreme court is freed from the normal re-
670 Id. 
611Jd. 
672 Williams v. United States, 293 A.2d 484 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972). 
673Jd. at 485-86. 
674 I d. at 486. 
o1u I d. at 487. 
010 Id. 
m See IowA CODE § 793.18 (1973). 
07>< State v. Simpson, 254 Iowa 637, 645, 118 N.W .2d 606, 611 (1962); accord, 
State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1967). 
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quirement that sentences will be overturned as excessive only where 
there has been abuse of discretion and then it makes its own indepen-
dent determination of the "right" sentence.679 This type of sentencing 
error is most likely to occur in those situations where the court's dis-
cretion is substantially restricted. For example, there are a few crimes 
for which the punishment is :fixed or mandatory, thus leaving nothing 
to the sentencing court's discretion. These include the five crimes pun-
ishable exclusively by life imprisonment.680 Some of the other more 
serious felonies are punishable for a term of years up to and including 
life, with the number of years to be selected from within the permis-
sible range by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion.681 
Other serious felonies are punishable exclusively by an indeterminate 
term of imprisonment, subject to a statutory maximum, in the peniten-
tiary or reformatory,682 thus leaving the effective determination of the 
amount of time to be served in the hands of the parole board.683 This 
leaves the sentencing judge with no discretion since he can choose 
neither the mode of punishment nor the length of incarceration within 
the one mode. 
On the other hand, many of the less serious felonies are punishable 
in the alternative. Thus, if the court decides to imprison the defend-
ant, it may impose either an indeterminate term in the penitentiary or 
reformatory, or a shorter, more definite term in the county jai1.684 As 
the supreme court has observed: 
Neither the trial court nor this court has any discretion as to the period 
of confinement in the penitentiary. . .• The discretion is only between a 
penitentiary sentence and a fine and jail sentence.685 
Nevertheless, if the trial court selects the jail-sentence alternative, it 
can exercise broad discretion in determining the exact duration of sen-
679 See State v. Stevenson, 195 N.W .2d 358, 360 (Iowa 1972). Notwithstanding 
the statutory stricture on increasing punishment on appeal, IowA CODE § 793.18 
(1973), a sentence may be modified in some cases even where the end result of 
the supreme court's action may be an increase in punishment. See State v. 
Weise, 201 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1972). 
6so See IowA CoDE §§ 690.2 (first-degree murder), 689.1 (treason), 706.3 (kid-
napping for ransom), 697.1 (death caused by explosives), 711.4 (train robbery) 
(1973). 
681 See, e.g., id. § 708.2 (1973) (aggravated burglary). 
682 See, e.g., id. § 690.10 (1973) (manslaughter). 
683 State v. Kulish, 260 Iowa 138, 145, 148 N.W.2d 428, 433 (1967) (dictum); 
State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Iowa 1972): 
The indeterminate sentencing act, section 789.13, requires the sentence if 
it imposes a penitentiary term shall not be fixed by the court, but it is 
imposed by law. 
684 See, e.g., IowA CoDE § 703.1 (1973) (bigamy). 
685 State v. Simpson, 254 Iowa 637, 645, 118 N.W .2d 606, 611 (1962). 
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tence. This is possible not only because the indeterminate sentencing 
provision applies only to terms of imprisonment in the penitentiary or 
reformatory, but also because practically all of these alternative jail 
sentences are for period'> "not to exceed one year," thus permitting the 
judge to choose any number of days between 1 and 365. 
The crime of burglary with aggravation, punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for any term of years up to and including 
life, 080 presents the trial court with the broadest range of permissible 
imprisonment in the Iowa criminal code. This sentencing authority 
permits the judge, in his discretion, to sentence a defendant to a period 
of from 1 year to life. Even when a life term is imposed, the sentence 
will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. A life 
term was upheld in State v. Kendall} 681 for example, with the supreme 
court merely noting that the trial court's action was justifiable because 
the defendant had assaulted a person with intent to commit rape dur-
ing the burglary. 
State v. Johnson688 is a recent illustration that the trial court's se-
lection of even a harsh alternative penalty will not be overturned upon 
appeal merely because the supreme court might disagree with the se-
verity of the sentence imposed. The defendant had been convicted of 
false drawing and uttering of a check and sentenced to an indetermi-
nate term of 7 years in the penitentiary, although the court could have 
sentenced him to a mere jail term of any number of days up to a max-
imum of 1 year.689 Conceding the trial court's right within the pre-
scribed statutory alternatives "to fix such punishment for the crime as 
it thought defendant des<:~rved," the supreme court mused: "Although 
the sentence seems quite severe in view of the amount of the check, 
we cannot say there was an abuse of discretion."090 
In State v. O'Dell,091 the supreme court, summarizing its philosophy 
regarding reduction of sentences it considers too severe, said: 
[T]his power will be exercised when the court below has manifestly vis-
ited too severe a penalty, one disproportionate to the degree of guilt. as 
shown by the proo£,692 
The court added that there must be "some legal data" upon which to 
base any reduction of sentence. 093 
Knox v. Harrison694 is one of the rare instances in which the Iowa 
o86 IowA CoDE § 708.2 (1973). 
687167 N.W.2d 909, 911-12 (Iowa 1969). 
08B196 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972). 
08o See IowA CoDE§ 713.3 (1973). 
ooo 196 N.W.2d at 571. 
oo1 240 Iowa 1157, 39 N.W.2d 100 (1949). 
602 Id. at 1161, 39 N.W.2d at 102. 
693 Id., 39 N.W.2d at 102. 
094185 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1971). 
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Supreme Court has reduced an otherwise legally imposed criminal 
penalty for being excessive. In this bizarre series o£ events, the de~ 
£endant spat in the judge's face upon being sentenced on a simple mis~ 
demeanor charge. Following an adjudication o£ guilt on a charge o£ 
contempt £or the spitting incident, he was sentenced by a second judge 
to 6 months' imprisonment in the county jail.695 However, the defend-
ant's conduct during the hearing before the second judge led to a sec-
ond citation £or contempt and ultimately to an additional 6 months' im-
prisonment, with the two terms to run consecutively, as well as a $500 
fine, the statutory maximum penalty. 696 Modifying the judgment in 
the second case, the supreme court said it "believe [ d] the sentence 
was excessive under the record here."697 Speculating that the sentenc-
ing judge, who had heard both contempt cases and imposed both sen-
tences, had been influenced in the second case by the defendant's con-
duct against the first judge, the supreme court said that the earlier 
incident should not affect the penalty for the contemptuous conduct in 
the second judge's court. Therefore, the supreme court modified the 
judgment by making the second 6-month term run concurrently with 
the sentence imposed in the first case and withdrew the $500 fine.698 
Although not discussing this case in such terms, the supreme court's 
approach amounted to a determination that the trial court had abused 
its discretion in exercising its statutory authority to order that the two 
sentences run consecutively.699 
E. Special Sentencing Considerations 
To this point, the discussion o£ the sentencing process has focused on 
£actors which apply to all cases. In addition to these generally appli-
cable sentencing considerations, there are a number o£ more specific 
elements that are applicable only in certain situations. Some o£ these 
can have the effect o£ increasing the court's discretionary powers, 
while others tend to narrow the scope o£ the court's sentencing options. 
The most significant o£ these specific £actors include the determination 
of the locus o£ imprisonment, the sentencing options available in 
OMVUI cases, the sentencing o£ juveniles convicted in criminal court, 
and the problem o£ the unrepresented indigent defendant. 
1. Locus of the Imprisonment 
Once a court has decided to imprison a convicted felon, it may have 
some discretion as to the locus o£ the imprisonment. The factors in-
695 This sentence was upheld in Knox v. Municipal Court, 185 N.W .2d 705 (Iowa 
1971). 
696185 N.W.2d at 720; see IowA CoDE § 665.4 (1973). 
697185 N.W.2d at 720 (Iowa 1971). 
698 Id. 
699 The statute authorizing consecutive sentences is IowA CODE § 789.12 (1973). 
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volved in determining whether there is discretion in selection of the 
place of commitment include: the nature of the crime, the age of the 
defendant, the sex of the defendant, and the defendant's prior criminal 
record. 
The penalty for some felonies is statutorily prescribed in the alter-
native, leaving it to the sentencing court's discretion whether the de-
fendant is to be imprisoned in the penitentiary or adult reformatory 
or in the county jail.700 The most innovative development in this con-
nection has been the statutory authorization for sentencing, at the 
court's discretion, to a local minimum-security correctional facility, if 
available, instead of exdusively to the county jail.701 To date, how-
ever, this sentencing option is only available to judges in central Iowa, 
since the only such local correctional facility in operation is in Des 
Moines.702 
Whenever a male defendant is to be incarcerated in the penitentiary 
or reformatory, there may be some discretion as to which of these 
state institutions the sentencing court selects. However, there is no 
such discretion if the defendant is a female, since there is no women's 
penitentiary in Iowa, only a women's adult reformatory. On the other 
hand, a male defendant, unless he has been convicted of certain felo-
nies,703 must be committed to the men's reformatory if he is under 30 
at the time of commitm•:nt and has never before been convicted of a 
felony.704 If he has been convicted of murder, treason, sodomy, or in-
cest, however, he must be sent to the penitentiary irrespective of his 
age or prior record. Se1ection of the locus of commitment is a matter 
of the trial court's discretion "as the particular circumstances may 
warrant," irrespective of age and prior record, when the crime is rape, 
robbery, or breaking and entering a "dwelling house" in the night-
time.706 
2. OMVUI Dispositions 
When the offense is operating a motor vehicle while under the in-
fluence of intoxicants, the trial court's sentencing options include not 
only imposition of imprisonment and/or a fine, but the court may also 
"order the defendant, at his own expense, to enroll [in], attend and 
successfully complete a course for drinking drivers."706 On a defend-
100 See notes 684-86 supra and accompanying text. 
101 See IowA CoDE§ 356A.3 (1973). 
102 See generally Oxberger, Revolution in Corrections, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 250 
(1973). 
703 These include murder, treason, sodomy, and incest. IowA CoDE § 789.16 
(1973). 
704 Id. 
1o5 I d. 
7UO Id. § 321B.16. 
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ant's first OMVUI conviction, this provision is operative, in the court's 
discretion, either "in lieu of, or prior to or after the imposition of 
[criminal] punishment," as well as being in addition to the court's 
authority to commit OMVUI offenders to a state treatment facility.707 
For subsequent OMVUI convictions, the court can still order the de-
fendant to attend the instructional course, but this alternative cannot 
be imposed as a substitute for the prescribed criminal penalty. 708 
Moreover, while the court is authorized to order the defendant com-
mited to a state treatment facility after any conviction for OMVUI, 
such commitment can be in lieu of the prescribed criminal penalty 
only on the second or subsequent conviction.709 
3. Juvenile Defendants in Criminal Court 
When a defendant is a juvenile whose case has been transferred to 
criminal court from juvenile court, the special sentencing provisions 
of section 232.72 come into play. Specifically, the trial court may, 
with the consent of the defendant, transfer the convicted juvenile back 
to juvenile court for further disposition under the juvenile system, or 
it may put the defendant on probation and then set aside his conviction 
after successful completion of at least 1 year of probation.710 However, 
the supreme court has repeatedly made it clear that the trial court can 
also sentence the juvenile under the criminal statutes like any other 
convicted defendant. As with sentencing in general, choosing among 
these three options is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion.711 
State v. Davis112 is the most recent, and possibly the most compre-
hensive, opinion upholding an exercise of judicial discretion in not 
affording special treatment for juveniles convicted of a crime. Follow-
ing transfer from juvenile court, the defendant pleaded guilty to break-
ing and entering. In addition to the two leniency options under sec-
tion 232.72, the trial court could have imposed sentence under section 
708.8. This provision, as the general penalty clause for breaking and 
entering, prescribes alternative sentences, in the court's discretion, of 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years in the penitentiary, or a jail term 
101 Id.; see id. § 321.281. 
1os See id. § 321B~6. 
709 Id. § 321.281. 
no IowA ConE § 232.72 (1973). 
711 See, e.g., Ethridge v. Hildreth, 253 Iowa 855, 859, 114 N.W.2d 311, 314 (1962); 
State v. Reed, 207 Iowa 557, 561, 218 N.W. 609, 610 (1928): 
[I]t was within the discretion of the district court whether or not the 
penalty should be attached for the crime, or whether the defendant 
should be referred to the juvenile court for final disposition of his case 
thereunder. 
712195 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1972). 
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not to exceed 1 year and a fine not exceeding $100.713 Although the 
defendant was a juvenile, the court opted for the more severe alterna-
tive and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment in the 
men's reformatory not to exceed 10 years. 
Affirming, the supreme court said the trial court rightfully did not 
use its powers for special disposition here since "[t]he information at 
the court's disposal did not merit special action."714 Recognizing that 
the trial court had £ulfilled its general responsibility of determining a 
proper sentence after a consideration of "all pertinent matters,"m the 
supreme court noted that the defendant had committed a number of 
previous offenses and was on parole from the boy's training school at 
the time of the instant offense. Once the criminal court determined 
not to exercise its option to afford him special treatment, the defend-
ant, albeit a juvenile, stood on the same footing as any other convicted 
defendant. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the impo-
sition of the penalty and the supreme court did not interfere with the 
sentence imposed, since it did not exceed the statutory limit. More-
over, it was no abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny the defend-
ant a bench parole, sinc:e its discretion in granting or withholding 
bench paroles is apparently as "broad" when acting specially under 
section 232.72716 as it is when acting under the general probation pro-
vision, section 247.20.717 
4. The Unrepresented Indigent Defendant 
A sentencing court's scope of judicial discretion in choosing among 
alternative modes of authorized penalties can be narrowed when the 
defendant is an indigent. In light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 718 unless an indigent defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waives his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel, a trial court can maintain its ordinary option under an alternative 
sentencing statute to impose a sentence of imprisonment only by ap-
pointing trial counsel for him. In other words, an unrepresented in-
digent defendant who did not waive his right to counsel cannot be sen-
tenced to imprisonment even though the applicable criminal statute 
provides for punishment t~ither by imprisonment or by fine or by both. 
The trial court's failure to appoint trial counsel, absent a waiver, thus 
operates to destroy the court's sta~tory authority to exercise its ordi-
ns IowA CoDE § 708.8 (1973). 
114 195 N.W .2d at 678. 
71~ Id. 
716 See id. 
111 IowA CoDE§ 247.20 (1973); see text accompanying notes 812-32 infra. 
718 407 u.s. 25, 36-37 (1972). 
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nary discretion in choosing among sentencing alternatives by limiting 
the sentence to a fine. 719 
F. Resentencing 
Another area in which recent federal constitutional decisions have 
intervened to reduce judicial discretion has been that of resentencing 
persons reconvicted subsequent to successful appeals of their original 
convictions. A court's discretion in imposing harsher penalties after a 
retrial in such circumstances was significantly curtailed in 1969 by the 
United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce.120 
Until Pearce, there was nothing in Iowa's statutes or in Iowa Su-
preme Court pronouncements that precluded a trial court from impos-
ing a harsher penalty upon reconviction for any reason whatsoever.721 
In that case, however, the Supreme Court, conceding that "neither the 
double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause !imposes an 
absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction,"722 never-
theless held that due process of law, under the fourteenth amendment, 
"requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having success-
fully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he 
receives after a new trial."723 To ensure against such vindictiveness, 
the Court concluded that the reasons for the harsher resentence must 
"affirmatively appear" in the record and, further, that these reasons 
must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable con-
duct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding,724 
Thus, Pearce does not preclude harsher resentencing when a factual 
basis therefore appears in the record for appellate review. This was 
made clear in Moon v. Maryland/25 in which the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a more severe sentence upon reconviction. 
The Pearce doctrine was applied by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
State v. Pilcher/26 in which a defendant's sentence was increased from 
50 to 60 years following his reconviction after a successful appeal. Be-
cause the case had been tried before Pearce, the supreme court ap-
plied the Pearce doctrine under its statutory authority to reduce the 
719 In addition, it may be constitutionally improper to imprison such an indigent 
defendant if he subsequently fails to pay his fine. See text accompanying notes 
795-811 infra. 
720 395 u.s. 711, 726 (1969). 
72IState v. Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1969). 
122 395 U.S. at 723. 
723 Id. at 725. 
724 I d. at 726. 
725 398 U.S. 319, 320-21 (1970) (per curiam). 
12s 171 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969). 
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sentence so as to bring it within proper limits. 727 The second sentence 
was reduced to 50 years since "the constitutional legitimacy of the 
extra ten years [did] not appear [in the record]."728 Although there 
was no claim that the trial court "was motivated in the slightest de-
gree by vindictiveness,"729 the supreme court nevertheless pointed out 
that the reasons for increasing the duration of the sentence did not ap-
pear in the record, as required by Pearce. 730 
In Colten v. Kentucky.131 the United States Supreme Court refused 
to apply the Pearce doctrine to an increased sentence following recon-
viction on a de novo trial before a different, higher court than the one 
in which the defendant was originally convicted. Pointing out that two 
different courts are involved in this type of two-tier trial court system, 
the Supreme Court observed that the higher court on a de novo ap-
peal is not "asked to find error in another court's work."732 Rather, 
the Court declared: 
[T]he Kentucky court in which Colten had the unrestricted right to have 
a new trial was merely asked to accord the same trial, under the same 
rules and procedures, available to defendants whose cases are begun in 
that court in the first instance.1aa 
Thus, no additional evidence was necessary to justify a more severe 
penalty imposed by the higher court after the new trial. Indeed, the 
latter court was not required to justify the harsher penalty at all, since 
the penalty imposed was within the permissible range under the ap-
plicable statute. 
The Iowa Supreme Court has followed Colten in upholding a harsher 
penalty after trial de novo in district court following a guilty plea on 
a non-indictable misdemeanor in municipal court.734 In City of Cedar 
Rapids v. Klees, 735 the defendant had pleaded guilty to a violation un-
der city ordinance and was fined $25. Upon reconviction in a trial de 
novo in the district court, however, he was sentenced to a 5 days in 
jaU. 
VII. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND PosTSENTENCING IssUES 
Once the defendant has been sentenced, the criminal process, at 
727 IOWA CODE § 793.18 (H173). 
728171 N.W .2d at 254. 
12n I d. 
1ao Id. 
731407 u.s. 104 (1972). 
732 I d. at 117. 
733 I d. 
734 Such courts will be abolished as of .Tuly 2, 1973, when Iowa's Unified Trial 
Court Act becomes effective. See Unified Trial Court Act, ch. 1124, § 45 [1972] 
Iowa Laws 454. 
735 201 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Ic·wa 1972) (per curiam). 
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least at the trial court level, is nominally completed. However, the 
trial court may still have an opportunity to exercise judicial discretion 
in a number of proceedings that may occur either individually or in 
combination after sentence has been imposed. 
A. Appeal 
One such postsentencing procedure involves the decision to appeal, 
which, under Iowa law, may be made by either the defendant or the 
state.736 In either case, the appeal can only be from a final judg-
ment,737 and the criminal court, unlike its civil counterpart,738 has 
absolutely no discretion in permitting or denying an appeal. When 
the defendant is the appellant: "The matter of appeal ... in a criminal 
case is not discretionary in Iowa. He may appeal as a matter of 
right."739 This right of appeal is purely statutory/40 however, and 
certain requisites ordinarily still must be met if the defendant is to 
successfully invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.741 
The trial court does have some discretion in the appellate process742 
when the defendant is alleged to be indigent. In the first instance, this 
discretion is exercised in the court's determination of whether the de-
fendant is in fact indigent. In doing so, "it is proper for the court to 
require a reasonable showing [that the defendant] is unable to em-
ploy counsel."743 As discussed earlier/44 however, there are no statu-
tory rules as to what constitutes indigency for purposes of appointing 
private counsel nor has the supreme court fashioned any guidelines 
other than a listing of general factors for the trial court to consider. 
736 IOWA CODE § 793.1 (1973). 
737 Id. § 793.2; see, e.g., State v. Coughlin, 200 N.W .2d 525, 526 (Iowa 1972); 
State v. Hocker, 178 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1971); State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W .2d 
390, 392 (Iowa 1968). 
Because the supreme court may not increase a criminal penalty set by the sen-
tencing judge, IowA CODE§§ 793.18, .20 (1973), the trial court's authorized exercise 
of its discretion, in setting less than maximum penalites, see text accompanying 
notes 677-98 supra, is nonreviewable at least as to that particular defendant. 
73S See IowA R. CIV. P. 33 (trial court can certify for appeal any action, except 
one involving an interest in real estate, where "the amount in controversy, as 
shown by the pleadings, is less than $1000 . . .") . 
739 Weaver v. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796, 799, 140 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1966). 
740State v. Olsen, 180 Iowa 97, 99, 162 N.W. 781, 782 (1917) (dictum). 
741 See IowA CoDE § 793.4 (1973). 
742 For another aspect of judicial discretion in the appellate process, see IowA 
CODE § 793.10 (1973) (sentencing court has discretion to order that defendant, 
who is unable to give appeal bail, continue to be detained in local custody in-
stead of being taken to the penitentiary "to abide the judgment on the appeal, 
if the defendant desires it.") . 
743Frink v. Bennett, 162 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Iowa 1968) (dictum). 
744 See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra. 
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In Sill v. District Court, 745 the trial court was held to have abused 
its discretion in refusing to appoint appellate counsel for a defendant 
who had appointive counsel at trial. The trial court may have been 
swayed by its reflections that the defendant suffered from no lmown 
infirmities and that he had been seen drinking with some friends, but 
the implication in SilL is that the trial court improperly exercised its 
discretion by considering these factors since they were extraneous to 
the issue of whether the defendant had the financial resources to em-
ploy his own attorney for his appeal. 
An additional opportunity for the exercise of discretion in the case 
of an indigent defendant, the decision whether to order that ·he be 
furnished a free transcript of the trial proceedings for use on appeal,T~a 
was eliminated in 1956 by the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Griffin v. Illinois.141 Applying Griffin, the Iowa Supreme Court 
ruled in Larson v. Bennettu8 that "an indigent is now entitled on 
direct appeal from his Cl)nviction to a transcript sufficient to insure an 
adeqaute appellate review."749 Nevertheless, it is still proper for the 
trial court to require a reasonable showing that the applicant is unable 
to pay for his own transcript.7~0 
As previously menticned, the state may also appeal under Iowa 
law, 761 but, unlike the defendant, not as a matter of right. The su-
preme court's guideline for permitting an appeal by the state, which, 
in any case is limited to questions of law and may not result in a 
reversal or modification of a judgment "so as to increase the punish-
ment,"762 is that the case must involve questions of law whose deter-
mination will be generally beneficial or guide the trial courts in the 
future/63 Even a successful state's appeal, by statute, "in no case 
stays the operation of a judgment in favor of the defendant."754 
m 184 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Iowa 1971). 
746 The statute provides that after perfection of an appeal and a showing of 
indigency, the judge may order a transcript "made at the expense of the county 
where said defendant was tried." IowA CODE § 793.8 (1973). The ordering of 
a free transcript rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Waddle, 
94 Iowa 748, 64 N.W. 276, 277 (1895). For specific abuses of discretion in the 
trial court's refusal to order a free transcript under the particular circumstances 
see Weaver v. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796, 800-02, 140 N.W.2d 178, 180-81 (1966); State 
v. Harris, 151 Iowa 234, 237, 130 N.W. 1082, 1083 (1911). 
747351 u.s. 12, 19-20 (19513). 
748160 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 1268). 
749 Id. at 306. 
1GO See Frink v. Bennett, 1.62 N.W .2d 404, 406 (Iowa 1968) (no absolute right 
to free transcript of the defendant's former trial). See also Britt v. North Caro-
lina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-30 (1971). 
Tut IowA CoDE § 793.1 (1973). 
162[d. § 793.20. 
1aa State v. Kriens, 255 Iowa 1130, 1131, 125 N.W .2d 263, 264 (1963). 
764 IOWA CODE § 793.9 (1978). 
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These general principles notwithstanding, the supreme court can 
reverse an unauthorized judgment of acquittal, one which is deemed 
totally void because not permitted by law, and order entry of lawful 
judgment upon remand. In State v. Deets,155 the trial court sustained 
a postconviction motion in arrest of judgment and then entered a 
judgment of acquittal. The entry of this judgment went beyond the 
limited purpose of an order in arrest of judgment, that is, to place a 
defendant "in the same situation or position as he was before com-
mencement of the prosecution."756 The acquittal in effect transformed 
the order in arrest of judgment into a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, a motion unauthorized in the Iowa criminal 
code.757 Holding that the trial court's entry of a postconviction judg-
ment o£ acquittal was "totally void and of no legal force or effect 
because not permitted by law," the supreme court remanded the case 
for entry of lawful judgment.758 
B. Motion in Arrest of Judgment 
Another postsentencing procedure that provides the trial court with 
an opportunity to exercise its discretion is the motion in arrest of 
judgment. Unlike a motion for a new trial, which must be made 
before judgment/59 a motion in arrest of judgment may be made be-
fore or after judgment.760 As previously discussed, a motion in arrest 
of judgment made before judgment is an application to the court that 
no judgment be rendered upon the verdict or plea of guilty.761 When 
this motion is made after judgment and sentencing, however, it is in 
effect a motion to set aside both the conviction and the sentence.762 
In State v. Hellickson/63 for example, defendant had pleaded guilty 
and been sentenced, but subsequently filed a motion to arrest the 
judgment together with motion for leave o£ court to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
Hellickson's asserted ground for arrest of judgment was that his 
guilty plea had not been entered knowingly and intelligently and was 
therefore void. The trial court, exercising its discretion, in the limited 
vein of reaching an "either-or" type decision from the conflicting 
evidence, determined that the plea was not coerced and denied relief. 
755195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972). 
756 I d. at 123. 
7 57 Id. at 124. 
758 Id. at 125. 
759 IOWA CODE § 787.2 (1973). 
760 I d. § 788.2. 
'761 See text accompanying note 568 supTa. 
762 The order in arrest of judgment cannot be used to acquit the defendant, 
however. See text accompanying notes 581-84 supTa. 
1ss 162 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1968). 
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Affirming, the supreme court defined its own task as being limited to 
determining "whether there is substantial evidence supporting the 
findings and conclusions reached by the trial court. 764 
In most circumstances, however, a trial court's ruling on a motion 
in arrest of judgment made after entry of judgment is not appealable. 
This general rule applies when "the grounds for the [motion] ap-
peared in the record at the time final judgment was entered" and 
the record "could have been reviewed on appeal from the judg-
ment."766 As the quoted statement suggests, the general rule is not 
applicable when the grounds for the motion "are not apparent but 
inhere in the whole record," and thus "would not appear on the record 
had appeal been taken from the judgment imposing sentence."766 
Allowing the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion, however, 
cannot lead to successive appeals. A defendant thus cannot move for 
an arrest of judgment, appeal from a denial thereof, and upon affirm-
ance, seek additional postconviction relief "on the same grounds 
previously asserted."767 
C. Postconviction Relief 
Another method by which the defendant can attack the validity of 
his conviction or sentence is by way of application for postconviction 
relief.708 This remedy, which was established by the Iowa General 
Assembly in 1971, supersedes the writ of habeas corpus in all situa-
tions in which persons have been "convicted of, or sentenced for, a 
public offense."769 Otherwise, this remedy, by statute, "is not a sub-
stitute for nor does it affect any remedy, incident to the proceedings 
in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction,"770 
and it cannot be used to relitigate any issues already adequately 
raised in a previous proceeding. 771 This is an action at law, triable 
to the court in which the challenged conviction or sentence took 
place.772 
The trial court's adjudication on this petition is critical, since ap-
pellate review "is on assigned errors and not de novo."773 Accord-
ingly, the supreme court does not disturb the postconviction judgment 
764 Id. at 394. 
7Gu I d. at 393. 
1oo I d. 
101 Id. 
1os IowA ConE §§ 663A.1-.11 (1973). 
100 I d. § 663A.1. 
11o Id. § 663A.2. 
711 I d. § 663A.8. As to the adequacy of the earlier raising of the issue see 
State v. Masters, 196 N.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Iowa 1972). 
112 State v. Mulqueen, 188 N.W .2d 360, 362 (Iowa 1971). 
773 Benton v. State, 199 N.W .2d 56, 57 (Iowa 1972) • 
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entered in such a proceeding "[i]f the trial court's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence and are justified as a matter of 
law."774 Stated differently, the trial court's "attendant findings are 
binding on [the supreme court] if substantially supported by the 
record, unless induced by an erroneous concept of the law."775 
With respect to indigent defendants, it is not clear whether they 
must be afforded appointive counsel in postconviction relief hearings. 
In State v. Mulqueen,176 the supreme court held that, under the cir-
cumstances, the trial court erred in refusing to appoint counsel for an 
indigent applicant of subnormal intelligence who also had psychiatric 
problems.777 However, the court added: "That is not to be construed, 
however, as meaning an attorney must always be appointed .... "778 
Also, because the authority to provide a free transcript appears to 
stem from the same provision as that which authorizes the appointment 
of counsel,779 it appears that a trial court possesses some discretion in 
determining whether to order a free transcript of the proceeding being 
challenged on postconviction petition by an indigent. 
In Mulqueen, the supreme court pointed out that the existence of 
discretion in deciding whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing 
on a petition for postconviction relief depends upon which of the two 
methods of summary disposition of the hearing question is being 
sought.780 When the court is acting on its own initiative, it can exer-
cise its discretion in determining whether there are sufficient material 
facts at issue to warrant an evidentiary hearing. To properly exercise 
this discretion, the court can dispose of the matter without an eviden-
tiary hearing only when " 'the motion and files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.' " 781 This 
conclusive determination that no material issue of fact exists cannot 
be made, however, when the factual allegations relate "to purported 
occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, 
therefore, cast no real light," unless the circumstances were of a kind 
that the judge " 'could completely resolve by drawing upon his own 
personal knowledge or recollection.' "782 On the other hand, a motion 
for summary disposition by the opposing party, being in reality a 
114 Id. 
ns Parsons v. Brewer, 202 N.W .2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1972). 
776 188 N.W .2d 360 (Iowa 1971). 
777 Id. at 365-66. 
778 I d. at 366. 
779 IowA ConE § 663A.5 (1973). 
1so I d., § 663A.6. 
78 1 188 N.W .2d at 367, quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 
(1962). 
782 Id., quoting 368 U.S. at 495. 
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motion for summary judgment,T83 cannot be granted absent an evi-
dentiary hearing. Thus, in Mulqueen, the supreme court decided that 
the trial court "proceeded erroneously in peremptorily sustaining re-
spondent State's motion to dismiss movant's application."784 
D. Nunc Pro Tunc Orders 
Once the court has pronounced sentence, the defendant is usually 
no longer subject to further execution by that court. However, pro-
ceedings nunc pro tunc can alter this pursuant to a statute which 
allows amendments of the record within 60 days of signature by the 
judge.780 This statutory power has also been enlarged so as to inhere 
in the court independent of the statute.786 Generally, nunc pro tunc 
entries are restricted to corrections of records which may be made to 
conform to the actual pronouncement of a court and can be made 
during or after expiration of term of court.787 Lapse of time will not 
bar exercise of this power,788 although it has been held that a nunc 
pro tunc order correcting a judgment by adding the insertion in the 
record of an original oral pronouncement of a £ne 6 years after exe-
cution and satisfaction of judgment was not permissible.789 This was 
later differentiated from a nunc pro tunc order imposed as conditional 
and contingent commitment for "the mode of enforcing payment of the 
£ne"700 which was permitted. This was based on the reasoning that 
the latter order was a "ministerial" or "clerical" error (recording of 
judgment) and not a "judicial" error (rendition of judgment) .791 In 
the same case, 
the power of the court to amend records of its judgments by correcting 
mistakes must not be confused with the power of the court to modify or 
vacate an existing judgment.792 
It thus can be presumed that after the 60-day statutory limit,T93 de-
fendants are ultimately free from court execution through amendment 
783Jd. at 368. 
184Jd. 
78G IowA CoDE § 602.15 (1973). 
786 See Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Iowa 1970). 
787 State v. Harbour, 240 Iowa 705, 710-11, 37 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1949): 
The correction was sought to make the record entry conform to the actual 
pronouncement of the court • . . . Such proceedings are clearly within 
the inherent power of the court and the existing statutes are merely 
cumulative. 
788 Parenti v. District Court, 198 Iowa 560, 564, 199 N.W. 259, 260-61 (1924). 
789 Smith v. District Court, 132 Iowa 603, 607, 109 N.W. 1085, 1087 (1906). 
1oo State v. Harbour, 240 Iowa 705, 712, 37 N.W .2d 290, 294 (1949). 
1o1 I d., 37 N.W.2d at 294. 
1o2 I d. at 714, 37 N.W .2d at 295. 
1oa IowA CoDE § 602.15 (1973). 
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by nunc pro tunc entries for all but "clerical" errors. In this regard, 
·the trial court's discretionary acts will not be reviewed since the Iowa 
Supreme Court has said it examines records without regard to "tech-
nical errors or defects."794 
E. Imprisonment for Failure to Pay a Fine 
Where the sentence imposed by the trial court includes the require-
ment that the defendant pay a fine, the court must be prepared te 
deal not only with the full panoply of considerations attendant to the 
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, but also with the significant 
body of law that limits the court's discretion to imprison a defendant 
for failure to pay a fine. In this regard, the trial court's actions are 
governed by statutory prescriptions tempered significantly by federal 
constitutional doctrine. 
The statutory prescriptions are the basic starting point, since they 
empower the judge to order a defendant jailed upon default of the 
fine. Iowa's statute, which is permissive rather than obligatory in 
nature, provides: "A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also 
direct that he be imprisoned until the fine is satisfied," and it gives 
the defendant a credit not exceeding 3% dollars for each day he is so 
imprisoned. 795 While this provision generally is made part of the 
original judgment, it need not be, since the Iowa Supreme Court has 
held that it can be added subsequently pursuant both to the Iowa 
Code796 and the court's own inherent powers.797 
Until1971, the states were free to follow their own procedural rules 
in this area: and Iowa took the position that "[t]he making of the 
order for jail commitment, in default of payment of the fine, is discre-
tionary with the court."798 This discretionary approach was sharply 
curtailed, however, by the United States Supreme Court in Tate v. 
Short. 799 In Tate, the Supreme Court declared that imprisonment re-
sulting from an indigent's failure to pay a fine is "unconstitutional 
discrimination"800 under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. That is, the federal constitution 
"prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then auto-
matically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is 
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full."sol 
Leaving the question open until raised in a concrete case, the Su-
794 State v. Herzoff, 200 Iowa 889, 892, 205 N.W. 501, 502 (1925). 
795 IOWA CODE § 789.17 (1973). 
796 Id. § 602.15. 
797Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1970). 
798 State v. Rand, 239 Iowa 551, 555, 32 N.W.2d 79, 81 (1948). 
799 401 u.s. 395, 398-99 (1971). 
8oo Id. at 397-98. 
801 Id. at 398, quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970). 
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preme Court noted, however, that its holding in Tate was not to be 
understood "as precluding 1mprisonment as an enforcement method 
when alternative means are unsuccessful despite the defendant's rea-
sonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means .... "802 
In State v. Snyder, 803 the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted Tate to 
preclude a trial court, which is aware of the defendant's indigency, 
from ordering his imprisonment "solely because he cannot make im-
mediate payment of a fine by reason of mdigency .... "804 In Snyder, 
the trial court was aware of the defendant's indigency since both trial 
and appellate counsel were appointed for him, and thus it was un-
necessary for him to file any motion after pronouncement of sentence 
to inform the court of his indigency. The Iowa Supreme Court, by 
vacating the sentence in Snyder, appears to be implying that the im-
prisonment-by-default provision must be administered in the following 
way: Once the court has pronounced a judgment involving a fine, an 
indigent defendant should inform the trial court of his indigency as a 
basis for modification of the judgment requiring immediate payment 
in one lump sum. If a defendant adequately demonstrates his indi-
gency, then a reasonable alternative plan of payment, for example, 
payments in installments, based upon his ability to pay, should be 
established. The provision in the judgment for default imprisonment 
should then have a qualifying clause to the effect that such imprison-
ment is to take effect only after the defendant fails to satisfy the fine 
under the alternative plan. The terms of this plan could be set forth 
in the judgment itself. 
It must be cautioned that neither the United States nor the Iowa 
Supreme Court has spe·~ificially held that imprisonment can follow a 
defendant's failure to meet reasonable alternatives m satisfaction of 
the fine. However, the United States Supreme Court emphasized in 
Tate that its holding "dl)eS not suggest any constitutional infirmity in 
imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine who refuses 
or neglects to do so."805 In a similar vein, the Iowa Supreme Court 
has upheld the imprisonment of an indigent defendant convicted of 
failing to make court-ordered child support payments. 806 The court 
interpreted the child-support statute807 as making "no invidious dis-
tinction between rich and poor. All who willfully fail to support their 
children are equally subject to its punitive provisions."808 Because 
willfulness is an element of this crime and he had been convicted, it 
so2 I d. at 400-01. 
8oa 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa :L972). 
so4 Id. at 290. 
8oa Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400 (1971). 
soo State v. Hopp, 190 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Iowa 1971). 
801!0WA CODE § 233.1(5) (1973). 
sos190 N.W.2d at 837. 
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followed that the defendant was imprisoned for violation of the statute 
rather than merely because of his financial disability. 
State v. Milliken809 illustrates that a trial court is not only restricted 
in the manner in which it may imprison indigents for failure to pay 
fines, it is even restricted in what it says regarding a defendant's in-
digency during the sentencing colloquy. Noting that his sentencing 
alternatives were either a fine or imprisonment in the penitentiary or 
both, the trial judge in Milliken mused: "There is no jail sentence 
possible in this case, except possibly to coerce payment of a fine." 
Noting that the defendant was a pauper and thus probably could not 
pay a fine, the judge continued: 
I am convinced that he ought to spend some time in prison or in jail and 
the only possibility of that is by sending him to the penitentiary •••• 810 
While reversing the conviction on other grounds, the supreme court 
strongly disapproved the trial court's sentencing remarks. Even i£ 
viewed as nothing more than a colloquial rationalization for the sen-
tence imposed, the remarks were to be "condemned." However, i£ 
the judge's reference to the defendant's indigency was intended as 
"an openly expressed determination that defendant's inability to pay 
a reasonable fine, per se, dictated an institutional commitment," it was 
not only to be "condemned," it was "patently impermissible."811 
F. Probation 
Once the trial court has sentenced a defendant to a term of impris-
onment, it may then order suspension of the execution of that part of 
the judgment and place the defendant on probation.812 Whether it 
grants probation is a matter that lies strictly within the court's judicial 
discretion. That is, a decision to refuse to grant probation (bench 
parole) is not a matter of personal discretion to be made arbitrarily. 
This means, for one thing, that the court must exercise its discretion 
by considering a defendant's application on the merits instead of 
merely denying applications in adherence to a personal policy of not 
granting probation.813 After hearing the evidence on both sides of the 
question, the trial court should then detail its reasons for granting 
or denying probation in each particular case to facilitate effective 
appellate review.814 
Once the trial court has properly exercised its discretion in consider-
ing an application for probation, it may decide not to grant probation, 
809 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973). 
s1o I d. at 598. 
811 Id. 
812 IowA CoDE § 247.20 (1973). This provision is not applicable if the defendant 
has been convicted of treason, murder, or certain drug offenses. Id. 
813State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 1256-59, 11 N.W.2d 407, 411-12 (1943). 
814 State v. Boston, 234 Iowa 1047, 1052-53, 14 N.W.2d 676, 679-80 (1944). 
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and unless the court has acted in an arbitrary manner,81~ a disappointed 
defendant has, as a practical matter, lost his fight. This is because the 
supreme court has consistently held that there is "broad discretion in 
the granting or withholding of bench paroles .... "816 The breadth of 
this discretion is evidenced by the supreme court's observation, in 
State v. Krana, 817 that it was obvious that the trial judge "was fully 
aware of his discretionary power to grant ... a bench parole regardless 
of defendant's two prior convictions" and the fact that, in the absence 
of a convincing showing that the trial court has acted arbitrarily, the 
supreme court has never overturned a trial court's denial of a bench 
parole. 
Iowa's general probation statute requires that probation be granted, 
if at all, "at time of or after sentence is pronounced but before impris-
onment."818 Accordingly, it would appear that once the trial court has 
exercised its rather considerable discretion in making the "either-or" 
decision about granting probation, it has little or no opportunity to 
exercise discretion in any other phase of the probation procedure. This 
initial impression may be somewhat deceptive. To begin with, since 
1971 the trial courts in Iowa have been able to employ a sentencing 
option known as "shock" probation, a device that has been tried suc-
cessfully in several jurisdictions.819 The Iowa "shock" probation pro-
. vision820 allows the court. to "shock" the defendant by sending him to 
jail for a short time before making a decision about probation. How-
ever, the Iowa statute is only applicable in situations where the de-
fendant has been sentem:ed to a county jail or other local detention 
facility.821 
In addition, the trial court also has the opportunity to exercise 
substantial discretion in making decisions about whether to revoke 
probations. Because Iowa's statutes "do not prescribe procedure for 
81G State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 1258, 11 N.W .2d 407, 411 (1943). 
816 State v. Cole, 168 N.W 1d 37, 40 (Iowa 1969). 
811159 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Iov;a 1968). 
818 IOWA CODE § 247.20 (1973). 
81° See Johnson, Recent Developments in the Law of Probation, 53 J. OF CRIM. 
L. & CRll\liNOLOGY 194, 197 (1962). 
820 IowA CODE § 356.47 (1973). 
s21 I d. The Iowa Criminal Code Review Study Committee has proposed ex-
panding this concept to permit delayed probation on parolable. offenses for in-
mates of all correctional institutions. Iowa Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., 
Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, ch. 3, § 203 (1973). However, the Committee 
suggests two additional provisions to better structure the operation of the statute. 
First, the court would have to act, if at all, within a prescribed period of time and, 
secondly, the decision on wh·~ther or not to exercise this option would be "dis-
cretionary with the court." 'I'he court's decision on whether to grant or withhold 
such delayed probation would be "not subject to appeal." Id. 
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revocation hearings,"822 trial courts must look to supreme court deci-
sions for ground rules concerning procedures at a probation revocation 
hearing. The general standard is that probation cannot be revoked 
"arbitrarily, capriciously, or without any information."823 The sub-
stance of a proper revocation proceeding, then, is left essentially to 
the trial court's discretion, provided there is a showing of a sufficient 
factual basis for any revocation order.824' 
In determining whether there is a sufficient factual basis, the su-
preme court has said that the trial court's order revoking probation 
will be upheld where "[s]ubstantial evidence was introduced ..• per-
mitting the trial court to make its finding on the basis of a preponder-
ance of the evidence."825 Further, while the strict rules of evidence 
in criminal trials do not apply in revocation hearings, the facts on 
which the court bases its revocation decision nevertheless "may not 
rest on rumor or surmise."826 Thus, hearsay is admissible, but the 
supreme court has cautioned that, "revocation does not constitute an 
abuse of discretion if the fact of the violation is established by evi-
dence which is competent."821 
What has been said so far about evidentiary rules and hearings may 
be largely inapplicable in a number of cases, for the Iowa Supreme 
Court has traditionally taken the position that no hearing is required 
as long as probation is not revoked "arbitrarily, capriciously, or with-
out any information."828 The United States Supreme Court's prescrip-
tion of minimal due process requirements for parole revocation in 
Morrissey v. Brewer,829 however, strongly suggests that probation rev-
ocations without hearings may no longer be constitutionally permis-
sible. In Morrissey, the Court overturned the Iowa parole revocation 
"no hearing" procedure and held that, under the fourteenth amend-
ment, a parolee is entitled: to written notice of alleged violations; dis-
closure of evidence against him; the opportunity to present witnesses 
and evidence; the right of confrontation, unless the hearing officer 
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; and a written finding 
of facts as to reasons for revoking parole. 830 The Iowa Supreme Court, 
without deciding whether a hearing is required on all parole revoca-
tions, merely noted, in State v. Hughes,831 that the instant issues pre-
822 State v. Hughes, 200 N.W .2d 559, 561 (Iowa 1972). 
B23 Id. at 562. 
824 I d. 
825 Id. at 563. 
826 Id. 
827 Id. (emphasis added). 
828 Cole v. Holliday, 171 N.W .2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1969). 
829 408 u.s. 471 (1972). 
8so Id. at 484-90. 
831 200 N.W .2d 559 (Iowa 1972). 
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sented questions of application of the Morrissey principles to "a hear-
ing which was in fact held."832 Quite clearly, however, the Morrissey 
principles should logically extend to the requiring of a hearing on a 
probation revocation proceeding in a state court. 
G. Reduction of Sentence 
Once the trial court has imposed a valid sentence, it loses jurisdiction 
over the case except for its authority to subsequently revoke probation 
where it has imposed a sentence of imprisonment but suspended its 
execution. This lack of judicial authority to alter sentences is incon-
sequential for inmates of the penitentiary and the reformatories, since 
the state parole board determines an :inmate's actual release date sub-
ject to the maximum time fixed in the court's sentence. However, 
this leaves the county jail inmate with no possibility of early release 
and thus with little incentive to cooperate in any rehabilitative pro-
gram. This void was filled in 1971 with the passage of a statute pro-
viding that a county jail inmate "may, upon the recommendation of 
the sheriff, and at the discretion of the sentencing judge, receive a 
reduction of his sentence of not more than twenty percent."833 The 
court can exercise this discretion, however, only if the inmate has not 
violated any jail regulations or state laws during his incarceration and 
if he has faithfully performed all duties assigned to him in the jail. 
VITI. CoNCLUSION 
It should be apparent: by now that "discretion is not limited to what 
is authorized or what is legal but includes all that is within 'the 
effective limits on the [court's] power."834 In seeking to define "the 
effective limits" of their proper judicial power, trial judges do not have 
to "search for and find some statute or rule prescribing the manner 
of doing every act of theirs in the furtherance of proceedings before 
them."835 
When there is a fixed rule they, of course, must follow it. But even 
then, they sometimes have some latitude in testing the peculiar facts 
of individual cases against this rule, and it is only after the court has 
determined that the facts fit the legal standard that the prescribed 
action must be taken. If the facts were conflicting and the proper 
legal standard was applied, then this ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal. This is because the appellate courts, subject to these two 
aforementioned qualifications, defer to the trial court's advantage of 
personal contact with the case, especially in matters "where the situ-
B32Jd. at 561. 
833 IOWA CODE § ,356.46 (1!373). 
831 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONAF;Y JUSTICE 4 (1971). 
S3G R. BowERs, THE JUDICJAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL CoUllTS § 10, at 14 (1931). 
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ation itself is not easily reproduced in its original character, and [thus] 
cannot safely be reviewed."836 This recognizes the importance of the 
trial court having "felt the 'climate' of the trial"837 and thus having 
had the opportunity "to observe the demeanor and personalities of 
the parties and their witnesses and to feel forces, powers and influ-
ences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record . . . ."838 
Accordingly, the trial court "can know better than an appellate court 
what will and what will not further the cause of justice in the case 
before it."839 
In reality, judicial discretion permeates practically every facet of 
every stage in the criminal trial process. Because the trial court's 
decision more likely than not will be upheld on appeal, except in 
instances o£ the most flagrant abuse, it seems that "in the atmosphere 
of the courtroom the judge is, speaking with some permissible exag-
geration, the center of the universe."840 Yet, "he is not altogether a law 
unto himself, but may be overruled i£ his action is such as to shock the 
universal or the common sense of what is right among his fellows."841 
Judicial discretion thus is properly exercisable "only within the bounds 
of reason and justice in the broader sense"842 and it is abused, and 
subject to reversal of the decision, when "it plainly overpasses these 
bounds."84s 
This Article should have made it apparent that there are abuses of 
discretion, but the abuses appear on balance clearly to constitute the 
exception and not the rule. Because of the merits of individualized 
justice, "elimination of all discretionary power is both impossible and 
undesirable. The sensible goal is development of a proper balance 
between rule and discretion."844 
In conclusion, Judge Cardozo probably best summarized the role 
of the trial judge in these terms: 
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to 
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit 
of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration 
from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, 
to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion in-
formed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and 
subordinated to "the primordial necessity of order in the social life." Wide 
enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.84G 
836 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 78, 58 A. 969, 970 (1904). 
837 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1957). 
838 Grant v. Corbitt, 95 So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1957). 
839 R. BoWERs, THE JUDICIAL DlsCREriON OF TRIAL CoURTS § 18, at 33 (1931). 
s4o Id. § 5, at 9. 
S41Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 77-78, 58 A. 969, 970 (1904). 
842 Id. at 78, 58 A. at 970. 
843 Id., 58 A. at 970. 
844 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 42 (1971). 
845 B. CARDOzo, THE NATURE oF THE JUDICIAL PRoCESs 141 (1921). 

